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Abstract
The issue of w hether the Irish banking system  com pares favourably or m ore 
adversely w ith  other banking systems in the provision of finance to small 
businesses and  in particular enterprises w ith  a riskier profile such as those w ith 
higher volum es of current or intellectual assets to fixed assets has been 
addressed by several authors to date. Foley and Griffith, 1993. Kinsella ,1992 
(Culliton Report). Deloitte and  Touche, 1994. Bannock and  Albach, 1991 
(Germany). Burns and  Clements, 1992 (UK).
Bank specific studies such as the above are com plem ented by studies which 
examine the perform ance of entrepreneurs and w here the issue of banking 
comprises an  ancillary issue rather than m ain focal point. Carpenter, 1993. 
Kinsella, Clarke, Storey, M ulveanny and Coyne, 1994. Cosh and  Hughes, 1994 
(UK). SBRC, 1992 (UK). H ogan, 1995. Kenny, 1994. A ston Business School, 1991. 
(UK)
This survey seeks to contribute to the literature by focusing on  the banking 
aspects of small business financing in an international context, building on the 
bank specific studies as its central th rust while incorporating some findings of 
firm  specific studies w here relevant.
Some practices of G erm an banks were applied as a yardstick against which to 
assess the perform ance of Irish banks vis a vis lending to small businesses. This 
study endeavours to assess the validity of beliefs th a t G erm an banks exercise 
influence on firms th rough  relationship banking, proxy voting rights and 
m em bership on supervisory boards w hich supposedly perm it the conferral of 
advantageous lending term s to business. A ttem pts will be m ade to establish if 
these w idely held views about the superiority of the G erm an banking system 
are valid in a small business context.
Through a series of in-depth  interview s w ith G erm an and Irish bankers who 
deal w ith  small businesses from  across the banking spectrum , additional 
insights em erge on how- the G erm an bankers perceive changes in the Irish 
system, the securing of loans, fallout rates in riskier small business groups and 
the orientation of lending.
A comparative analysis of bank lending to SMEs in  
Germany and Ireland
"The international convergence in the cost o f capita l ...applies in actual fa c t  
only to  big firms. Where sm aller firm s are concerned, the im pact on costs o f the 
particular features o f national financing system s continues to be an im portant 
determining factor in their international competitiveness".
OECD, 1994 N ational Systems for Financing Innovation
Introduction
A com parison betw een the G erm an banks system  of lending to small and 
m edium  sized enterprises and that of the Irish banks is useful for a num ber of 
reasons.
The m ost salient reason reflects the paucity of inform ation w hich describes the 
experiences of banks w ho are involved in lending to sm aller enterprises.
Bannock and  Albach (1991) have conducted a survey w hich describes the 
experiences of the UK vis a vis the G erm an banks w hile Foley and Griffith
(1993) have explored the view  that G erm an banks take equity in  SMEs.
M ost studies how ever, conducted in Ireland or the UK are concerned w ith 
ascertaining w hich firms should  be targeted by industrial policy. Such fast 
grow th studies tend to focus on the perform ance of firm s or the existence of 
financing gaps. UK exam ples include Storey (1994) and  Binks and  Coyne (1983). 
C orresponding studies in  Ireland w hich have a large firm  specific dimension 
include H ogan  (1995), C arpenter (1993) and Kinsella, Clarke, Coyne, 
M ulveanny and Storey (1994).
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Studies which concern the access of small firms to bank finance inter alia 
include the Cham ber of Commerce of Ireland (1994) survey, the recent Forfas 
Innovation Survey (1995) and that of Deloitte and Touche, (1993).
There is a need for balance in the literature since the question as to w hether 
there is a financing gap or w hether Irish banks' are risk adverse cannot be 
satisfactorily answ ered by reference to firm  specific studies alone. Firm  specific 
studies can be supplem ented by studies w hich involve interview ing banks in 
lieu of entrepreneurs or industry  representatives.
Since the UK banking system  is sim ilar to the Irish banking system  (Rybcznski, 
1984); (Frazer and  Vittas, 1982), bank studies such as that of Binks, Ennew  and 
Reed (1988) m ay perm it com parisons to be d raw n betw een Ireland and the UK. 
However, UK internal bank studies are no t equivalent to studies which examine 
the bank based systems of m ainland Europe. Similarly, the study in 1994 by the 
Irish Bankers' Inform ation Service w hich investigates bank lending statistics in 
the US, UK and Ireland using m aterial from  the Small Firms' Associations' 
survey (1989), lacks a European dimension. (IBIS, 1994)
It is necessary to discuss the definition of a small business. This definition has 
been interpreted in num erous ways. The European O bservatory for SMEs 
(Small and M edium  Sized Enterprises) defines SMEs as being firms w ith fewer 
than 500 employees. Such a definition will not be applied in this discussion
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since it does no t deal w ith  smaller enterprises in an  Irish context. The 
G overnm ent Task Force report on  Small Business (1994) defined a small 
business as having less than  50 em ployees and  a tu rnover of less than  £3 
million.
C aution should be exercised in interpreting the G erm an definition of small and 
m edium  sized enterprises. The term  "M ittelstand" the term  categorising small 
and  m edium  sized enterprises in Germ any is m isleading since it does not 
d istinguish betw een industry  and  the professions. A partnersh ip  of accountants 
in  Germ any, for example, is referred to as an  SME. (Kayser and  Ibielski, 1986) A 
m edium -sized enterprise in  a G erm an context can have approxim ately £40 
m illion turnover (100 m illion DM) and em ploy 499 people. The w ord SME in 
the G erm an context is therefore a m isnom er and  m ust be qualified by referring 
to small enterprises since their m edium  sized enterprises equate w ith  large Irish 
enterprises.
The term  "sm all enterprise" can also m ean in certain instances start ups, young, 
innovative businesses, small firms dealing in intellectual (hi-tech) assets or 
small enterprises w ith  low fixed asset to profit ratios. The term  "small 
enterprise" has a m ulti-faceted and flexible application. The m ain criteria used 
to define a small enterprise refer to turnover a n d /o r  the num ber of employees. 
The au thor's  discussions focused on bankers' reactions to small businesses
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engaged in  m anufacturing although bankers m ade occasional reference to the 
services sector by w ay of comparison.
No study  w hich examines banking practices in  Ireland and  Germ any, has yet 
recognised the significance of decentralised banking structures in  Germany. 
These decentralised, autonom ous banks at a local level in  Germ any, examples 
of w hich being savings banks and  cooperative banks are responsible for m ost 
lending to sm aller businesses. Several non-Irish studies testify to their 
im portance. (Kohler, 1995); (Bannock and  Albach, 1991); (Fischer and  Edw ards, 
1993)
The Irish banks have been subjected to a "tooth  extraction"1 process since the 
G overnm ent Task Force Report on Small Business in 1994 to the effect that there 
are now  a num ber of new  loan schemes and  services on offer to small business 
clients.2
There is as yet no evaluation as to how  these recent changes m ade by Irish 
banks com pare w ith  existing bank lending practices elsewhere or w ith  past 
Irish practice. As Foley and Griffith, (1994) express the need for an  appraisal of 
these new  schemes:
1 C om m ents m ade by Mr. D. P. N . Tierney at the Forfas National Innovation C onference, D ecem ber, 
1995.
2 Exam ples being the new  Enterprise Loan Sch em es som e o f  w hich started as early as 1989 and the 
A ccess to Finance S chem e (introduced 1995) as w e ll as loans subsidised by the European Investment 
Bank.
4
"Empirical assessm ent of m any aspects of the b an k / SME interface is hindered 
by insufficient quantitative information. For example, there are no objective 
assessm ents of the role and  perform ance of the single m ost innovative banking 
product in  recent years, the Enterprise Loan Scheme, begun in  1989".3
It is beyond the scope of this survey to rem edy this'inform ation deficit since this 
w ould necessitate com prehensive quantitative research. This survey envisages 
com paring the fallout rate of an Irish bank on its small business portfolio w ith 
th a t of G erm an banks w ho divulged their fallout rates. U nder the auspices of 
certain Irish small business loan schemes, the requirem ents for personal 
guarantees are relaxed. The appraisal by G erm an bankers of the fallout rate 
sustained by an  Irish bank under one such scheme is docum ented.
The survey captures aspects of regional bank policy in  Germ any by taking the 
follow ing approach. Rather than  concentrating solely on  the regional clearing 
offices to savings banks (Landesbanken) or the head offices of m ain banks such 
as the D resdner bank, the interview s w ere also carried ou t at local level in the 
region of Baden W ürttem berg. Baden W ürttem berg, w hich is the second largest 
G erm an state and  is situated in  Southw est Germ any, is referred to in  the 
literature as having a particularly dynam ic small enterprise base because it 
lacks the natural resources and  m ineral deposits typical of area in the Rhineland 
or Ruhr area. (Cooke, M organ and  Price, 1992); (Bannock and Albach, 1991)
3 Foley and Griffith p .31 o f  the Irish Banking R eview . Autumn, 1994,
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It is an  interesting tim e to undertake a com parative survey of this nature since 
Germ any is experiencing its first recession in the period  following the Second 
W orld War. Certain economists em ployed in  G erm any w ith the Institut fu r  
Mittelstandsforschung4 are taking a revised look a t bank lending to small 
enterprises in  the w ake of exacerbated credit conditions and trad ing  difficulties 
encountered by small businesses. In particular, reservations are being expressed 
about the capacity of G erm an banks to continue sustaining high gearing levels. 
(Kaufmann and  Kokalj, 1995)
This study w hich neccessitated interview s on  location in Germany, attem pts to 
supplem ent previous studies by furnishing recent reports and statistics by the 
G erm an guarantee banks and  Institut ju r  Mittelstandsforschung m ade accessible 
through  the au tho r's  know ledge of German.
Also central to the discussion are the responses of G erm an bankers inter alia to 
the loan fallout of an  Irish bank on its loan book and the securitisation of 
lending. In o ther w ords, G erm an banks are asked to com m ent on the threshold 
level tow ards unrecoverable loans exhibited by an Irish bank in lending to 
certain small businesses under the auspices of a sm all enterprise program m e 
w here the cash flow of the small business takes precedence over loan security. 
O ther points investigated are the reactions of G erm an bankers to new  schemes
4 The German equivalent o f  the S m a ll F irm s A ssocia tion  or Irish  B usiness E m ployers C onfereralion .T he  
name literally m eans the “ Institute for Research into SM E s” .
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w hich have been in troduced by Irish bankers in  recent years w hich provide for 
different arrangem ents concerning the use of personal assets as security on 
loans.
This discussion partially addresses the deficiency in  the literature caused by an 
over em phasis on  how  firms perceive banks dr experience difficulties in 
obtaining finance. It takes cognizance of changes m ade by Irish banks in  recent 
years and  tries to evaluate their innovativenss by com paring existing Irish bank 
lending practices w ith  the experiences of their G erm an counterparts.
7
Chapter One 
An examination of the theory that German banks 
are better lenders
1.0 In troduction
This chapter exam ines the basis for claims tha t the G erm an system  of lending to 
small and  m edium  sized firm s is superior than  that of its Irish counterpart. The 
views postulated by various industrial developm ent theorists will be related to 
lending to small enterprises. This is because m uch of the literature is concerned 
w ith  lending in general and  does not cater for lending  specifically to smaller 
enterprises. For this reason, there exist m any erroneous perceptions of the 
G erm an bank based banking system  w hich suggest a greater involvem ent of 
G erm an banks w ith  small corporate borrow ers than  is actually the case.
This chapter exam ines the supposed m erits of the G erm an banking system  and 
attem pts to ascertain if w idely held views that G erm an banks are better lenders 
are valid w ith  respect to G erm an banks' small business clients. This review  of 
perceptions about the G erm an banking system  draw s on the contributions of 
British and G erm an authors w ho have docum ented the role of banks in 
industrial developm ent.
It is useful to exam ine the theory under the following headings.
1.1 The role of banks in  industrial developm ent
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1.2 The G erm an banks' historical and  present day reputation  as lenders to 
smaller enterprises.
1.3 The perceived advantages of the G erm an banking system.
1.4 A description Irish and G erm an banks w hich lend to small businesses.
1.5 Qualifications to the arguem ent that G erm an banks are better lenders.
1.1 The role of banks in industrial development
Smaller, ow ner m anaged enterprises suffer from  the well know n problem  of 
sourcing external finance w ith  difficulty. OECD (1994), Cosh and H ughes (1994) 
and H ughes (1992) The reason for this so called m arket failure or "equity gap" 
em anates from  the fact that outside investors cannot readily evaluate the 
perform ance of a small com pany due to the negative im pact of high fixed 
m onitoring costs and  the problem s relating to m oral hazard. M oral hazard  for 
instance im plies the risk of opportunistic behaviour which can arise w hen a 
certain person or institu tion can m islead its contractual partner thereby creating 
gains for itself. This risk is inherent in  corporate debt m arkets w here firms can 
deceive banks and  ultim ately investors into believing that they are m aking 
satisfactory progress in order to obtain additional debt finance or avoid existing 
loans being recalled.
W riters such as Jenson and  Meckling (1976) and  Diam ond (1984) have referred 
to agency theory as a w ay of explaining the role of financial interm ediaries such 
as banks. They argue that the num ber of depositors who place their funds at the 
disposal of industry  considerably outnum bers corporate borrowers. This
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fragm entation on  the side of depositors does no t perm it any one depositor to 
gather sufficient inform ation on the perform ance of the borrow er. Collectively, 
depositors have a voice and  can exercise influence th rough  their financial 
representative over the m anner in w hich the corporate borrow er uses their 
funds. This representative of depositors' interests could be a bank or other 
financial interm ediary. A bank or agency can convey m ore inform ation through 
"noisy m onitoring about a borrow er than  a single lender, even in  the presence 
of inform ational asym m etries". Yanelle (1989a).
The second m ore general theoretical reason for needing a financial interm ediary 
such as a bank em anates from  the benefits accruing to the lender through 
shared risk. A banks portfolio should  be diversified since it comprises, ideally, 
m any different borrow ers and  borrow er profiles. As a result of this negligible 
exposure of the bank or agency to any one com pany, the probability of a firm  
defaulting is reduced and  by doing so the threat of a liquidity crisis occurring at 
the bank in averted. Gurley and Shaw (1960) exam ine the issue of risk 
portfolios and  come to the conclusion that as an  econom y evolves, there is a 
greater necessity for this sharing of risk through diversified portfolios. They 
ascribe im portance to banks and  financial interm ediaries in  industrial 
developm ent.
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N ow  that the theoretical rationale has been presented as to how  financial 
interm ediaries assist industrial developm ent th rough  m onitoring firms on 
behalf of depositors, the discussion turns to the role of enterprises in industrial 
developm ent.
For countries em barking on  grow th policies, m easures are taken to prom ote the 
grow th of young firm s w ith  export and  em ploym ent potential. It is envisaged 
that w ith  the passage of tim e some of these seedling enterprises will become the 
grow th engines of the fu ture and create exponential em ploym ent. (Employment 
through  Enterprise, 1994)
Just as individual investors can hope to gain from  low er m onitoring costs if a 
bank intercedes on  their behalf, small firm s pose problem s to financial 
interm ediaries due to the small scale of their operations and in the case of small 
incipient firms due to their lack of track record. If a large proportion  of their 
borrow ing is to cover non-tangible goods such as w orking capital or m arketing 
expenditure, the problem s of accessing finance are even m ore difficult. These 
problem s are com pounded by the fact that due to the small scale of their 
operations, they are precluded from  selling securities on the capital markets. 
H olstrom  and Tiróle, 1990. M yers and Majluf, 1984. As the OECD Report 
(1994)1 on innovation states the case;
1 The Financing o f  Innovation, 1994. P .60
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"..the m ajority of SMEs, which have only lim ited access to the securities 
m arkets and  inspire little enthusiasm  am ong the providers of venture capital 
are the ones to suffer as they m ust bear the full b run t of credit rationing".
Stiglitz and  Weiss (1981) in  their frequently cited article elucidate the issue of 
credit rationing. They m aintain that even increm ental interest rates cannot 
continue to com pensate for risk indefinitely. At som e stage credit will be 
w ithheld from  potential borrow ers w hen  the lender perceives the risk as being 
too great. There are therefore imperfections in the loan m arket because beyond 
certain threshold levels, an interest prem ium  com m ensurate w ith  the 
borrow er's risk profile will not defray the risk incurred by the lender ow ing to 
the high variance of the returns.2
Even w hen  credit is not w ithheld, the cost of obtaining a loan for a small 
enterprise can be prohibitive due to a higher interest differential or spread. 
Often, there is a several percentage points difference betw een the cost to larger 
corporations of credit and the cost charged their smaller counterparts. 
According to the same report m entioned above, the cost to the small firm  of 
these increm ental interest rates has not be am eliorated by converging 
international banking standards:
"The international convergence of the cost of capital..applies in actual 
fact only to big firms. W hen smaller firm s are concerned, the im pact on costs of
2 In the event of borrower risk becoming too great yet with the possibility of high returns, debt 
could be converted to equity.
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the particular features of national financing system s continues to be an 
im portant determ ining factor in their international com petitiveness".3
The G overnm ent Task Force Report (1994) pointed to the fact that small 
enterprises in  general have gained in im portance internationally:
"Since the 1970s, the international trend has seen small business become a net 
creator of jobs, w hile large business has been a net'shedder of jobs".4
A part from  smaller enterprises in non-traded sectors the financing of w hom
leads to substitution effects5, there are m any incipient and  developing firms
engaged in industrial activities w hich could create value for the economy
through  the production  of goods in the form  of export or im port substitutes. In
addition to established small enterprises engaged in  the m anufacturing sector,
there are also others w ho have not yet realised their full potential and  w hich
constitute "deserving projects" from  an industrial policy perspective. OECD
Report (1994). The w ay in w hich a banking system  functions has im plications in
particular for this category of fast grow th enterprise, since inadequate financing
of such firms could be detrim ental to the welfare of the country as a whole;
"That is to say, selection by the m arket of innovation projects is not only 
incomplete, since it does no t systematically choose deserving projects in term s 
of social need or grow th, bu t is also partial, since the projects chosen are 
necessarily better than  those rejected"6.
3 OECD. National System s for Financing Innovation, 1991. P. 47
4 G overnm ent Task Force on Sm all B usiness, 1994. P.II
5 It depends on the defination o f  “non traded” . The parameters as to what constitutes non traded are 
shifting and increasingly these enterprises could  be categorised as exports as distribution im proves
6 OECD. National System s for Financing Innovation, 1994. P60
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The issue of m arket im perfections existing in  the provision of finance to small 
enterprises particularly a t the early and  developing stages has its ow n extensive 
literature including Kinsella, Clarke, Storey, M ulveanny and Coyne (1994), 
Siobhan Kenny (1994), Cosh and  H ughes (1994), H ughes (1992), H ughes and 
Storey (1994), Binks and Coyne (1983) and  the Aston Business School (1991).
As can be seen from  the above, the need for finance by small enterprises is a 
well docum ented fact. This discussion is less concerned how ever w ith  fast 
grow th and  finance gaps such as those of the studies as w ith the relationship 
betw een banks and  small enterprises in  an  economy. G erm an banks were 
chosen by w ay of com parison w ith  those in Ireland for several reasons.
Firstly, the G erm an banking system  is acknow ledged to be a "bank based 
system". G ardener and Molyneux, 1990. The Irish banking system  has been 
com pared w ith  that in the UK, C anada or the US. Bannock e t alia (1991). SFA 
(1989).
This tendency to com pare Ireland w ith  the m arket system s of the UK and the 
US could em anate from  the proxim ity of the Irish banking system  to such 
systems rather than the bank based system s witnessed in  Germ any or Japan. 
Rybcznski, 1984. S tanw orth et al., 1992. It is useful to take the route of Foley and 
Griffith, (1992) Bannock and Albach (1991) or UK studies prom pted  by the
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M acmillan Report7 and  look beyond the m arket based system  in order to 
critically evaluate a bank based system  w hich is allegedly m ore 
accom m odating tow ards sm aller enterprises.
Secondly, the G erm an "Economic Miracle" b rought about after the Second 
W orld W ar w as largely ascribed to the burgeoning smaller firms which 
developed into viable, independent entities. Foley and  Griffith refer to the need 
for "post-w ar reconstruction". The part played by the banks in this prom otion 
of SME is w ell charted in  the G erm an literature although opinions differ as to 
the relative im portance of the banks.
Thirdly, bo th  Foley and Griffith (1993) and the Task Force Report on Small 
Business refer to the h igh prioritisation of small enterprises in G erm an public 
policy:
"Ireland is behind, too, in  the place it gives to small business in public policy 
making. The w orld 's strongest economies, the US, Japan and Germ any, have 
long recognised the im portance of encouraging their small businesses side by 
side w ith  their large ones"8.
The following section describes the evolution of the G erm an economy through 
the banks fostering of small industries before some of the opinions concerning 
the perceived advantages of the G erm an system  are discussed.
7 European Institute for SM E Research (3 i)
8 Governm ent Task Force Report on Small B usiness, 1994. P.II
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1.2 The German banks' historical and present day reputation as lenders 
to smaller enterprises
Adjectives used to describe the G erm an banking system  are bank or credit 
based. Stanw orth et. alia (1992) Rybcznsksi (1984) OECD (1994) Frazer and 
Vittas (1982) G ardner and  M olyneux (1990).
Such a system  is characterised by a large inpu t from  the banking com m unity 
w hich manifests itself in high industrial gearing ratios, or "organic ties" 
betw een industry  and the banks or in  the incidence of banks taking equity in 
firms and  influencing firms a t corporate governance level through the 
exercising of proxy voting rights.
Bank based systems are also characterised by less developed equity m arkets 
since the financing needs of industry  are m et to a greater extent by the banks. 
(OECD, 1994)
The characteristics of the G erm an based system  in relation to its British m arket 
based counterpart can be sum m arised by draw ing on the contributions of 
industrial economists. M ayer and  Franks, 1990 on G erm any and the UK. Von 
Thadden, 1990 on Germ any. Table 1.2.1
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Table 1.2.1 National Financing Systems; A sim plified typology
Market based system  
United Kingdom
Credit based system  
Germany
Strongly m ediated Participatory governance
Relatively low  d e b t/ equity Relatively h igh debt equity
Major financing instruments:
comprise retained earnings and  to a 
lesser extent, bonds and  new  equity 
issues
Major financing instruments:
Loans and retained earnings
No of listed companies:
Very large
1.84 per billion of GDP
No. of listed companies:
Small
0.39 per billion of GDP
Type of monitoring:
D ispersed am ong specialised 
institutions
Type of monitoring:
Bank centred and participatory
H ow system copes w ith uncertainty:
Venture capital and  other financial 
instrum ents. Large to medium-scale 
G overnm ent support
H ow system copes with uncertainty:
Banks consortia. Diversification of 
large banks tow ards support of 
SMEs' creation and developm ent. 
Bank-supported entrepreneurship in 
large firms. M edium  scale 
governm ent support
Some critical issues:
Short termism. Problematic financing 
of intangibles, especially hum an 
capital. V enture capital m arket shows 
signs of decline. M ixed record of 
m ergers and  acquisitions as a w ay to 
discipline use of capital especially 
w hen one considers their effect on R 
& D activities.
Some critical issues:
The dom inant corporate governence 
system is w eakened by the tendency 
of large firms to drift away from  bank 
financing and by the turbulances that 
the reunification creates on the labour 
m arket which m akes co­
determ ination m ore difficult. 
Diversification of large banks 
tow ards small firms calls for a 
problematic adaptation of their 
assessment and  m onitoring 
procedures
Source: Mayer C. and I. Alexander, 1990. Von Thadden, 1990
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There is m uch sim ilarity betw een the definitions that apply to the Germ an 
banking system  and descriptions of the Japanese system. (Hoshi, 1989b and c)
The historical evolution of the G erm an system  is well docum ented. Following 
the afterm ath of the Second W orld War, G erm any experienced a decline in 
personal savings needed to finance industry. A t the sam e time, the Allies feared 
that if G erm an industry  w ere no t restored, a repetition of the W eimar Republic 
could precipitate a reoccurrence of the Second W orld W ar.
The policy w as to prom ote sm aller enterprises referred to as the Mittelstand and 
nurtu re  them  into larger viable entities. (Cooke, M organ and  Price, 1992) In 
order to prioritise this objective, the im portance of SMEs was codified into the 
legislation. This legislation w hich was im plem ented at regional level in 
G erm any com m itted the G erm any economy to support SMEs in order to secure 
economic recovery. Kayser and  Ibielski, 1986. A n exam ple of this is the "Law to 
Prom ote Small and M edium  Sized Firms, 1975" introduced into Baden- 
W ürttem berg. Sabel (1991) refers to the dynam ic grow th experienced in the 
Baden W ürttem berg region due to the prom otion of small enterprises. Bannock 
and Albach, (1991). Cooke, M organ and Price (1992) also testify to the 
im portance ascribed the small enterprise sector in this region:
"N ow here is this (need for investm ent in R&D) m ore evident than in 
Baden-W ürttem berg, the first region in Europe to launch a SME oriented 
regional innovation strategy, and, arguably one of the best industrial success 
stories over the last 30 years".9
9 P C ooke, K M organ and A Price. P. 163 The Future o f  the M ittelstand: Collaboration versus 
C om petition in G lobalisation, N etw orking and Small Firm Innovation , 1994 . Dermot O ’Doherty (Ed)
In Germany, the role of the banks in  financing the small and  m edium  sized 
enterprises has been especially im portant since the Second W orld War. 
(Bannock and Albach, 1991) There is a conscious policy to prom ote SMEs in 
order to prevent a re tu rn  of the major cartelisation of large corporations such as 
the chemical com pany BASF. (Fischer and  Edw ards, 1992) These were 
dism antled following the W ar to reduce their dominance. Com petition via start 
ups w as welcom ed and supported  by the G erm an State. The historic and 
cultural reasons for establishing a healthy SME base are cited in the following 
extract w hich explains Chancellor E rhard 's motives:
"C om petition is only possible if there are a sufficient num ber of firms in 
the m arket and  Professor E rhard 's first aim  was to encourage as m any people 
as possible to start up  businesses. N ew  business form ation w as therefore 
facilitated. Restrictions upon  trade w ere abolished and  a strict anti-trust policy 
followed. This m eant ignoring dem ands for policies favouring the large scale 
industries in w hich pre-w as Germ any had  excelled10".
In the industrial economic literature, w riters have seen the im portance of 
Germ an banks predate the policies of the 50's.
Diamond, (1984), in his axioms on m onitoring refers to inform ation 
asymm etries betw een financial interm ediaries and enterprises. Gerschenkron 
(1962) uses the function of banks as m onitors to explain their im portance at the 
inception of the G erm an state. Young firms lacking a track record pose serious 
problems for financiers and  so a bank is in a unique position to m onitor a
10 “Small Firms and the German E conom ic M iracle”, Willibrord Sauer, in Small B usiness Theory and 
Policy, Cyril Levicki (Ed), A cton Society  Trust, 1984
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com pany since it is also in a position to m onitor the firm 's liquidity via its 
deposit account.
Hell wig, (1991) w ho discusses the ideas of G erschenkron expresses the 
im portance of banks in  Germ any during  the early parts  of this century as 
follows:
"W e m ay therefore look a t the imperfect inform ation approach to financial 
interm ediaries as the theoretical basis for G erschenkron's view that banks and 
bank involvem ent (in Germ any) w ere needed to provide outside finance w hen 
capital w as "scarce and  diffuse" and the "d istru st of industrial 
activities.. .considerable" "n .
The risk associated w ith  the financing of young or em erging industrial forms is 
present in m any fast grow th  studies m entioned above. Gerschenkron thought 
that the G erm an banks w ere best equipped to deal w ith  this risk. Gerschenkron 
was of the opinion that banks in Germ any had  by 1962 fulfilled their function 
by filling the vacuum  left by inadequate equity m arkets. As a country evolves 
and  small firms lacking in track record develop, the role of the bank, in his 
opinion declines. Banks in  his view  w ere expedient in providing funds to 
industry  bu t as firms become self sufficient the role of the banks should decline 
in im portance. In fact, Gerschenkron argues that G erm an banks are not as 
im portant now  as they have been in supplying industrial SMEs w ith finance; 
"..at the tu rn  of the century, G erm an industrial com panies became rather less 
dependent on their banks than  they had  been during  the start-up phase".12
11 H ellw ig , 1991 referring to G erschenkron’s (1962 ) appraisal o f  the role o f  German banks
12 G erschenkron, 1962 cited P. 57 M. H ellw ig  in European Financial Integration. A. G iovannini and C. 
M ayer (E ds.)
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This portrayal of the G erm an banks as a useful transitionary tool in prom oting 
industrial developm ent is not shared by the author M ayer (1988). M ayer 
ascribes a m ore lasting role to the Germ an banks in their support of industry. 
He examines the period 1970 -1985 and concludes that banking systems such as 
those in G erm any perm it m ore long term  lending. The presence or otherw ise of 
long term  lending is w hat differentiates one financial system  from  another. This 
presence of long term  lending is facilitated through close, organic ties betw een 
the banks and  industry.
M ayer contends that the G erm an banks continue to be supportive of industry 
through their provision of long term  finance while Gerschenkron insists that 
their role is becom ing obsolete. G erschenkron's views are shared by historians 
Feldenkirchen (1979) Pohl (1983) as well as industrial economists at the tu rn  of 
the century, Jeidels (1905) and  Riesser (1910).
Despite the disagreem ents of industrial economists as to the role of Germ an 
banks in com pensating for risk aversion in the financing of industrial firms w ith 
an inadequate track record, consensus rem ains on one issue; Germ an banks 
provided finance to small businesses at a very crucial stage of industrial 
developm ent in Germ any. W hether inferences can be draw n from  this to 
support present day support by banks in Ireland for SMEs rem ains to be 
investigated.
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Such advocates of the G erm an system  are the industrial economists Cosh, 
H ughes and  Singh (1990). They profess the superiority  of the G erm an system  to 
its British counterpart as follows:
"The financial institutions w ould  need to pool their resources together, set up  
specialised departm ents for prom oting investm ent and  innovations - in  other 
w ords behave like G erm an banks".
A nother British advocate of the Germ an system  is Crafts (1992) in his 
dissertation exam ines the efficiency of the stock m arket in regulating the 
perform ance of m anagers as opposed to the strait jacket im posed on corporate 
borrow ers by bankers w ho are takers of equity or providers of long term  loans;
"There are good reasons to choose the G erm an rather than  the British 
style of capital m arkets. Substantial bank involvem ent in  long term  lending and 
m anagem ent of industrial companies....In practice the effectiveness of Germ an 
banks as m onitors of com pany perform ance (Cable, 1985) and the apparent 
ineffectiveness of the British takeover m echanism  in  elim inating poor 
perform ance and  creating post m erger efficiency gains (Meeks, 1977) m akes the 
G erm an system  unam biguously  superior"13.
The final extract taken from  a report w hich assesses various financial systems to 
support innovation testifies to Germ an bankers being able to influence 
m anagers and accordingly the projects being undertaken  through their 
possession of equity;
"In  continental Europe and Japan, the financial system 's involvem ent in 
corporate m anagem ent is m uch m ore direct and  takes place w ithin the 
fram ew ork of a complex netw ork of bilateral relations betw een firms and 
financial institutions. Large-scale interm ediaries holding substantial blocks of 
shares do not m erely supply  industry  w ith savings, bu t share some of the
13 Fischer and Edwards citing from Crafts, 1992. Banks, Finance and Investm ent in Germany (1994 )  
P. 4
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corporate m anagem ent's prerogatives w ith  regard  to investm ent project 
selection and  m anagem ent".14
Contrasted w ith  this praise of the Germ an banks based system, Irish and  UK 
bank systems are infrequently referred to as being risk adverse or inadequate in 
some respects.
"..This is a country (Ireland) w here the environm ent for banks has 
always been good, w ith  the Irish banks am ongst the m ost successful, that they 
cannot ignore this. I see no reason, and  I believe the shareholders (banks') 
w ould have no objection to m ore help being given to the indigenous sector by 
way of seed capital, since it is the success of the indigenous com panies over the 
next 20 years w hich will guarantee the environm ent w here the banks can 
continue to be to be successful .."15
He continues by exhorting them  to become m ore involved w ith  firms rather 
than consenting to help under outside pressure in  a "tooth  extraction" process.
Are these allegations as to the superiority  of the G erm an banking system 
substantiated by the literature? These perceived advantages of the Germ an 
system  can be exam ined in turn.
The first relates to the taking of equity by G erm an banks in industry. This is 
both a w eak and  an  invalid arguem ent w here it refers to small businesses. It is a 
weak arguem ent since only listed com panies w ith  the legal title of AG are 
perm itted to seek equity on the stock exchange. There are considerably more 
Public Liability Com panies (their British and Irish equ iva len t) in the UK. At the
14 OECD, 1994, P. 77
15 Com m ents made by Mr. Dan Tierney speaking at Forfas N ational Innovation C onference. 08 .12 .1995
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end of 1985 2,135 UK pics w ere listed while 474 w ere listed in Germany. 
Partnerships are a far m ore popular legal form. (Edwards and  Fischer, 1992)
There w ere 401,687 com panies w ith Limited Liability status in 1989 and  of those 
only com panies w ith  in excess of 500 em ployees w ere obliged to have a 
supervisory board according to Fischer and  'E dw ards (1992). Since this 
discussion concerns itself w ith  small businesses w ith  less than  50 employees, it 
follows that it is totally m isguided to say that smaller firm s have profit in terms 
of favourable financing arrangem ents in G erm any due to having banks 
participate on their supervisory boards. The event of a bank m em ber presiding 
or being in  a position to influence the com pany's direction in  a firm  w ith  less 
than 50 em ployees never arises in Germany.
It is im portan t to em phasise the fact that banks do no t take equity in small firms 
in Germ any. Only firm s of the AG (Pic) legal form  are perm itted to issue equity 
if they have a listing. Since there were 2,508 Public Limited Com panies in 
G erm any in  1989 of w hom  486 were listed, it follows that only these 486 of these 
w ith an  average ow ners' capital of £19 million could possibly have been 
granted equity by a bank. Edw ards and  Fischer, (1994). A small business w ith 
less than  50 em ployees is no t in a position to issue such stock. For this reason 
one has to dism iss the idea that banks take equity in small businesses.
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This same fact that G erm an banks do not take equity  in small firms was 
evidenced in  a 1993 Irish survey by Foley and  Griffith w here the Germ an 
Regional Banks (Landesbanken) interview ed took equity only in certain 
circumstances. One stipulation of a Regional Bank in N orthern  Germ any was 
that the firm  be in a position to contribute at least £300,000 of its ow n funds. 
A nother Regional Bank indicated that its provision of equity was to facilitate 
the firm  in a floatation bid. Both these reports suggest that the firms in question 
m ay be SMEs according to the G erm an definition as expressed by Kayser and 
Ibielski (1986) bu t large by Irish standards.16 The other factor w hich reinforces 
the possibility that these w ere no t small businesses concerns the orientation of 
the Regional banks. Regional banks focus their lending efforts on larger, 
established com panies and  no t on young or riskier ventures. Such firms are 
catered for by the savings banks and  cooperative banks as shall be seen at a 
later stage. (See 1.4) Foley and  Griffith conclude that:
"The G erm an banks do not norm ally take equity in an SME as part of 
their financing packages, contrary to some com m ents m ade here in Ireland. The 
banks do hold  a significant proportion of the econom y's share, bu t this refers 
m ore to large firm s".17
The next issue refers to the advisory role of G erm an banks. One could 
reasonably hypothesize that even if bankers have no presence on supervisory 
boards dealing w ith  SMEs, that perhaps being long term  lenders, their 
com m itm ent to the firm  could be nonetheless im portant. If the banks had at 
their disposal technically qualified staff who could readily assess loan
16 Kayser and Ibielski postulated that the German defination o f  an SM E includes firms with up to 500  
em ployees and turnover o f  100 m illion  DM w hich is a large com pany by Irish standards.
17 Foley and Griffith, 1994 in “T he Irish Banking R eview ”, Autumn, 1994. P. 44
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applications on their ability to be commercially viable, this could perm it a loan 
to be extended on the m erits of the loan application rather than solely relying 
on the existing balance sheet assets of the firm. The ability of Irish bankers to 
possess such technological staff capable of ascertaining the potential of, for 
example, a com puter com ponent m anufacturer has been raised in the past. 
(Governm ent Task Force Report, 1994.) A lthough Kinsella, (1995) 
acknow ledged the efforts m ade by financial institutions in  recent years in terms 
of their know ledge base on the financing SMEs, he referred to the difficult task 
w hich could face financial institutions w hen technology has taken quantum  
leaps:
"The kind of com panies that are com ing on-stream  now  are quite different in 
their nature and in their financial needs to traditional companies....I w ould 
m aintain that our financial institutions have not yet caught up  w ith  that18".
The question is w hether G erm an loan officers possess technological 
qualifications w hich w ould pu t them  at an  advantage in accessing loan 
applications of a technical nature.
O pinion differs in the literature as to the presence of technical banking gurus 
w ho could professionally assess an  innovative loan application. There is 
evidence from  the following quotations that Germ an banks were formerly 
perceived to be particularly well inform ed about the loan applications
18
Reply o f  Mr. Ray K insella to question at Forfas Annual C onference on Innovation, Dublin Castle, 
1995
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presented by industrial firms. The view that G erm an bankers are endow ed w ith 
technical qualifications w hich allows them  advise entrepreneurs and  appraise 
loan applications is challenged by m ore current evidence. The first abstract 
from  W illiam Olsson is cited by Hell w ig (1991) and shows the degree of trust 
harboured by G erm an bankers in their clients. It also suggests that there was a 
basis for the supposition that G erm an banks, at least early this century, w ere 
familiar w ith  technology.
"The pioneer w ould  take his proposal to one of the great banks w ith  an 
industrial departm ent, and the proposal w ould im m ediately be p u t before 
experts, scientific and  technical, well know n to the banks and thoroughly 
trusted, w ho, (on the assum ption that the proposed  business w as really good) 
w ould report well on it, and w ould  be believed"19.
However, tw o other m ore recent w riters w ould  dispute Olsson's account. The 
first is Macrae (1966) w ho investigated the supposition that Germ an banks have 
"those fam ous technical and technological departm ents". These transpired  to be 
"m yths". He goes on to say that:
"..even in the biggest banks, they seem  to be m erely bankers w ith some 
know ledge of present trends in particular industries, rather than great 
innovating boffins in their ow n right".
Corbett (1987) w ould agree w ith  M acrae's conclusion, m aintaining that the 
procedure in G erm any for appraising loans is sim ilar to that used in the UK and 
Japan.
19 William O lsson (1 9 1 9 ) cited by H ellw ig  (1991 )
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The final issue as to w hy the G erm an banking system  is perceived by some 
outsiders to be m ore advantageous than the UK banking system  (to which the 
Irish system  is closely allied) refers to the prevalence of long term  lending in 
G erm any. Even if has been established that banks do no t take equity in Germ an 
SMEs, the fact that there could be a greater am ount of long term  lending at 
fixed interest rates w ould be indicative of m ore lenient practices. If, for 
example, a young firm  encountered high initial start up  costs and  exhibited a 
h igh ratio of trade debtors to creditors, a long term  loan a t fixed interest rates 
could dem onstrate a bank 's long term  com m itm ent to the firm.
M ayer (1988), as has been m entioned earlier, underlined  the role of the Germ an 
banks in the provision of long term  finance. Although, it has been proven above 
that G erm an banks do not exert any influence on firm s via supervisory boards 
and so this issue should no t affect the provision or otherw ise of long term  
lending, this caveat does not detract from  M ayer's claim  that close links20 
betw een banks and  industry  is conductive to the provision of long term  finance 
to industry  by G erm an banks.
The claim that G erm an banks are good long term  lenders to SMEs is evidenced 
in recent research. (Burns and W hitehouse, 1995) Figure 1.3.1
20 Referred to in som e industrial econ om ic texts as “organic links
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Figure 1.3.1 Long term loans (over 5 years) as a % of total debt
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In G erm any the proportion of long term  lending as a percentage of total 
lending has increased over the 3 year period  from  31 percent in 1992 to 36 
percent in  1995. In Britain, the percentage has increased from  11 percent to 19 
percent. This represents a percentage change of a 72 percent increase in the UK 
com pared w ith  a 16 percent decrease for Germ any. H ow ever, it still does not 
detract from  the arguem ent tha t there is m ore long term  lending by Germ an 
banks to SMEs.
It is not sufficient to infer the G erm an banks have a long term  view on the 
evidence of long term  lending alone. One m ust look also take the nature of the 
lending into consideration. (Foley and  Griffith, 1993).
"The type of funding  is also significant. M ortgage-type funding is 
obviously very long term  and  one w ould  expect such funding  to be over 10 
years or more. Long term  funding  of this nature w ould  no t be particularly 
innovative or risky in term s of long term  availability of credit".21
Since different countries have different definitions of w hat constitutes "long 
term  lending", it is useful to com pare the percentage of total debt accounted for 
by overdraft finance. (Burns and  W hitehouse, 1995) Figure 1.3.2
Here, it is evident that Britain exhibits a proportion of overdraft finance to 
SMEs of 42 percent in 1995 although this has dim inished from  58 percent in 
1992. Both these percentages are in  stark contrast to a proportion of 17 percent 
of overdraft finance registered by G erm any in  1995. Even though the figure
21 Foley and Griffith, 1994 in “The Irish Banking R ev iew ”. Autumn, P. 45
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Figure 1.3.2 Overdraft as % of total debt
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pertaining to 1995 overdraft finance to SMEs by banks has increased from  14 
percent in  1993, it is still considerably below  the average of 29 percent for 1995.
W hen the proportions of long term  debt are related to the percentage of this 
debt accounted for by relatively riskless overdraft finance, the long term  view 
of the G erm an bankers is evidenced.
As Burns and  W hitehouse (1995) assert:
"British SMEs have the shortest financing horizons in  Europe w hilst Germ an 
SMEs have the longest".
Up to this point, G erm any has been com pared against the UK and Italy in  the 
area of long term  lending. Due to the fact that Ireland is a peripheral economy, 
international com parisons of long term  lending w hich extend to Ireland are less 
prolific than  com parisons w hich feature larger European countries. 
N evertheless, the European Business Survey of SMEs (1994) rectifies this 
imbalance som ew hat by supplying inform ation on long-term  lending which 
includes Ireland. Figure 1.3.3
In the context of the preceding statistics which include the UK, it is not 
suprising that few er UK enterprises have long term  bank loans com pared with 
their G erm an counterparts. The form er am ounts to 24 percent of all enterprises 
exhibiting long term  loans w hile G erm an enterprises exceed this proportion to
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Figure 1.3.3 Companies with long term (exceeding five years) bank loans
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Source: European Business Survey of SMEs, Spring, 1994
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the extent that 42 percent of enterprises have loans above 5 years duration. 
Considerably m ore G erm an enterprises display subsidised loans than  UK firms: 
13 percent vis a vis 3 percent.
The statistics m anifest that a sm aller p roportion  of Irish firms have long term  
loans than  either UK or G erm an firms. In 1994, according to this survey, 16 
percent of Irish enterprises had  long term  loans. A gain only 1 percent of all 
enterprises, at this period had  subsidised loans. This shortage of long term  
lending in Ireland w as indicative of an  aversion on the part of lenders to 
channel funds into higher risk projects:
"There is reluctance to extend advances for periods longer than  5 to 7 years, 
particularly to firm s lacking a sound track-record and thus, by com parison w ith 
other countries, Irish business is d isadvantaged in this respect".22
Since 1994, the period investigated in  the European Business Survey of SMEs
(1994), there have been changes in the am ount of subsidised loans m ade 
available by the banks. W riters such as Foley and  Griffith (1993) have lam ented 
the fact that until now  the im pact of these schemes has not as yet been 
ascertained:
"Conclusive evaluation of the role of the banks is constrained by the 
limited availability of empirical data. Empirical assessm ent of m any aspects of 
the b an k / SME interface is h indered by insufficient quantitative information. 
For example, there are no objective assessm ents of the role and perform ance of 
the single m ost innovative banking product in recent years, the Enterprise Loan 
Scheme, begun in 1989".23
22 •
Section 6.4. Shaping our future: A strategy for enterprise in Ireland in the 21st century. Forfas
23 Foley and Griffith, 1994. P. 31 “ Irish Banks and the D evelopm ent o f  Sm all and M edium Sized  
Enterprises” in The Irish Banking R eview , Autumn 1994.
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One m ay argue that the im pact of the Enterprise Loan should be w itnessed in 
the 1994 statistics. U nder the auspices of this scheme a total of £58 m illion was 
extended in loans to start ups businesses and sm all developing companies 
while the requirem ent for personal guarantees was w aived.
A lthough the Enterprise Loan Schemes should  be registered in the 1994 
statistics, the Access to Finance Scheme is not. This subsidised loan scheme 
envisages a fund  of £208 m illion in  the form  of subsidised loans at a rate of 6.5 
percent to established com panies for 7 years. Since its inception in 1995, already 
£46 m illion had  been d raw n dow n by December, 1996 for these Section 114 
loans. This scheme w as funded  to the extent of 50 percent by the participating 
banks them selves, the rem ainder being taken up  by European Structural Funds 
and  the Exchequer.
Subsidised lending of a m ore general nature is extended to SMEs by Irish banks 
in the guise of funds w hich em anate from  the European Investm ent Bank. Irish 
banks have been at the receiving end of criticism from  small firms 
representative groups for no t draw ing dow n their full allocation.24 (Irish 
Independent, 09. February, 1994).
The 1994 statistics which testify to Irish banks being poor long term  lenders 
predated  m uch of these changes. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the
24 A llegations w ere made by the ISM E that at the end o f  1993 on ly  a proportion o f  the total EIB 
subsidised loans allocated to Ireland w ere drawn down by the banks. This proportion, it w as claimed, 
am ounted to 65 percent o f  the total am ount allocated to Ireland by the EIB.
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disparity betw een long term  loans secured by UK and  the Irish firms, on the 
one hand, and those of G erm an firms on the other indicate that lending in 
Germ any appears to be longer term. This does not im pute that G erm an banks 
are better lenders. In fact, the large proportions of subsidised loans suggests 
that banks are facilitated by government.
That the G erm an banks are designated by the G erm an governm ent an 
im portant role in prom oting SMEs is evident in a repo rt by Bannock and  alia 
(1991). Table 1.3.1
In Bannock's com parison of the UK and the G erm an program m es for 
supporting SME, it em erged that 59.3 percent of the G erm an budget allocated to 
SMEs in 1991 w as adm inistered in the form  of loans, grants and guarantees.
43.3 percent of the total governm ent spending budget in Germ any on SMEs is 
assigned to guarantees and loan subsidies which are adm inistered by guarantee 
banks and  banks w ith  special functions such as the Lastenausgleichsbank25 in 
conjunction w ith  the commercial banks. Bannock concluded that if Germ an 
commercial banks are long term  in their outlook it is as a consequence of the 
considerable proportions of G overnm ent resources w hich are channelled into 
direct financial assistance to firms via the banking system. This policy of 
facilitating the banking system  is diam etrically different to the British laissez 
faire or supply side policies w hereby State funds are directed tow ards the
25 Literally m eans the “ Bank for com pensating for burdens” .
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Table 1.3.1 Support for SMEs by type of programme in 1991 
(Britain and Germany)
£ million Britain % Germany %
Special regional 
assistance
108.5 21.2 167.1 9.1
R & D and technology 10.0 2.0 375.2 20.3
Loans, grants and 
guarantees1
3.8 0.7 1093.4 59.3
Start-up assistance 199.0 39.0 61.7 3.3
Training 110.0 21.5 81.5 4.4
Information and 
consultancy
77.9 15.3 64.7 3.5
Other 1.6 0.3 0.3 -
Total 510.8 100.0 1843.9 100.0
Source: Graham Bannock and Partners, 1991
Table 1.4.1 The Access to Finance Scheme as of 31 December, 1996 
(£40 m illion)2
Irish Bank Quota
(million)
Qualifying
Applications
(million)
Approved
(million)
Drawn
(million)
Bank 1 £79.0 £79.0 £6.633 £13.244
Bank 2 £89.0 £89.0 £22.529 £24.744
Bank 3 £30.0 £30.0 £21.453 £6.092
Bank 4 £10.0 £9.5 £4.424 £1.975
Total £208.0 £207.5 £55.039 £46.055
1 Loan support in Germ any in the form o f  subsidised loans and guarantees amounted to an estimated  
£800  m illion. This corresponds to 43.3%  o f  the total support administered by the German governm ent in 
1991.
2 This A ccess to Finance Schem e provides subsidised loans at 6.5%  over 7 years and is being delivered  
on the basis o f  a partnership betw een the G overnm ent, the EU and the participating banks.
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education and  training of entrepreneurs. It is evident that start up  assistance is 
also a priority  in Britain. A proportion of 39 percent w as assigned to start ups 
com pared w ith  a m ere 3.3 percent in the case of Germany. This data 
underestim ates the considerable funds allocated to start ups in Germ any via the 
O w ners' Equity Assistance Program m e26 w hich is adm inistered under the 
auspices of the Lastenausgleichsbank. A lthough only approxim ately 13 percent 
of guaranteed  loans are allocated to start ups27, guarantee banks represent 
nonetheless another source of funding to start ups w hich data supplied by 
Bannock does no t categorise separately. It is logical to argue that Table 1.3.1 
w hich supplies estim ates by Bannock (1992) underestim ates the contribution of 
finance available for start ups by not isolating out the elem ent of subsidised 
finance w hich is adm inistered via the banks to start ups.
A sum m arised profile of these two schemes supplies inform ation pertaining to 
eligibility, interest rates, duration, the guaranteed am ount, the processing fee 
involved, the adm inistering bank or institution and  the loan security required. 
Table 1.3.4
The reason w hy this inform ation bears relevance to the high percentages of 
G erm an enterprises w ho have long term  loans w itnessed in Figure 1.3.1, is that 
commercial banks extend loans and are joint partners in State guarantees. It 
follows that if 2 percent of the British State budget is assigned to SMEs in the
26 EigenkapitaLhilfeprogramm
27 Annual Report o f  the Baden W ürttemberg Guarantee Bank and Venture Capital Com pany, 1994
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Table 1.3.4 Two G erm an state program m es w hich  assist start ups
Owner's equity 
assistance programme
Guarantee bank 
programme
Description Eligible persons should be 
less than 55 years old and 
possess industrial as well 
as commercial 
qualifications. This 
programme is applicable 
when the owner's capital 
base in insufficient. It is 
imperative that the 
applicant be able to prove 
the viability of the project.
Bank loans and credits 
advanced under the 
auspices of State 
programmes must 
normally be secured. If a 
viable business 
proposition fais due to the 
lack of security, start ups 
can apply for a 
State/Regionally secured 
guarantee administered 
by a guarantee bank. All 
sectors including 
agriculture, fishery and 
the professions are 
eligible.
Interest rate and duration A fixed market rate 
applies for the first 10 
years of the loan after 
which a new fixed rate is 
established.
Special conditions for start 
ups:
A 2 year interest moratoria 
after which a 2% rate 
applies in year 3, a 3% rate 
in year 4 and a 5 % rate in 
year 5. After this market 
rates apply.
In the case of loans 
comprising a mixture of 
working capital and fixed 
capital, the loan duration 
may be a long as 15 years. 
In the case of building 
premises, the duration 
may reach 23 years.
Processing fee A once off fee of 2% the 
loan principle
-
Guarantee premium 0.5% p.a 1% p.a
Maximum amount Approximately £270,000 
or 700,000 DM
Approximately £385,000 
or 1 million DM
Security None 80% covered by guarantee
Method of applying Administered by the 
Ausgleichsbank via every 
German bank
Administered by the 
house bank
Source: Translated from "Wirtschaftliche Förderung in den alten 
Bundesländern". February, 1995
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form of loans, grants and guarantees, that the UK banks are less facilitated than 
the G erm an banks. The policy of the British governm ent m ay be to facilitate 
SMEs th rough  supply  side policies as m entioned earlier. This is evidenced in 
the high proportions of the UK budget allocated to training for and  inform ation 
to SMEs. The point being m ade here is that the absolute am ounts of long term  
lending being advanced by banks in one country cannot perm it inferences to be 
m ade as to how  long term  the view  of these banks are. M ore significantly, these 
am ounts are aggregates com prising the contribution m ade by both  the private 
and public sector. It is only w hen the effects of governm ent are detracted from  
the equation that the true relevance of the figures becomes apparent.
The fact that bank based systems are synonym ous w ith  high industrial gearing 
ratios was introduced above28. It is not suprising therefore, that Germ an 
enterprises had  in 1994, on average 82 percent bank debt as a proportion  of total 
capital em ployed29. This proportion  rose in the case of smaller enterprises to 
betw een 85 and  90 percent in the case of start ups. In one instance, the directors 
of a guarantee bank in Baden W ürttem berg indicated in their 1994 Annual 
Report that some of their clients had  less than  10 percent equity. The fact that a 
Germ an state program m e adm inistered by the Lastenausgleichsbank stipulates 
that every start up have 15 percent ow ners' equity as a prerequisite to obtaining 
the rem ainder in the form of a subsidised guarantee loan perpetuates the high 
gearing levels found in Germany.
28 See Section 1.2
2<) Bundesbank M onthly Report, N ovem ber 1995.
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This long term  subsidised loan Eigenkapitalhilfeprogramm which literally means 
"O w ners' equity assistance program m e", accom m odates ad priori low equity 
levels in start ups. This program m e w hich involves loans of 20 years duration 
largely for capital acquisition purposes has been sum m arised separately .30
The fact that G erm an economists such as K aufm ann and Kokalj (1989) and
(1995) have cast aspersions on the ability of small enterprises w ith high gearing 
levels to rem ain viable through the recession, testifies to their frailty. In the 
w ords of the directors of the S tuttgart guarantee bank which are translated as 
follows:
"Problem s arising out of high gearing levels are onerous interest 
repaym ents w hich accum ulate as debt rises, falling profits from turnover and 
declining m argins prove that small enterprises are becoming increasingly 
vulnerable to crisis. An inadequate capital base in one of the m ost common
causes of insolvency An adequate equity base is absolutely essential w ith
regard to fu ture investm ent, structural changes in our economy and the threat 
of cyclical dow nturns".31
O n the other hand, Irish enterprises exhibit low er gearing ratios. To cite from a 
report on European gearing levels:
"Considering all sectors aggregates, gearing ratios for Belgian, Irish and French 
firms of all sizes appear similar, grouped around  the 40 percent figure".32
30 See 1.3.4
31 G eschäftsberichte der Bürgschaftsbank BW  und der M ittelständische B eteiligungsgesellschaft BW, 
p.46
32 European Observatory for SM Es. First Report.
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Foley and  Griffith (1993), in their com parison of inter alia the proportion of 
ow ner's equity in Ireland and the United Kingdom  w ith  other European 
countries, concluded tha t the low  gearing ratios in Ireland could be 
sym ptom atic of m ore accom m odating lending policies in countries w ith  higher 
gearing ratios or could be indicative of an adequate equity base in  Irish firms.
It is the au thor's  opinion that w here low  gearing ratios are coupled w ith  poor 
access to finance, the form er scenario w hich was presented by Foley and 
Griffith (1993) could be the case. In this instance low gearing w ould be 
indicative of risk aversion on the p art of banks. This could have implications for 
loan applicants w here credit rationing policies w ould be pursued  by the banks.
The fact that G erm an economists such as K aufm ann and Kokalj (1995) have 
expressed their reservations about the h igh levels of gearing in Germany, 
indicates that h igh gearing levels m ay not always be advantageous, particularly 
in recessionary times.
H ave G erm an enterprises gained m aterially from  w hat is perceived to be more 
accom m odating lending policies by G erm an banks? It is evident that Germany 
dem onstrates an  above average rate of start ups com pared w ith  its European 
counterparts. The European Observatory for SMEs (1993) cites a figure of 18.3 
percent for start ups in Germ any in 1989 as a proportion of existing enterprises. 
In Ireland this figure w hich relates only to m anufacturing enterprises is 6.9
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percent. The figures do perm it comparisons to be d raw n  betw een Ireland and 
Germany. How ever, G erm any exhibited higher natality  rates for SMEs in  1989 
than  either Belgium, Denm ark, France, Italy, the N etherlands or the UK whose 
SME natality rate as a p roportion  of the existing stock of enterprises am ounted 
to 12.3 percent, 14.4 percent, 13.3 percent, 6.6 percent, 14.4 percent, and  5.9 
percent respectively.
Perhaps the reunification of Germ any in 1989 in responsible for some of this 
grow th  in  enterprises at a time other European nations were experiencing 
recession. One could also in terpret the low grow th in  Irish enterprises as being 
sector related. Start ups in certain services industries such as a guesthouse m ay 
require less capital and  expertise. Since adequate figures relating to m ortality 
rates are no t furnished on G erm any and Ireland, it is no t possible to establish 
w hether the low  natality rate w itnessed in Irish m anufacturing could have been 
offset by a correspondingly low m ortality rate. D uring the author's 
conversations w ith  bankers w hich will be reported  at a later stage, there were 
repeated accounts by G erm an bankers of unem ployed persons seeking to 
establish them selves in the services sector. Kinsella (1992) referred to this 
phenom enon of people being m otivated by so called "unem ploym ent push" 
factors rather than "em ploym ent pull". Suffice to conclude that figures relating 
to natality rates m ust be p u t in context w ith general economic conditions before 
opinions are ventured  as to w hether banks pursue m ore generous lending 
policies.
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1.4 A descrip tion of Irish  and  G erm an banks w hich lend  to SMEs 
It w ould be difficult to em bark on a com parison of G erm an and  Irish banks' 
lending to smaller enterprises w ithout first describing the raison d ' etre of the 
different types of bank. Ireland has 5 m ain banks and  an  ICC bank as well as 
building societies, all of w hom  cater for smaller enterprises. The ICC bank in 
w hich the M inister for Finance has a 99 percent shareholding, covers 40 percent 
of its operating costs th rough  its Investm ent bank wing. The ICC bank 
adm inisters the £100 m illion Small Business Expansion Loan Scheme and a £30 
m illion 20 year loan scheme. This bank is m ost closely allied to Germ an 
guarantee banks w hich have the State as a m ajority shareholder and  adm inister 
public funds such as that of the E uropean Regional Program m e. Germ an 
guarantee banks also com prise a profit oriented w ing w hich could be com pared 
w ith  the Investm ent bank w ing of the ICC bank w ith  a separate corporate 
identity. The profit oriented bank filiate subsidises the activities of its 
interventionist sister filiate.
In Germany, the range of banking type distinguishes itself from  Ireland in that 
there are 3 categories of banks, all of w hom  have universal bank status and  not 
all of w hom  serve sm aller enterprises equally. In addition  to this are the banks 
w ith  special functions w hich have a State m andate to serve certain m ore 
disadvantaged corporate categories. Such banks are the Lastenausgleichsbank 
and the Bank fur W iederaufbau and the Regional guarantee banks described 
a b o v e ,
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In Ireland, the 3 banks w ith  the largest domestic base are largely instrum ental 
in extending advances to smaller enterprises. The largest bank in  term s of total 
m arket capitalisation serves approxim ately 40 percent of smaller customers.33 
Its allocation under the Access to Finance Scheme am ounted to £79 million 
w hich corresponds to 38 percent of the total am ount adm inistered. Table 1.4.1
The second largest bank in  term s of domestic activities, serves the 
approxim ately the same num ber of smaller enterprises.34 A n estim ate of 40 
percent corresponding to its m arket share comes close to its allocation of funds 
under the Access to Finance Scheme. Its tranche w hich am ounted to £89 million 
corresponds to 43 percent of the total quota. By 31 December, 1996, this bank 
exhibited the highest usage of the fund in providing subsidised finance to 
smaller enterprises.
The th ird  large Irish bank in term s of lending to smaller enterprises, is also 
oriented tow ards larger, blue chip enterprises.
The smallest of the Irish commercial banks to serve smaller enterprises has a 
strong focus on this segm ent w hich was evidenced by its entering into an 
exclusive financing arrangem ent w ith  the m em bers of a small firm 
representative group.
33 M y own estim ates based on the tranche o f  funds it received under the A ccess to Finance Schem e, 1995
34 Estimate of a lending officer with responsibility for Small Business Development at this bank.
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In Germ any, the m ain banks such as the D resdner bank, the Com m erzbank and 
the Deutsche bank focus on larger SMEs.35 Despite the fact that commercial 
banks in Germ any traditionally have focused on larger SMEs in the same 
m anner as regional savings banks (referred to as Landesbanken) have catered 
for SME a t the higher end of the size and turnover range, there is evidence that 
this trend is changing. The OECD report (1994) has described this trend  as a 
"diversification of large banks tow ards small firms". O ther economists such as 
Cooke, M organ and Price (1995) have w itnessed the same phenom enon.
The im portant point to note is that in Germany, sm aller enterprises are served
predom inantly by the local savings banks and cooperative banks. Edw ards and
Fischer (1994) articulate this sam e poin t as follows:
"As far as lending to firm s is concerned, the local savings banks in a 
particular region tend  to concentrate on m aking loans to small firms, while the 
regional giro institutions lend m ore to m edium - and large sized firm s"36.
The regional giro institutions operate as clearing banks at regional level to the 
autonom ous cooperative banks and  savings banks. Savings banks belong to 
their depositors whose interests are protected by the m unicipality or local area. 
The independence of the savings banks and cooperative banks is bounded by 
the interests of their depositors. In the case of the savings banks these 
depositors com prise m em bers of the local com m unity while in the case of 
cooperative banks local industry  finances the bank by depositing funds.
35 According to the German defination of SME this could mean with 250 employees and 100 
million DM (£400,000) turnover
36 Fischer and Edwards, “ Banks, Finance and Investm ent in Germ any”, 1994. P. 105
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The contribution m ade by the local savings banks and  cooperative banks in 
Germ any tow ards financing smaller enterprises is further evident in the 
proportion  of guaranteed loans adm inistered by these banks. Figure 1.4.1.
Rather than  rationing credit in the event of a small business applicant who 
cannot provide sufficient security, G erm an banks have the option of recoursing 
to a guarantee bank. Since 23 percent of all State assistance to SMEs is in  the 
form  of guarantees and  loan subsidies (Bannock and  Albach, 1991), it follows 
that the adm inistration of 71 percent of this assistance by a com bination of 
savings banks and  cooperative banks underpins their role as lenders to riskier, 
small businesses. Cognizance m ust be taken of the fact that all firms in receipt 
of such guarantees are small firms w illing to become established or expand but 
w ho constitute credit risks from  the banks perspective.
It is interesting, that despite the great variety of banking types in Germany, 
some of w hom  have a small enterprise focus, there are m ore bank branches per 
head of the population in Ireland. (Spanish Bankers' Federation, 1994) The 
European average of 3,894 m em bers of population to every bank branch is more 
at variance w ith  a figure in Germ any of 10,790 per branch than the Irish figure 
of 3,564 per branch. It seems likely th a t the scale of operations of G erm an banks 
can perm it bank branches to operate as autonom ous units since they have on 
average 3 times the potential custom er base of Irish banks.
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Source: Guarantee Bank Baden 
Wuerttemburg Annual Report, 1995
Share of German Bank Lending to SMEs
Cooperative Banks 
47%
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The m ost im portant issue is not to confuse the perceived advantages of Germ an 
bank lending in general, w ith  lending to small enterprises. Since Germ an banks 
do not take equity in small enterprises, it follows that if Irish banks are urged to 
participate in secondary securities, or Developm ent Capital M arkets (DCMs), or 
Unlisted Securities such as those described by Forfas (1996) and Kinsella (1995) 
and for higher risk smaller enterprises, that there is no established precedent in 
Germ any for this37. In the event of Irish banks taking equity in smaller 
enterprises th rough such program m es, their participation should not be 
regarded as a catching up  exercise.
Secondly, the perceived advantages of the G erm an banking system  w ith  respect 
to bank representation on supervisory boards applies to a lim ited num ber of all 
G erm an firms and does not apply at all in the case of enterprises w ith  less than 
50 employees.
Thirdly, w ith regard  to long term  lending to sm aller enterprises, it is true that 
G erm an banks are superior to UK banks in this regard. This is particularly true 
w ith  reference to the greater am ount of relatively riskless overdraft finance as a 
proportion of total finance extended by UK banks. There is a need for small 
enterprise specific data relating to Irish overdraft lending as a proportion of all 
lending.
37 A s o f  January 1996, banks and insurance have been permitted to participate in a U nlisted Securities 
Market although it is too early to evaluate the im pact o f  this schem e according to a source at the Institut 
fu e r  M itte lstandsforschung  in Bonn
1.5 Conclusion
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The evidence suggests th a t G erm an banks are m ore long term  in their provision 
of finance to sm aller G erm an enterprises than  Irish banks. Two facts however, 
suggest that G erm an banks are also facilitated by the G erm an governm ent in 
this regard. The first is that a greater p roportion  of G erm an firms are in receipt 
of long term  loans b u t also in  receipt of subsidised loans than  is true of Irish 
enterprises. The fact th a t a considerable proportion  of the G erm an budget 
com prising support m easures for SMEs in  adm inistered in  the form  of 
subsidised loans an d  loan guarantees w hich facilitate long term  lending 
suggests th a t G erm an banks are in receipt of com paratively m ore state support 
in  their lending practices than  is the case in the UK w here m ore em phasis is 
placed on supply  side governm ent m easures such as training for SMEs and 
advice. Since Ireland, sim ilar to the UK has a m arket based rather than bank 
based system  of industrial support m easures, there is reason to believe that the 
situation in  the UK w ith  m ore supply  side m easures and less governm ent 
support via banks is rem iniscent of Irish situation.
The fact th a t sm all businesses in G erm any have a tendency to m anifest high 
gearing is a situation no t regarded w ith  equanim ity by bankers and  economists 
alike as recessionary conditions m ake the redem ption of loans difficult for 
Germ an SMEs. In this regard  the low er gearing ratios exhibited by Irish 
enterprises are m ore prudential.
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Despite the fact th a t G erm an banks have indisputably a longer term  view  w hich 
is reflected in  the longer loan durations and  less em phasis on  overdraft lending, 
the im pact of the bank initiated Access to Finance Scheme introduced in  1995 
has no t yet been registered. There is reason to believe th a t the statistics 
com paring Ireland to G erm any w hich relate to  1994 belie progress m ade by 
Irish banks in  the intervening period betw een 1994'and 1996.
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Chapter 2 
The Problem: is there an Irish lend ing  gap?
Introduction
This chapter seeks to address the issue of w hether there are areas relating to 
bank lending in  Ireland w hich are not sufficiently covered by the literature and 
thence need to be investigated.
Opinions differ as to w hat sort of a lending gap, if any, prevails in  Ireland. 
Secondly, opinions differ am ong entrepreneurs them selves as to w hether this 
lending gap presents a problem. For example, it w ill be show n that empirical 
evidence dem onstrates certain types of small enterprises encounter difficulties 
in obtaining finance. Such firm  specific studies w hich proceed to ask small 
businesses if accessing funds constitutes a problem , m ay discover that a 
shortage of finance is no t first on the list of concerns voiced by such small 
businesses. In other instances, the difficulty is no t judged  by small firms to 
em anate from  shortage of bank finance bu t of other types of funding.
It is im perative to consider the opinions of the entrepreneurs themselves as to 
how  they w ould  prioritise the issue of bank lending w ith  respect to other issues.
There are am biguities in the Irish literature as to the nature this funding should 
take. The existence of a funding gap is also either d ispu ted  or not qualified as 
being specifically a bank finance deficiency rather than one of venture capital.
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2.1 The issue of bank finance
2.2 C redit rationing in certain industrial sectors
2.3 Bank ratings by small firms w hich experience difficulties
2.4 The changing list of small firm  concerns and' how  they com pare w ith  
those of G erm an firms.
2.5 Conclusions.
2.1 The issue of bank finance
The G overnm ent in  1993 in its response to the M oriarty Report articulated the 
view  that:
"It is a m atter of some controversy as to w hether there is indeed an 
increasing shortage in  the supply  of longer term  finance for industrial projects, 
particularly for small and  m edium  firms. While som e assert that there is a 
shortage of finance, others claim th a t the problem  is really one of a dearth  of 
investm ent projects".1
One representative of an  Irish bank interview ed2, claim ed that venture capital 
com panies had  approached the bank seeking clients and  had  lam ented the 
scarcity of projects w hich m erited investm ent. This is the reverse side to the 
argum ent th a t credit is being w ithheld  or rationed by banks or financial 
institutions bu t of course there are other needs for finance apart from  start-up 
equity.
This discussion takes the following format:
1 P.55 E m ploym ent Through Enterprise. The G overnm ent Response to the Moriarty Report.
2 The name o f  the bank is not d isclosed  for purposes o f  confidentiality
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The view  of the Task Force on  Small Business (1994) qualifies this further by 
arguing that there does no t appear to be a shortage of finance b u t ra ther that 
the m ajority of projects being financed are classified as "low  risk". This could be 
borne ou t in the citation above which specifies "industrial projects" as a 
category w arranting  m ost attention. Yet industrial projects in Ireland are in 
receipt of m ore grant aid  than  any other EU m em ber state. (Task Force on Small 
Business, 1994)
Deloitte and  Touche (1993) indicated a shortage of finance for the purposes of 
w orking capital in specific sectors. Their view  if a financing gap refers to 
particular industrial sectors. In  a later report (1995), they qualify this financing 
gap still further:
"In  our view, there are currently no m aterial gaps in the provision of 
finance, long-term  or short to good quality unquoted  companies in Ireland; 
w ith  an  adequate track record and w hich are of such a size as to fall w ithin  the 
am bit of formal venture capital investors".3
The inference in the verdict by Deloitte and Touche (1996) as in the conclusion 
of the M oriarty report cited previously, is that the finance gap, if any, is 
prom pted  by a lack of good quality projects since all good quality projects 
autom atically receive funding.
3 The Scope for Increasing Investm ent Opportunities for Irish Pension Funds in the Econom y o f  Ireland. 
July, 1996. P64.
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The follow ing section examines the case of loan rejection rates and  individual 
industry specific success rates in  obtaining finance to see if the rejections of a 
finance gap in  bank funding  by M oriarty and  Deloitte and  Touche too good 
quality projects is evidenced in  the following reports.
2.2 C red it ra tio n in g  in  certain  industria l sectors.
According to a recent report undertaken  by Forfas (1995), certain small firms in 
advanced sectors exhibited a greater tendency than  firms engaged in  more 
traditional areas, to judge the lack of appropriate sources of finance as a 
significant concern. T able 2.2.1
In this survey w hich categorised businesses operating in  Ireland according to 
size and  country of origin, it em erged that 50 percent of advanced small 
businesses claim ed to experience a finance gap vis v  vis 35 percent of firms 
engaged in  m ore traditional sectors. The interesting po in t is that this question 
does not refer to banks specifically b u t to sources of finance in general. W ithout 
a distinction d raw n  betw een venture capital finance and  bank debt, a 
conclusion cannot be m ade as to the nature of the finance deficiency. The 
outcome is, in other w ords, am biguous. The authors acknowledge however, 
that this survey predated  changes w hich have been effected in  the financial 
sector in the intervening period:
"It should  be noted that the survey data was collected prior to the launch 
of a num ber of recent significant G overnm ent initiatives in the areas of venture
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Table 2.2.1 Lack of appropriate sources of finance
Judged to be significant by 33% of firms
Irish Foreign
Small Large Small Large
Traditional 35% 29% 30% 21%
Advanced 50% 14% 27% 15%
Source: Forfas Innovation Survey, 1995
Table 2.2.4 Percentage of advances sanctioned to firms by banks
Sm all Firms A ssociation 
1989 Survey
%
Loan approved 70%
Of remaining, accepted by firm  on revised term s 7%
Of remaining, rejected by firm  on revised term s 3%
Rejected outright 15%
No final decision 2%
Rejected by firm on revised term s 3%
Source: SFA, 1989
Table 2.2.5 Percentage of advances sanctioned to firms by banks
Bank Internal Survey (1996) %
Loan approved 69
Of remaining, accepted by firm  on revised terms 14
Of remaining, rejected by firm  on revised terms NA
Rejected outright I7i
No final decision NA
Rejected by firm on revised terms NA
Source: U npublished internal bank report
1 O f these 17% declined outright, 89%  w ere subsequently by another lending institution
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capital and  "soft" loans. It w ould be expected that the im proved access to 
sources of finance, w hich these initiatives will provide, should im pact on the 
perceptions of small firms in relation to the availability of finance for 
innovation projects."4
This developm ent is analogous to the results of a survey by Deloitte and 
Touche (1993) w hich investigated, inter alia shortages of w orking capital. 
According to the results of their survey, 43.7 percent of small enterprises from  
the engineering and  electronics sector sought an  increase in w orking capital 
facilities com pared w ith  28 percent from  the services sector5. Table 2.2.2
This com parative difficulty in obtaining w orking capital encountered by the 
engineering and  electronics sector in also evidenced by the fact th a t 57 percent 
of the applicants w ho sought an increase in  their w orking capital facility 
obtained it in  the last tw o years com pared w ith  77 percent from  the services 
sector. In essence, there were m ore applicants for an increased w orking capital 
provision from  the engineering and  electronics sector than from  the m ore 
traditional services sector and also m ore rejections.
W ith regard  to long term  debt, firms from  the engineering and  electronics 
sector once again m anifest a lower success rate in obtaining long term  facilities
4 Com m ents m ade by Mr. John Travers at presentation hosted by Forfas, Dublin Castle. D ecem ber, 1995.
5 For the purposes o f  com parison with the Forfas survey described above, the engineering and electronics 
survey corresponds to the “advanced” sector w h ile  the services sector serves as an exam ple o f  a 
“traditional” sector.
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Table 2.2.2 W orking capital issues by sector
Category Number of firms
Sought increase in last 2 yrs Obtained increase in last 2 
years
Have difficulty operating 
within WC limits
Food and Drink 27.1 79 58.8
Electronics and Engineering 43.7 57 64.3
Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals
29.3 70 58.8
Textiles and Clothing 52.6 65 70
Paper and Packaging 25 75 37.5
Services and Distribution 28 77 55.5
Source: Deloitte and Touche, 1992
Table 2.2.3 Long term finance issues by sector
Category Sought LT facilities Obtained LT facilities
Food and Drink 29 76.1
Engineering and Electronics 34.2 60
Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals
28 57.1
Textiles and Clothing 33 44.4
Paper and Packaging 56.3 77.8
Services and Distribution 63.6 71.4
Source: Deloitte and Touche, 1992
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than firms from  either the services sector or food and  drink  sector. Table 2.2.3 
Both these latter sectors are rem iniscent of m ore traditional industrial activities 
defined by Forfas (1995).
The consensus am ong three of the four Irish banks w ho ventured  an opinion as 
to w hy the engineering and  electronics sector exhibited higher than  average 
rejection rates, w as th a t according to their ow n lending experience there was 
not above average w ithholding of loans to applicants from  the engineering and 
electronics sector.
The fourth  bank representative suggested that according to his experience small 
firms in the electronics and  engineering sector are overly reliant on  large 
distributors w ho exert pressure on their operating profits. This in tu rn  induces 
w orking capital difficulties.
The anecdotal explanations offered by bankers cannot be deem ed as conclusive 
evidence w hich can be used to dem onstrate that credit rationing does not take 
place. It is useful to refer to a survey carried ou t by the SFA (1989) and  internal 
bank statistics cited by one bank representative.
Table 2.2.4 and  T able 2.2.5
These tw o surveys both deliver inform ation w hich relates to the average decline 
rate encountered by firms. According to the SFA Report 70 percent are
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sanctioned on application w hile the bankers' report puts this figure at 69 
percent. The bankers' report cites a percentage of a further 14 percent being 
sanctioned on different term s6 follow ing a revision of the application while the 
SFA puts this percentage a t 10 percent. A m ore recent survey w hich is cited in 
inform ation released by IBIS (1995) cited a success rate of 70 percent am ong 
firms requesting new  banking facilities.7
The two above m entioned reports w hich supply  inform ation pertaining to the 
rejection rates encountered by Irish firms can be related to a survey by Deloitte 
and Touche (1993) m entioned earlier. According to the survey by Deloitte and 
Touche the engineering and  electronics sector exhibits a success rate of 57 
percent for w orking capital loan applications and 60 percent for long term  loan 
facilities. This does no t com pare no t very favourably w ith  an average 
acceptance rate of betw een 83 percent and  77 percent8.
Does the fact that m ore advanced sectors experience a greater likelihood to 
have expansion plans thw arted  by a lack of "appropriate  finance" im ply that 
there is a deficiency of bank debt on  favourable terms? The authors of the 
report by Deloitte and Touche (1993) believe that there is a deficiency:
They proceed to voice their concerns as follows:
"The difficulties experienced by some firms w ith  w orking capital and 
high banking costs is evidence of a need for some form  of intervention by the
6 Presumably less favourable from the firm s’ perspective
7 Market Research Bureau o f  Ireland; survey for the main retail banks, 1995
8 The estim ate o f  77%  w hich relates to the overall sanction rate o f  loans by banks according to the SFA  
report (1 9 8 9 ) takes into account that o f  the 10% accepted after further negotiation with the bank, the firm 
only agrees to proceed with the new  m odified  loan proposal in 7% o f  the cases.
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State to enable these companies w hich are lacking in track record and security, 
bu t which nevertheless are viable profitable grow th oriented operations, to 
access m edium  term  debt finance at a reasonable cost9".
The less desirable com panies from a banking and  perhaps even venture capital 
perspective10 w arran t assistance. This report exonerates the banks and venture 
capital institutions for the deficiency by m aking it clear that it is incum bent on 
public policy m akers and not the private sector to address this issue through 
suitable intervention.
As a corollary to the fact that an industrial sector such as engineering and 
electronics encounters a higher than  average bank rejection rate, it is not 
suprising that a relatively higher proportion  of equity finance in the 
engineering and electronics sector w ould  be earm arked for refinancing 
purposes.
"The Engineering and Electronics sector indicated an  above average equity 
requirem ent for refinancing purposes"11.
This w ould infer that stretched w orking capital facilities could be financed by 
for example overuse of an overdraft. Could this be sym ptom atic of overtrading 
by some of the firms from this industrial category? It is interesting to note that 
the partially G overnm ent/ bank funded  Access to Finance Scheme w ould 
therefore fail to address the issue of an debt financing gap in this sector since
9 P.8, D eloitte and T ouche. R eview  o f  Irish SM Es. 1994
10 The 1995 report by the sam e authors cited in 2 .1 , denies that there is a financing gap for firms with a 
track record either in the area o f  bank capital as w ell as venture capital.
11 D eloitte and T ouche, 1993. P. 35
6 2
one of the eligibility criteria stipulates that the loan no t be used for the purposes 
of refinancing.
There is inadequate evidence to support the view that credit rationing or poor 
loan term s are adversely affecting those firms w hich exhibit high rejection rates. 
The reason for com ing to this conclusion is presented in the following section. It 
can be dem onstrated tha t rap id ly  expanding small firm s in both studies by 
C arpenter (1993) and  Kinsella (1992) w hich are m ost in need of funding to 
financing their expansion, rate their banks better than  stable firms w hich do not 
exhibit such grow th  rates. Irish bankers interview ed by the author believed that 
the statistics presented in  the Deloitte and  Touche (1994) survey represented an 
anomaly. They denied th a t the expanding engineering and electronics sector 
exhibited higher loan rejection rates than  a com paratively "safe" activity such 
as the food sector. In o ther w ords, higher rejection rates as a result of risk 
aversion on the part of bankers in  high technology grow th sectors did not 
accord w ith  the experience of bankers.
It is to be expected that Irish bankers reject the inference m ade by the evidence 
of the Deloitte and  Touche (1994) survey that a new, grow ing sector 
dem onstrated a higher rejection rate on loan applications.
Banks could not supply a breakdow n on the num bers of applicants from  each 
industrial activity along w ith  the corresponding rejection rate. In the absence of
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such inform ation it is no t possible to conclude that som e sectors are m ore liable 
to be financed by banks. It is useful, however, to refer to the two firm  specific 
studies m entioned above by C arpenter (1993) and  Kinsella (1992) w hich 
investigate the attitude different categories of small business have tow ards their 
banks. The rationale behind including these tw o firm  specific studies in the area 
of credit rationing is as follows. Irish bankers described the engineering and 
electronics sector as a grow th sector. If it is a grow th  sector, it is in  need of m ore 
finance to fund its expansion than  firms from  a stable, "safe" sector. It follows 
that if fast grow th  firms dem onstrate a positive attitude tow ards their banks, it 
is unlikely that they have experienced above average rejection rates by banks on 
loan applications.
2.3 Bank ratings by firms which experience difficulties
It is interesting to com pare ratings of the perform ance of Irish banks by small 
firms from  diverse sectors. In order to do so, this discussion draw s on surveys 
by Kinsella (1992) and  C arpenter (1993)
Table 2.3.1
According to Kinsella, fast grow th firms found their banks to be m arginally 
more helpful than  their m atch counterparts. O n an  average scale of helpfulness, 
banks were assigned a value of 3.5 for the form er com pared w ith  a value of 3 
for the latter.
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Table 2.3.1 H ow small growing firms rate their banks.
Fast Growth
Kinsella, 1992 Scale of helpfulness 3.5
Carpenter, 1993 I have a close 
relationship w ith 
m y bank
M y bank m anager 
does a good job
Sources: Kinsella, 1992; Carpenter, 1993.
Scales:
Kinsella:
1- not helpful 5- very helpful
Carpenter
1-strongly disagree 5- strongly agree
Match
3.0
Mean of companies 
who had employed 
more people in the 
last 12 months
Mean of companies 
who had not 
employed more 
people in the last 
12 months
3.74 3.11
3.82 3.15
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In a survey of SMEs by Carpenter (1993) small firm s were categorised into 
different classifications depending on several different indicators. These 
indicators com prised projected em ploym ent grow th, historical em ploym ent 
grow th or the selection of the com pany onto the Business Developm ent Scheme 
under the auspices of the IDA., C arpenter (1993) sought to examine inter alia 
the issue of a financing gap.
In C arpenter's study, a higher proportion of firm s w ho anticipated em ploying 
m ore w orkers in the following year, perceived finance to be a major obstacle to 
growth. This w ould  correlate w ith the findings of the Forfas report and the 
outcome of the Deloitte and  Touche report described above12.
C arpenter how ever, d id  no t sectorise according to the area of industrial activity 
b u t divided her sam ple along the param eters of those w ho proposed to increase 
their workforce w ithin  the next 12 m onths and  those w ho had not envisaged 
such changes. She had  decided on using this criteria following the discovery 
that by distinguishing betw een firm s participating in the IDA's Business 
Developm ent Program m e and m atch firms from  the Kompass Directory, one 
could not obtain significant differences in responses to the question,"W hat do 
you consider the m ost significant constraint to expansion"? However, the 
interesting point is that w hen  the sample was divided betw een those firms 
intending to expand em ploym ent num bers in the com ing year and  those not, 53
12 See Section 2.2
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percent of the form er perceived the shortage of finance to present difficulties in 
com parison to 47 percent of the latter.
An interesting point to em erge from  C arpenter's survey and  w hich bears 
relevance to this discussion as to how  firms rate the perform ance of their banks, 
w as that firm s w ho anticipated increasing their em ploym ent levels w ithin  the 
next 12 m onths w ere m ore enthusiastic about their banks than other firms. This 
is despite that fact that these firms anticipated difficulties ahead  in obtaining 
finance. This is suprising, since one w ould imagine that firms w ho anticipated 
difficulties ahead in obtaining finance w ould find their banks culpable or rate 
them  m ore negatively than  others. However, this phenom enon w as not 
evidenced in  C arpenter's survey.
"In this study, no significant differences w ere found betw een sm all businesses 
who had  hired  m ore em ployees in the last year and those who h ad  not, in  so far 
as they perceived individual aspects of the service they received from  their 
bank. They still, however, tended to score m ore positively statem ents which 
gave approval to their bank's overall perform ance"13.
It has been seen above in the survey by Deloitte and  Touche (1993), that the 
engineering and electronics sector exhibited higher rejection rates for their loan 
applications than firms from  the food and drink or services and  distribution 
sectors14.
13 P. 59, Foley and Griffith, 1993
14 S ee  T a b les  2 .2 .2  a n d  2 .2 .3
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It w ould  be expected, therefore, that such firms encountering above average 
rejection rates on their loan applications w ould  be sufficiently p iqued to 
m ention access to finance as a salient concern. O n the contrary, firms from  the 
engineering and  electronics sector displayed less concern w ith  the access to 
w orking capital than firm s from  the services and  distribution or food and  drink 
sector. Table 2.3.2
Engineering and  electronics assigned the concern a value of 4.7 com pared w ith  
a value of 5.0 assigned this concern by the services and  distribution category. 
Firms from  the food and  d rink  category gave even m ore precedence to this 
concern by denoting it by a value of 5.2. This tendency repeats itself w ith 
respect to the issue of long term  lending. As seen previously, SMEs from  the 
engineering and  electronics sector dem onstrated a lower success rate in 
obtaining a long term  loan than  firms in the food and  drink or services and 
distribution sector15.
It w ould therefore be expected that firms in this advanced sector w ould 
designate the access to long term  lending as a m ore significant concern than 
either of the other tw o industrial categories. This is not the case. Firms from  the 
engineering and  electronics sector denoted this concern w ith  a value of 4.5. This 
corresponds to their least significant concern. Both services and distribution
15 See Table 2.3.3
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Table 2.3.2 Concerns Irish SMEs have with their banks
Please rank  the greatest d ifficulties you currently  have w ith  your ban k in g  arrangem ents
Food & Drink
banks
know
business
margins interest 
rates 
too high
lack of WC 
facilities
lack of 
flexible WC
bank
charges & 
costs
lack of LT 
loan
guarantee
4.4 6.9 7.3 5.2 5.5 6.4 4.8 5.4
Electronics & 
Engineering
4.9 6.6 7.3 4.7 4.7 6.0 4.5 4.8
Chemicals & 
Pharmaceuticals
4.0 6.6 6.9 4.9 5.0 6.3 4.2 5.7
Textiles & Clothing 6.0 7.7 8.1 5.7 6.2 7.2 5.9 6.8
Printing & Packaging 4.5 7.2 7.2 4.3 3.8 6.6 3.9 5.4
Services & 
Distribution
3.6 7.3 5.8 5.0 4.3 7.4 4.7 3.0
Source: Deloitte and Touche, 1993
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and food and  drink assigned this concern m arginally m ore im portance by 
assigning it values of 4.8 and  4.8 respectively.
2.4 The changing list o f sm all firm  concerns and  how  they  com pare w ith  
those of G erm an firm s
A nother related issue w hich should be m entioned concerns the prioritisation of
concerns firm s encounter have w ith  their bank. It is evident th a t the issue of
bank security has ceased to be an im portant a concern as form erly has been the
case.
This trend  can be observed by taking two studies w hich investigated the 
securitisation of loans in ter alia. According to the SFA report (1989) w hich is 
cited in  Foley and Griffith (1993), the am ount of collateral w hich firms had  to 
subm it as security qualified as being the second m ost u rgen t concern behind 
that of bank fees and service charges. Table 2.4.1
The taking of security w as categorised by 22 percent of all firms in the 1989 
report as being m ost im portant. 34 percent of respondents elected the issue of 
fees and  service charges as being m ost deserving of attention. In other w ords, 
the taking of security is designated as being overall the second m ost significant 
concern. Interest rates occupy th ird  place, being voted by 18 percent of the 
respondents as being m ost urgently  in need of review.
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Table 2.4.1 M ost important concerns w ith the banks
Small business study Bank margins too 
high
High interest rates Bank charges/costs Guarantees
Small Firms' 
Association, 1989
NA 18% of respondants 
rank  3
34% of respondants 
r a n k l
22% of respondants 
rank  2
Deloitte and 
Touche, 1993
Less than 10 
employees
7.7 w eighting 
rank  1
7.4 w eighting 
rank 2
6.5 weighting 
rank  4
6.8 weighting 
rank 3
Between 10 and  50 
employees
7.1 w eighting 
rank  2
7.5 weighting 
rankl
7.0 weighting 
rank  3
5.9 weighting 
rank 4
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Com paring the SFA (1989) survey w ith  that conducted by Deloitte and  Touche
(1993) 4 years later, the order of priorities m ost in  need of attention have 
changed. T able 2.4.1 In this instance, the issue of guarantees has been relegated 
to th ird  place behind that of bank m argins and  interest rates. In the case of firms 
w ith  betw een 11 and 50 employees, the issue of guarantees is dem oted even 
further to fourth  place by being placed behind that of bank charges. Deloitte 
and Touche (1993) disaggregate firms w ith  less than  50 em ployees into those 
w ith less than  10 and  those w ith  less than 50 employees. The issue of bank 
m argins is voted as the m ost im portant concern w ith  a value of 7.7 by the 
smaller subgroup and  as the second m ost im portant concern w ith  a value of 7.1 
by the larger subgroup. Similarly, there is no consensus am ong the subgroups 
as to the significance of interest rates as a concern. A lthough the smaller 
subgroup assigns interest rates a value of 7.4, their larger counterparts prioritise 
them  as being a less im portan t concern than bank m argins by assigning them  a 
value of 7.5. The concerns of the "11-50 employees" subgroup and  those of the 
"less than  10 employees" subgroup do not always display unanim ity as can be 
seen from  the responses. There is no am biguity how ever about the dim inishing 
in the im portance of collateral as a concern over the 4 year period since the SFA 
(1989) repo rt and  the survey by Deloitte and Touche in  1993.
For the purposes of com parison w ith  small businesses in Germany, the concerns 
of G erm an small enterprises as investigated by Clem ents and Burns (1992) are 
tabulated alongside those of their Irish counterparts. Unfortunately, the Irish
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and G erm an surveys do no t in every case use the sam e question format. It 
follows that the responses of the small businesses in Germ any are not 
synchronised w ith  those of the Irish survey. Table 2.4.2
The interesting observation to be m ade here is that the top two concerns w ith 
Irish small businesses, that of interest rates being h igh  and  the high cost of 
banking are either of little relevance in the case of the form er or of dim inished 
relevance in the case of the latter w ith  respect to the area of lending to small 
businesses.
The claim  about interest rates being too high is a macroeconomic issue or
exogenous variable w hich is beyond the rem it of the Irish banks. To cite from
the IBIS Fact File (1995);
"In  the final analysis, the in terest rates bank m ust pay to attract funds 
from  both  the wholesale m arket and  retail custom ers are determ ined by forces 
outside their control - principally the interaction of supply  and dem and in the 
m oney m arkets".
The issue of h igh charges, as will be show n in the following chapter, has w aned 
as a concern. A recent SFA Report (1995) conceded th a t a basket of banking 
services cost on average 25 percent less in the Republic of Ireland than in 
N orthern  Ireland and  137 percent less than in the UK.
This leaves the issue of governm ent intervention in the form  of guarantees and 
high bank m argins as the rem aining m ost im portant issues. There is evidence
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Table 2.4.2 Criteria German bankers use to access loan applications 
according to small businesses
Indicator
Ranking in order of import 
Average
ance 
Owner managed
Value of the overall 
assets
1 1
Long term health of 
business
2 4
Interest cover 3 3
Personal guarantees 4 2
Charges on personal 
assets
5 5
Source: Clements, 1992
Table 2.4.3 Bank satisfaction ratings of Irish and German SMEs
Irish SMEs German SMEs
Relationship w ith bank All: All:
59.4% very good 90% excellent or good of 
which 29% excellent
Less than 10 employees: Owner managed:
54% very good 92% excellent or good of 
xohich 38% excellent
Source: Irish Statistics from D eloitte and Touche (1993)
German Statistics from Clements (1992)
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from  interview s w ith  the Irish banks that credit assessm ent has undergone 
changes w hich will allow the pricing of loans to be m ore contingent on 
objective criteria. This area of pricing will become in the future m ore obscure as 
loans will be tailored according to individual circumstances. As Mr. Thomas 
M ulcahy of the AIB stated in 1995:
"O urselves and  other banks have p u t a lot of investm ent into credit grading 
systems. We are beginning to get better quality grading"16.
A positive resu lt of this policy change on the part of Irish banks could be a 
greater percentage of m ore riskier loans constituting m arginal cases being 
accorded better lending terms. If this w ere the case, the high ranking value 
assigned to this concern could be reduced. The reverse side to this argum ent 
w ould be that banks will perhaps no t continue to defray the risk in  lending to 
small businesses via a h igher m argin bu t rather th a t overall lending terms 
including a heightened dem and for business assets as securities w ould 
deteriorate.
Kinsella (1992) suspected th a t the new  credit grading systems w ould lead to 
m ore cautious lending on the p art of the banks w hich in view  of the m ore 
liberal lending policies of the early eighties;
16 Financial T im es, 23 February, 1995
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"The new  effect is that banks, operating new  credit assessm ent systems and 
w ith  refocussed priorities are alm ost certainly m ore cautious in  their approach 
to lending"17.
Collateral does no t feature highly as a concern either in Ireland or Germ any 
according to small business owners. ( Clements and Burns, 1992) (Deloitte and 
Touche, 1993) T able 2.4.1 an d  Table 2.4.2
In Ireland, as has been already witnessed, it ranks behind interest rates and 
charges w hilst G erm an entrepreneurs w hen asked w hich issues rank highest 
w ith  bankers w hen  extending a loan, personal guarantees and charges secured 
against personal assets come in fourth  and fifth place respectively. However, 
Clements, in the same survey of small businesses in G erm any does indicate that 
collateral ranked in  second place for ow ner m anaged companies. This w ould 
suggest th a t sm aller businesses in  Germ any are subject to m ore onerous 
collateral term s th an  their larger counterparts.
The survey by Clem ents asked firms to prioritise the criteria looked for by a 
G erm an bank in  assessing a loan application. Therefore, it can only be used as a 
proxy for a list of small business concerns. C lem ent's survey of small businesses 
in  Germ any, unlike the survey by Deloitte and Touche does no t investigate the 
concerns of small businesses. It does dem onstrate, how ever that owner
17 K insella, 1992. The m edium  term developm ent o f  indigenous industry: the role o f  the financial sector.
P. 18
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m anaged businesses in Germ any perceive the supplying of guarantees to be a 
m ore necessary prerequisite to having a loan sanctioned by the bank than  other 
forms of business. Banks are therefore m ore cautious in lending to owner 
m anaged businesses in Germ any since the procedure used is m ore transactions 
based than  cash flow based.
H ow  do the satisfaction ratings of Irish firms com pare w ith the experience of 
G erm an SMEs? Unfortunately, as in the case of m any attitudinal surveys, the 
param eters used are no t the same and caution m ust be exercised in interpreting 
such qualitative data. The responses of the Irish and  G erm an firm s can be 
depicted in the following table. Table 2.4.3
It is difficult to m ake m eaningful com parisons betw een the perceptions of Irish 
and Germ an banks by small businesses in  their respective countries. This is 
because "excellent", "very good" and  "good" are subjective judgem ents. Also it 
is not possible to conclude that if a m ajority of firms in Germ any describe the 
relationship they have w ith  their bank as "good" or "excellent" that this is a 
m ore positive response than a smaller majority of Irish banks categorising their 
banking relationship as "very good". The com parability problem  lies in the 
different adjectival indicators used in each study to describe the relationship 
between the small business and it's bank.
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It follows that one cannot infer from  the fact that if 90 percent of all SMEs 
regard their relationship as "excellent" or "good" that this is m ore enthusiastic 
than 54.4 percent of Irish firm s judging  their banks to be "very good". The 
frequency of the "good" responses registered by G erm an firm s in the study by 
Clem ents and  Burns (1992) could outw eigh the "excellent" responses. The net 
effect w ould  be to bring the evaluation of G erm an small businesses of their 
banking relationship closer to th a t of the Irish small businesses. Q ualitative 
inform ation such as this should serve as an  indicator only. (Taylor and Bogdan, 
1984)
W hat is interesting is that ow ner m anaged firms are m ore euphoric about their 
banks th an  non  - ow ner m anaged firms w hich perhaps reflects aspects of the 
unique house bank relations prevailing in G erm any w hich extends also to 
micro enterprises.
2.5 Conclusions
The m ost interesting conclusion is th a t the fast grow th firms w hich are reputed  
to have m ost difficulty in accessing funds for expansion purposes are not 
show n in  attitudinal surveys to perceive this shortage as em anating from  the 
banking system. This phenom enon is evidenced in their above average ratings 
of their bank 's performance.
78
Despite the fact that credit rationing appeared to prevail in  a situation 
involving firms from  the electronics and engineering sector, this d id  not register 
as a salient concern w ith  the firms.
This evidence leads the au thor to believe th a t bank rationing is not prevalent 
and  w here it is exercised, the firm s' affected d en y  it is a problem  because they 
have or anticipate alternative sources of finance.
The other major inference w hich can be m ade on the basis of the evidence 
presented in  this chapter, is that some concerns such as the securitisation of 
loans have cased to p rom pt the same anxiety am ong smaller enterprises. The 
precedence given this concern has changed and  now  bank m argins rem ain the 
priority. This change in  small firm  priorities is evidenced in the SBA (1995) 
report w hereby h igh  bank charges are perceived as the saliant concern.18
It is true that small businesses pose present higher risks for banks. As Deloitte
and Touche express the issue:
"From  a bank lending perspective, lending to SME's is fraught w ith 
difficulty... W hile banks in the past m ay have inadvertently lent m oney on a 
basis w hich left it carrying, effectively, an equity risk, it is clearly no t a bank's 
function, in its capacity as a lender, to act as an  equity risk taker in  a project"19.
18 This is in spite of the fact that bank charges in Ireland are on average lower than charges 
incurred by firms in the UK on a similiar basket of services. SBA (1995)
19 P. 110, D eloitte and T ouche, 1992. R eview  o f  Irish SMEs.
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The solution therefore w ould be in some form  of governm ent intervention 
w hich w ould  facilitate the banks in their task of lending to the small business 
sector, perhaps in the form  of guarantees.
This solution is proposed by the President of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in  Ireland (ICAI) on the presentation of their 1995 survey of small 
firms:
"W e recom m end that some of the funds currently allocated by 
G overnm ent to capital grants w ould be better em ployed in providing some 
form  of low  interest subsidies coupled w ith  partial guarantees for long term  
borrow ings"20.
It m ust be nevertheless acknow ledged that banks have a role to play in 
m atching m edium  term  loan applications w ith  m edium  term  loans. In other 
w ords banks should be lending on  term s conm easurate w ith  the tim e period 
and  business risks rather than  try ing to revolve claims to the corporate sector in 
as short a tim e period as possible. The introduction of new  credit grading 
systems m ight facilitate this developm ent.
20 C om m ents m ade by Mr. Joe Gannon on the presentation o f  a survey by the Institute o f  Chartered 
A ccountants in Ireland entitled “Encouraging and supporting sm all business start ups” . 09. March, 1995
Chapter 3
Gaps in the existing research   __ _______
3.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter much inform ation w hich relates to the funding by 
banks of small businesses in  Ireland and G erm any w as presented. W hy is there 
a need to examine this already well docum ented issue? There are a num ber of 
reasons.
Since the release of the G overnm ent Task Force on Small Business (1994), there 
has been no appraisal of Irish bank lending to small enterprises in an 
international context. No cognisance has yet been taken of recent developm ents 
such com m ittm ents by the banks to refrain from  taking a charge on an 
entrepreneur's  residence as security on a loan. Discussions w ith  Germ an and 
Irish bankers will seek to address this know ledge gap.
C om paring tw o bank system s is hazardous in the case of Ireland vis a vis 
Germ any due to the fact that m ost literature on this subject deals w ith  Germ an 
bank lending from  a British perspective or vice versa. Ireland, being a relatively 
smaller player in a E uropean context, has no t prom pted  any external research 
to date in the m anner in  w hich the higher profile British equity based banking 
system  has been the subject of research.
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These deficiencies in the literature will be addressed under the following 
headings;
3.1 The secondary literature and its relevance to curren t bank lending 
practices
3.2 The need for a bank based survey.
3.3 Lack of com parisons in  the literature betw een peripheral and  larger 
banking systems.
3.4 Conclusions
3.1 The secondary literature and its relevance to current bank lending  
practices
As already m entioned in the pream ble to this discussion, there is a time factor 
w hich m ust be taken into consideration w hen  using  inform ation sources 
relating to a previous tim e period.
The traditional view  of G erm an banks being accom m odating tow ards small 
firms has also been subject to review  in the literature. This reappraisal of the 
"w idely held view" as to G erm an banks being better lenders is contained in a 
textbook type analysis of the G erm an banks system  undertaken  by Klaus 
Fischer and  Jeremy Edw ards, 1992 of Cam bridge University. They exam ined 
the close ties betw een industry  and banks in order to ascertain if there were any 
substance in the belief that these ties m ade it possible for banks to place m ore 
trust in  their small firm clients and thence enable long term  lending. Clements
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and Bum s (1992) in a critique of the above survey, expressed the following 
opinion:
"Recent research by Jeremy Edw ards and Klaus Fischer challenges the 
conventional w isdom  th a t G erm an banks are m ore generous in their lending, 
m ore loyal and  m ore involved w ith  their business custom ers than  UK banks, 
and  suggests that the partnership  is m ore loosely defined than is commonly 
supposed"1.
Clements and Burns (1992) proceeded to establish how  m uch form al contact 
G erm an firms have w ith  their banks. He revealed that 92 percent of ow ner 
m anaged firms in G erm any did  not regularly send a copy of their annual 
accounts to the bank. If one assumes that the ow ner m anaged firms corresponds 
to the smaller firms, this could be indicative of the inform al relations betw een 
banks and firms borne ou t in Fischer.
Kinsella in  his report to the Industrial Policy Review Group(1992) came to the 
same conclusion regard ing  the banks' distance from  industry.
"...One major deficiency, which has been identified in other countries, is 
the lack of contact in the form  of visits by senior branch executives to small, as 
com pared w ith  larger com panies"2.
There are two arguem ents one could use to challenge this notion that banks in 
Germ any m ore are divorced from  industry  than thitherfore thought. The 
author's prem ise for m aking both of these points is from  recent evidence 
collected in 1996.
1 C lem ents and Burns, 1992. The relationship betw een German SM Es and their banks. P.4
2 K insella, 1992. The m edium  term developm ent o f  indigenous industry: the role o f  the financial sector. 
P.29
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The first concerns the issue of guarantees. Small firms lacking collateral in  the 
form  of tangible assets w ho had  been earm arked by their house bank for a 
guaranteed loan had to subm it a com prehensive business plan. A 
representative of one of G erm any's 4 m ain banks in  Frankfurt com plained 
about the am ount of paperw ork  involved in assessing a loan of this nature. He 
m aintained that this was the reason he solicited thè assistance of the Institut fiir 
W iederaufbau (a state developm ent bank) rather than  the Regional Guarantee 
Bank. All banks m entioned cash flow  statem ents as being a prerequisite to 
giving a loan.
Perhaps Clem ents (1992) is correct in  saying that contact is informal, in  the case 
of ordinary, as opposed to governm ent subsidised lending. How ever, all banks 
affirmed their role as universal banks. They alluded to the fact tha t all firms in a 
house bank relationship had  personal and  corporate deposit and current 
accounts w ith  its respective bank. Lending bankers had  licence to m onitor these 
accounts and be aw are of cash flow difficulties long before the firm  defaulted 
on its loan.
Both Fischer (1994) and Clem ents (1992) testified to G erm an banks facilitating 
their small firm  clients w hen faced w ith a shortage in w orking capital. 
Respondents interview ed by the au thor 1996 w ere careful to distinguish 
betw een w hat constituted a short term  crisis, i.e. one caused by a cyclical 
dow nturn  in general economic activity and an industry  specific crisis, i.e. a
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perm anent and  ongoing crisis encountered by an industrial branch. In the case 
of the form er crisis, the bank w ould not hesitate to ease its clients financial 
distress w hilst in  the case of the latter (one banker cited the case of the local 
textile industry), a banker w ould  be m ore reluctant to help.
The point being argued is that Clem ents has accused the G erm an banking 
system  of being uncom petitive, yet this very uncom petitive house bank 
relationship had  enabled G erm an banks to extend long term  finance.
(Kaufmann and  Kokaij, 1995) (OECD, 1995c, S107)
There is an elem ent of inconsistency in Clem ent's argum ents which, on the one 
hand condem ns the m onopoly of the G erm an banks, w hilst on the other hand 
revealing that G erm an banks w ere accom m odating in  their lending behaviour, 
at least in the short run.
Currently, there is m ore com petition w itnessed am ong G erm an banks at the 
point of w riting  than  at the beginning of the decade. A lthough Germ an banks 
dem urred to answ er a question relating to their m argins, there is reason to 
suspect that savings banks and co-operatives are experiencing incursions m ade 
into their traditional small firm  sector clientele by the 4 m ain banks. (Edwards 
and Fischer, 1994) This practice of "cherry picking" of their m ore profitable 
clients m ust have as a consequence a decline in savings bank margins. 
Analogously, the very fact that the 4 m ain banks are turning their attentions to
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the partnerships' sector, points to their declining turnover m arket share. The 
recession therefore, w hich was alluded to by m any of the au thor's  respondents, 
has not featured in  either the study by Clem ents (1992) or Edw ards and  Fischer
(1994) since both  these predate the economic dow nturn  in Germ any w ith  
consequences for bank competition.
A m ore obvious example of events superseding the literature is in the case of
Kinsella (1992). This interesting report anticipates the appraisal of loans on a
case by case basis. This individual tailoring of interest rates by banks w ould be
m ore com m ensurate w ith  the risk exposure of the banks tow ards small
businesses than  the all - encom passing AA rate. This result is borne out in an
analysis of deregulation on bank lending to riskier borrow er categories. (T.P
Quinn, 1992) According to Kinsella, (1992);
"A  m ore flexible approach to the pricing of risk w ould be to the benefit 
of both the com pany and the bank. This will require a change of culture 
centrally w ith in  banks and, also, an  increased capacity at branch level to 
undertake the responsibility for this"3.
Even w riting  in  1992, he has anticipated the evolution in credit grading systems 
expressed by Mr. Thomas M ulcahy of the AIB 3 years later.4
Kinsella anticipates change in the sam e report5, w here he em phasises the 
identification of fast grow th firm s as a precursor to targeting these for
3 K insella, 1992. The medium term developm ent o f  indigenous industry: the role o f  the financial sector.
P.31
4 See 2.4
5 The M edium  Term D evelopm ent o f  Indigenous Industry: The Role o f  the Financial Sector, 1992 
P. 27
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governm ent assistance. This concept of using arbitrary  indicators to define fast 
grow th is inherent in  the Section 84 loans w hich target industry, tourism  and 
internationally traded  services.
Section 84 lending w as deem ed necessary and  useful in 1994 by a panel of 
entrepreneurs w hilst at the same time the governm ent w as urged to expand the 
industrial categories eligible for support to include m ore categories from  the 
service sector. (Governm ent Task Force Report, 1994)
This m ove tow ards em ploym ent related indicators in assessing loan 
applications is anticipated in the C arpenter analysis presented in the last 
chapter, w hich indicates that it w as m ore logical to segregate firms into 
classifications com prising those firms who had  or had  not em ployed m ore 
people in the last 12 m onths6. This m ethod of distinguishing grow th  firms on 
the basis of em ploym ent indicators m ay be difficult to apply in an ad  priori 
situation. Nevertheless it served as a better predictor of grow th than a division 
of firms according to their participation in the standard  Business Developm ent 
Program m e7 vis a vis those not part of the scheme. This suggests that w hen one 
uses arbitrary m ethods of distinguishing fast grow th firms, it m ay exclude 
other potentially good albeit "m atch" firms.
6 See 2.1
7 Selected by IDA
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It is interesting to refer to the Task Force Report on Small Business (1994) as a 
final note w hen looking at the relevance of past studies relating to bank 
lending. The group had  urged, w hile it w as still in session for long term  fixed 
interest loans. In response to their request, the ICC Bank placed £100 million in 
1994 at the disposal of small businesses seeking long term  loans at fixed interest 
rates. This w as to become the Small Business Expansion Loan Scheme. The 
requirem ent for taking a charge on collateral w as not waived. Different 
commercial banks received a tranche of this scheme and it has since been 
allocated. Since this scheme has been allocated, the banks themselves, under 
their ow n initiative, under pressure from  the Governm ent, introduced the 
Access to Finance Scheme8. U nder this scheme, no charge w as taken on the 
family hom e and  there had  been a reduction in  the em phasis placed on 
security. H ave both these schemes am eliorated the problem  of a lending gap or 
have they been introduced as a tem porary m easure to appease pressure 
groups? In other w ords, is the introduction of these schemes an example of 
events overtaking the literature and  has the crisis of a lending gap been 
perm anently defused?
Evidence from  the various interview s conducted w ith  the m ain Irish banks 
suggests that these schemes have proven themselves popular. There is reason to 
believe that those who could have afforded finance albeit at higher interest rates 
or on m ore unfavourable terms, m erely deferred applying for loans until the
8 See 1.3
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launch of these new  m easures. In other w ords, there has been a considerable 
displacem ent effect. The Irish banks do not reject the notion that the Access to 
Finance Scheme w as to rew ard small firms w ho w ere already prospering. The 
banks can be com m ended for taking this initiative b u t from  an industrial 
view point, if one is looking at m aking finance m ore available for "deserving 
causes" these schemes m ay have to be supplem ented or extended. It w ould  also 
be interesting to establish w hat proportion of all lending to small businesses is 
accounted for by these schemes.
There w as a need to ascertain if G erm an banks also em ployed similar schemes. 
In order to establish if there w ere similar schemes on  operation it was 
im perative to question G erm an bankers personally in order to p u t the Irish 
schemes in  a G erm an context.
There is no current inform ation apart from  a not small firm  specific Germ an 
survey by D rukarcyk (1985) w hich deals adequately w ith  the ratio of collateral 
used to secure a loan as a percentage of the loan. D rukarcyk's survey cannot be 
applied to the case of lending to smaller enterprises since his sample is 
w eighted tow ards larger Germ an firms. Its use is very lim ited due to this 
inherent bias. Due to the fact that the survey by D rukarcyk could not be 
extrapolated to small firms, as opposed to a biased sam ple representing all 
firms in Germ any, it w as necessary to com pensate for this deficiency by 
undertaking interview s w ith  G erm an banks. These interviews w ould be
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supplem ented by reference to the rules governing the evaluation of collateral in 
Germ any contained in the Kreditwesensgesetz9.
The SFA survey of 1989, w as deem ed m ore m eaningful than  that of Drukarcyk 
in that it examines specifically the ratios of collateral to loans of smaller 
enterprises. It could therefore be retained. The optim al situation how ever in any 
com parative research is a parallel approach and  w ith  this in view, the SFA 
survey relating to collateral needed to be supplem ented by prim ary research.
The G overnm ent Task Force Report (1994) discussed above, suggested that the 
Business Expansion Loan Scheme w hich had been introduced at their 
suggestion, should have less onerous collateral requirem ents. They stated that 
m ost collateral is in the form  of fixed, tangible assets. Their proposal w as to 
alleviate the strain  im posed on a young, firm  w ith  little to offer a bank as 
security bu t its book debts. In other w ords a charge should be taken by the bank 
of the book debtors of a com pany by repealing provision 115 of the 1994 
Finance Act w hich gives precedence to the Revenue Com m issioners to liquidate 
the assets of the company. This provision precludes the banks from  using book 
debt as a security measure.
In view  of the fact that banks have been ardently criticised by small firm 
representative bodies for their supposed unwillingness to have Section 115
9 Literally m eans “L eglislation for financial institutions”.
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repealed. Invoice discounting was considered prohibitively expensive from  the 
firm s' perspective. O n the other hand, it w as alleged to be a very lucrative 
business from  the banks' point of view. Mr. Eoghan H ynes of the ISME 
challenged the banks for;
"having devised a m ore lucrative buying and  less risky approach to funding 
industry , have now  a vested interest in  the ma'intainance of the Revenue's 
preferential status"10.
In order to establish w hether the Germ an banks w ho are no t precluded from  
taking a charge on com pany book debts have frequent recourse to this m easure, 
it w as decided to broach the issues in interview s conducted by the author. This 
is another exam ple of a deficiency lack being rem edied through  prim ary 
research.
The final area w hich has no t yet been exam ined in a com prehensive w ay by the 
literature is the extent of risk shouldered by the Irish banks in their Enterprise 
D evelopm ent Units. The first of these "incubators" for prom oting fragile yet 
potentially viable small firm s w as introduced by the bank of Ireland in  1994.
Prelim inary interview s w ith  the Irish banks suggest th a t these could represent 
an  Irish version of a G erm an house bank relationship. The basis for referring to 
the Units as such is the tacit understanding betw een the bank and  the small
10 C om m ents made by ISM E chairman Mr. Eoghan H ynes w hich were cited in Business and Finance. 17 
N ovem ber, 1994.
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business that this is a long term  relationship. There is evidence to support the 
view  that a bank can only recoup its investm ent in this firm  after a considerable 
num ber of years w hen  the firm  becomes profitable. (Hellwig, 1991)
There is a lack of inform ation as to w hether G erm an banks w hich have 
reputably always m aintained these house b an k  relations offer their small 
businesses lending term s equivalent to the Irish banks' Enterprise Developm ent 
Units. As revealed in  the M ethodology, establishing w hat is m eant by "better 
lending term s" can be difficult. N evertheless, disguised statistics relating to 
inter alia the losses incurred by such a lending U nit w ere presented to Germ an 
banks. It w as therefore possible to relate the Irish banks' Units to the G erm an 
m ain bank relationship under several param eters such as advice, risk and 
collateral.
It is useful to recapitulate that the banking system  has progressed since 
previous studies w ere w ritten. This tim e lag has led to inform ation gaps arising 
in the following areas:
a. Change in  small businesses' m ain  priorities of concerns
b. Effects the u p tu rn  in economic activity has had  on the relationship 
betw een small businesses and  their banks
c. The extent of risk shouldered by Irish banks in  their Units
d. Policy changes of the Irish banks induced by pressure from 
G overnm ent and SME representatives.
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The first tw o points enum erated above will m ost likely be addressed in the 
fu ture by a study  exam ining the responses of Irish small businesses. In the 
opinion of the author, a study  of this nature w ould m ost likely reveal a higher 
level of SME satisfaction than  w ith  the banks several years ago. This is not mere 
conjecture. D uring a recession, bank charges rise to defray the losses sustained 
by banks by higher firm  default rates (Kinsella 1992) This is borne out in 
C arpenter's study  (1993), w here firms w hich w ere prospering assigned their 
banks higher ratings than  firm s w ho w ere not. D issatisfaction w ith  banks is to a 
large extent a cyclical phenom enon.
Since the research elem ent of this discussion com prises interview s w ith  banks 
and  no t small businesses, it follows it will relate som e policy changes in Irish 
banks no t covered by the literature to the banking G erm an system.
3.2 T he need  for a b an k  based  survey
The characteristics and  financing of small businesses is a well docum ented issue 
in Ireland. G row th studies such as Carpenter, (1993), Kinsella, (1992) or 
financing studies by Foley and  Griffith, (1993) and  the Irish Cham ber of 
Commerce, (1994) in  add ition  to various G overnm ent Reports and  SFA releases. 
Deloitte and  Touche, (1993) asked a sam ple of 400 firm s11 w ith  less than 50 
em ployees to describe the relationship w ith their banker. This is essentially a
11 R esponse rate o f  64%
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survey concerning firms and not banks. This is rem iniscent of the study  by 
Binks and  Ennew, (1988) w ho posed similar questions to English firms. It was 
therefore interesting to regard the issues from  another vantage point; that of the 
bankers.
The literature relating to banking relations in G erm any is replete w ith  studies in 
Germ an w hich have no t as yet been translated. Of the two landm ark studies 
which are available in  English, the first by Clem ents and  Bum s (1992) has been 
w ritten under the auspices of 3i12 w hich is a centre based in  England. Its 
predecessor by Fischer and Edw ards (1992) w as w ritten  in conjunction w ith  the 
University of Cam bridge. Unfortunately, m any studies, apart from  those 
released at European level13, have no t been translated. In particular, reference 
can be m ade to publications by the G erm an equivalent of 3i, the Institut ftir 
M ittelstandsforschung (literally "The institute for research into SMEs"). The 
annual accounts of m any G erm an banks, apart from  the Bundesbank are also 
not translated. Fortunately, the au thor has been able to access some publications 
thitherfore no t referred to in an Irish context.
An Irish study w hich exam ined the G erm an banking system  in relation to 
Germ an banks taking participations in small businesses has been carried out. 
(Foley and  Griffith, 1993) The aim  of this discussion is to supplem ent this 
former analysis by interview ing, not merely the Regional Banks w hich act as
12 Explain origins o f  3i
13 European C om m ission  Publication “European Observatory for SM Es w hich contains extracts translated 
from various European contributors
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clearing banks to the savings banks, bu t banks involved in lending to small 
businesses across the whole banking spectrum . This is borne out by the recent 
m ore stratified sam ple undertaken  in 1996 w hich show ed that the regional 
banks tended to cater for the larger SMEs seeking loans of £150,000 upw ards14. 
As show n in Chapter One, the savings banks and  co-operative banks betw een 
them  account for 71 percent of lending to SMEs and  therefore their inclusion 
w ould  generate a m ore representative sample of G erm an banks15.
The telephone survey conducted by Foley and  Griffith in 1993 did  indicate that 
guarantees by guarantee banks are often used in the case of companies w ithout 
sufficient collateral. This w as substantiated by the 1996 interview s conducted by 
the author.
Foley and Griffith (1994) also exhorted the Irish banks to apply a m ore cash 
flow approach to lending;
"..there is a need to continue their (Irish bankers') efforts to better access risk, in 
particular, assessing businesses on a cash flow basis rather than on a balance 
sheet basis"16.
Evidence relating to how  G erm an SMEs perceive how  their banks assess 
lending dem onstrates that G erm an bankers look at total business assets before 
liquidity ratios. (Clements and  Burns, 1992) This w ould  p u t the behaviour of
14 V olksbank, Reutlingen
15 See M ethodology in Chapter 5 for the com position o f  the sam ple
16 Irish Banking R eview , Autumn 1994. P.30
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Irish banks into context17. In order of precedence, according to G erm an SMEs, 
G erm an banks place the value of the overall business assets first before the long 
term  health  of the business in the loan appraisal rankings. In fourth  place comes 
interest and  d iv idend  cover before personal guarantees and finally collateral in 
fifth place. It is interesting that this observation is m ade by the firm  owners 
themselves and  no t the bankers. If a banker asserted that collateral w ere of 
secondary im portance and  that the long term  health  of the business came first, 
he m ight be treated  w ith  m ore scepticism than  if the observation w ere m ade by 
a small business owner.
The difference betw een the approach taken by this study  and that of Clem ents 
(1992), is that while Clem ents interview ed G erm an SMEs and elicited their 
responses in  a num ber of areas including the criteria by w hich loans are 
evaluated by banks, this study  proposes to interview  the banks in  and  gain 
insights on the criteria they use. By interview ing banks in lieu of small 
businesses, one endeavours to gain inform ation from  the perspective of the 
bankers. O ptim ally, one w ould endeavour to relate the feedback from  a firm 
specific survey to th a t of bank specific research in order to see if the two 
accounts deviate from  one another. This optim al situation w ould necessitate a 
larger scale survey than  the one being undertaken  here.
17 See 2.4
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Foley and  Griffith alludes to the paucity of em pirical inform ation in the whole 
area of bank lending to small businesses.
"Conclusive evaluation of the role of the banks is constrained by the 
lim ited availability of empirical data. Empirical assessm ent of m any aspects of 
the b an k / SME interface is h indered  by insufficient quantitative inform ation"18.
Despite the sensitivity of the inform ation, banks p roved  to be co-operative in 
furnishing some vital statistics. The nam e of the Irish bank w hich provided the 
inform ation relating to small firm  default rates w as no t disclosed to Germ an 
banks. The G erm an banks w ere asked to com m ent on  the figures in the context 
of their ow n experience of lending to small businesses. This m ay seem a very 
circum vent w ay of obtaining inform ation regard ing  bank bad debt provisions 
or fallout rates w ith  various risk categories of small business. As described in 
the M ethodology, it is a w ay of eliciting responses to sensitive information.
As will be seen in C hapter 4, attem pts w ere m ade to use data disclosed by Irish 
banks as an input into the G erm an interviews. G erm an bankers, due to the 
sensitivity of the inform ation w ere asked to take a judicious look at the Irish 
inform ation and  p u t it in the context of their ow n lending experience. This 
indirect approach was applied  in order to elicit responses in  an area where 
inform ation is scarce.
18 Irish Banking R eview . Autumn, 1994. P.31
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There are considerable differences betw een the G erm an and  Irish banking 
systems w hich lead to inform ation gaps and com parability problems. The 
following have been discussed in C hapter One.
The first difference betw een the tw o systems is inherent in the m ore 
interventionist approach  of the G erm an governm ent via guarantee banks as 
discussed in the first chapter.
The second difference is tha t G erm an banks are no t precluded from  taking a 
charge on the book debts of an enterprise as in  Ireland.
The th ird  is the autonom ous nature of the savings banks and co-operative 
banks in extending loans.
The fourth  m ajor com plication arises out of the im portance assigned Chambers 
of Commerce and  the Regional Governm ents in providing assistance to small 
businesses. (Bannock and  Albach, 1992)
A very im portant com parability problem  w hich had  not been m entioned yet is 
the m ethod of accounting for risk in both  countries. A bank's specific bad debt 
provision is often an  indicator of how  m uch risk it is prepared  to shoulder w ith 
firms. It often bears com parison w ith  the historic default rate of borrowers. 
Another m ore direct m easure is the actual default rate of firms. A
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representative of a G erm an accounting firm  in D üsseldorf19 explained the fact 
that in  G erm any a general provision against bad debt in a bank can only 
am ount to 4 percent of outstanding claims at m axim um . This is subtracted from  
the asset side of the balance sheet. It is impossible to establish the level of a 
specific risk provision because it can be buried  in the bank capital reserves on 
the liability side of the balance sheet. As will be seen in the M ethodology, 
differences in accounting for risk in Germ any and  Ireland m ake it m ore difficult 
to establish the risk exposure of banks. This m akes inform ation furnished by 
Irish banks interview ed relating to default rates in tw o custom er risk categories 
all the m ore useful since it helps overcome the lack of em pirical data.
3.3 Lack of comparisons in the literature betw een peripheral and larger 
banking systems
This comprises the final issue in this C hapter w hich deals w ith  reconciling 
imbalances and  deficiencies in the literature th rough  m ore up  to date 
inform ation sources or additional research. It is notable that in Ireland there are 
references to the UK banking system, the US or Canada. The prevalence of 
secondary literature w hich deals w ith  the British banking system  is fortuitous 
on the one hand, since this literature can be applied to the Irish banking system 
by virtue of similarities betw een the two systems. It can be argued that the Irish 
banking system  resembles m ore the British system  by virtue of well developed 
equity m arkets expressed in low gearing ratios. Recent evidence by Burns and 
W hitehouse (1995) finds the British short term ism  evident in short term
19 Werth & Klein
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financing horizons reprehensible20. It follows that it is not useful to com pare 
Ireland against a country the whose banking system  is acknow ledged to be 
short term  in its outlook.
Unfortunately, this m ost recent study by Burns and  W hitehouse (1995) is 
representative of other landm ark studies com m issioned by another European 
country or transeuropean  institution in that Ireland is rarely cited by w ay of 
comparison. This tendency of focusing on larger and m ore significant 
economies gives an imbalance to the literature. Binks, Ennew and  Reid for 
instance (1988) also cite Japan and  Germ any as countries w here banking 
practices differ. Similarly Irish authors use large economies as a reference point 
against w hich to m easure the perform ance of the Irish banking system. Kinsella 
(1992) does no t refer to a small banking system  m ore com parable w ith  th a t of 
Ireland such as D enm ark w hen he states:
"Firstly, the existence of an adversarial relationship betw een the banking 
industry and  the authorities is not unique to Ireland. There are, however, 
num erous exam ples from  other countries w hich confirm  the benefits of a 
positive and  open relationship. G erm any is a case in point. So too, is 
Switzerland, and  Japan"21.
The point w hich should  be m ade is that if one w ere to com pare G erm any w ith 
Britain, com parisons in the literature abound. Examples of such U K / Germ an 
studies include those by M ayer and Alexander (1990), the OECD Report (1994)
20 See 1.3
21 Kinsella, 1992. The m edium  term developm ent o f  indigenous industry: the role o f  the financial sector. 
P.24
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and  M ayer and Giovanni (1991). There is a reciprocity in  studies undertaken in 
both  countries.
Ireland, on  the other hand, by virtue of its peripheral nature and the m inor role 
it plays in  a w orld  or even European economic sense, has never surfaced m uch 
in the prolific internationally based British literature. This makes the task of 
retrieving com parative studies w hich m ention bo th  Germ any and Ireland 
difficult. The solution is to use any inform ation, how ever incomplete for the 
analysis. This inform ation can then be supplem ented by extensive interviews 
w ith  both  Irish and  G erm an bankers.
G iven the prolific literature to date w hich contrasts the UK equity based system 
to the G erm an bank based system, the task conducting a two nation study 
com prising Ireland in lieu of Britain is facilitated. A lthough the em phasis in 
m uch of this literature is on bank lending to larger corporations, it is useful in 
the provision of general background information.
The international literature pertain ing  to the subject of banking, focuses on 
larger, developed countries of com parable size and  significance. Ireland and 
Irish banks are no t well docum ented in  external reports despite the existence of 
internal G overnm ent or public policy reports such as th a t of Kinsella (1992).
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This survey endeavours to supplem ent deficiencies in the literature for the 
following reasons.
Firstly, since the publishing of the G overnm ent Task Force Report on Small 
Business (1994), the Access to Finance Scheme has been introduced. Foley and 
Griffith (1994) articulated the need for an  international appraisal of the 
Enterprise Loan Scheme which they refer to as the "single m ost innovative 
banking p roduct in  recent years". One aspect of this scheme, nam ely a reduced 
reliance on the en trepreneur's  personal collateral to secure a business loan, will 
be com pared w ith  the personal collateral policy pursued  by G erm an banks.
N otw ithstanding, there is a need for a m ore com prehensive review  of other 
im provem ents in  the Irish system w ith  respect to small business lending w hich 
are beyond of the scope of this survey. Such a study could entail ascertaining 
the proportions of the small business population eligible for preferential loans 
(i.e access) and w hether the criteria em ployed by Irish banks in  assessing loan 
applicants is com parable to that applied by other European banks such as 
Germany.
The second reason as to w hy it is necessary to undertake discussions w ith  
bankers, is due to the dearth  of inform ation on how  the bankers view  the 
situation of lending to small businesses. There has been a tendency to focus on
3.4 Conclusions
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the contributions of the entrepreneur or m anager of a small business. In order 
to m aintain some equilibrium , it is im perative to look at the testim onies of small 
business ow ners and  also at those of their banking counterparts. Surveys which 
have collated inform ation relating to small businesses are of vital use as an 
input to this discussion bu t m ust be supplem ented by interview s w ith  bankers 
if one is to obtain a balanced argum ent.
This survey aims to achieve m ore reciprocity and  to rectify the imbalance in the 
literature w hich arises from  an  abundance of firm  specific studies not paralleled 
by bank specific studies. This is not to detract from  the value of firm  specific 
studies such as those of Kinsella, Clarke, Coyne, M ulveanny and Storey (1994) 
or Deloitte and  Touche (1994).
A nother factor w hich p rom pted  the need for prim ary research is one w hich can 
best be rem edied by qualitative interviewing. This concerns the problem  of 
obtaining em pirical data w hich relate to certain banking practices such as the 
assessm ent of collateral. Such inform ation can be categorised as highly sensitive 
in nature. For example, few  bankers w ould discuss internal banking reports 
containing collateral to principle ratios experienced by their bank. 
U nfortunately, some of the m ost inaccessible inform ation is also the m ost 
useful. This problem  w hich arises in the event of com paring the ratios of 
collateral used  as security by a bank and  the corresponding value of the loan is 
com pounded by the fact that the m ost com prehensive survey of this nature
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undertaken  in  G erm any is redundan t for the purposes of com parison w ith 
Ireland. This is due to the fact that D rukarcyk (1985) d id  no t target small 
enterprises in  isolation bu t rather an aggregate of industries in general. It 
follows tha t this study  is not representative since a com parison betw een it and 
the SFA (1989) survey of collateral w hich does target small enterprises could be 
m isleading. There w as a need to rem edy this gap in the literature by conducting 
discussions w ith  G erm an bankers them selves in  order to establish the 
m agnitude of collateral used to secure loans of different durations.
The final gap w hich occurs in the literature em anates from  inter alia the 
geographical focus of past surveys on G erm any to the exclusion of Ireland. It is 
obvious th a t on a European level, for example, Ireland is a m inor player 
com pared to Germ any. Therefore, there is a proliferation of reports 
docum enting G erm an banking behaviour a t a European level w hilst at the same 
tim e a paucity of inform ation relating to the Irish situation.
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Chapter 4 M ethodology
4.0 Introduction
The last chapter presented some of the gaps in  the literature and  questions 
unansw ered  w hich could be addressed by qualitative research in  the form  of 
structured  interviews.
This research evolved in 3 stages. As described in the preceding chapters, it is 
possible to am ass a considerable am ount of secondary inform ation in the form 
of reports w hich deal w ith  the issues of bank lending to small businesses 
Ireland and  Germany. Since these studies are no t tailored to answer the 
particular questions this discussion seeks to address, there is a need to 
supplem ent this m aterial by interview ing banks and State agencies in Ireland 
and  Germ any.
The m anner in w hich interview s w ere conducted, the com position of questions 
asked and  the sample fram e are discussed under the following headings:
4.1 Research content: stage one
4.2 Research content : stage two
4.3 Research content : stage three
4.4 Lim itations of the research
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The research becomes progressively m ore refined w ith  each stage. The first 
questions concern the b road  "m acro" issues. W hen one considers w hat makes 
one system  of bank lending superior to another, the m ost salient and 
conspicuous differences are examined. The m ost salient issues in  this discussion 
comprise those m ost often discussed in the literature. D uring January a 
prelim inary set of interview s was held w ith 6 G erm an bank representatives and 
one representative of a Cham ber of Industry  and Commerce. This served to 
give direction to the research. The broad  issues discussed w ith  these bankers at 
this stage are described below. Figure 4.1.1
It was im perative to establish w hich banks in G erm any lend to small 
businesses. The im portance of the savings banks and  co-operative banks was 
em phasised in som e of the literature and so it was expedient to m eet a cross 
section of banks. (Kohler, 1995) (Edwards and  Fischer, 1994).
This representative sam ple section com prised in all 14 G erm an banks. This 
included tw o savings banks, a state guarantee bank, a private bank, a regional 
bank, a local branch and  head  office of two m ain G erm an banks and  the head 
office of the organisation of savings banks1. It was also deem ed im portant to 
m eet the representative of a local branch of the Cham bers of Industry and
4.1 Research content: stage one
1 Verein der D eu tschen  S parkassen , Frankfurt
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Diagram 4.1.1 Evolution of research
Input into Stage 1:
Cambridge Report, 1994 
Köhler, 1995
Mayer and Alexander, 1990
Input into Stage 2:
SBA failure rate on US guarantee loan scheme 
Information on working capital1 
Selected bank bad debt provisions 
Charge on Debtors2
Input into Stage 3:
Irish bank fallout rate 
Irish risk provisioning 
Bundesbank gearing figures
Preliminary interviews with:
5 German banks 
1 regional guarantee bank 
Representative of Chamber of Commerce
Semi structured interview with:
5 main Irish banks 
1 Irish accountant firm 
1 Guarantee bank
Semi structured interview with:
14 German banks
1 German accountant
Institut fur Mittelstandsforschung
Output from Stage 1:
Information on:
State funding administered by banks 
Relevance of different forms of German bank 
Current economic conditions affecting SMEs
Output from Stage 2:
Information on:
Irish bank fallout rate (normal borrowers)
Irish bank fallout rate (Special Unit borrowers) 
Rejection rates of SME loan applications3 
Impact of New Policies 
Charge on house
Output from Stage 3
Information on:
German bank fallout rate relative 
to Irish
Collateral weightings 
Use of Charge on Debtors 
Impact of Government Schemes and 
Guarantees
1 D eloitte and Touche, 1993
2 G overnm ent Task Force Report, 1994
3 A lso  rejection rates fo llow in g  further negotiation with bank
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Commerce at this preparatory  stage since he liased w ith  m any small businesses 
and could supply inform ation pertaining to different banking types.
The inform ation obtained from  these interview s w as for the m ost part 
qualitative. These interview s endeavoured to establish the institutional 
differences betw een different types of banks. They also explored the autonom y 
of the savings banks in the area of lending. The bankers w ere asked to quantify 
if possible, the m axim um  loan am ount extended prior to notifying a more 
senior colleague. The interview s explored the historic background to the 
G erm an banking system  and the need for different types of bank.
The effects of the recession of firm  default rates and  bank lending behaviour 
w ere also broached w ith  the Germ an banks. This is because I had  reservations 
concerning the available literature on bank lending to Germ any, w hich to a 
large extent predates the first major cooling of the G erm an economy since the 
Second W orld War.
Also discussed w ith  the bankers was the 20 year long term  loan extended by the 
State via the banks, on w hich there is a two year interest m oratorium 2. The 
eligibility criteria w ere also discussed since the direction and  scope of State 
intervention im pinges on the type and num ber of small businesses being 
assisted th rough  the banks.3
2 “E igenkapitalhilfeprogram m ” (literally assistance to s e lf  -finance)
3 See 1.3
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Table 4.2.1 Irish banks and institutions interviewed
B ank /  in stitu tion R epresentative D escription
Allied Irish Bank Small Business Banking Executive Irish bank
Bank of Ireland Enterprise Support Unit Executive // //
Ulster Bank Retail Business Executive / !  / /
National Irish Credit Assessment Executive / /  / r
Trustee Bank Credit Assessment Executive
ICC Bank Lending executive State Industrial Bank
Deloitte and Touche Executive Accountancy Firm
Forfas Executive State Agency
Irish Bankers' Information Service Director General Bankers' representative body
O' Riada Stockbrokers Executive Stockbrokers with bank clients inter alia
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Table 4.2.2 The Interviews with Irish banks
SME by  sector Collateral Risk Long term  or Short 
term  finance
New Schemes
Evidence from 1993 that 
43% firms in Engineering 
and Electronics Sector 
rejected for working 
capital loan than in Food 
and Drink Sector1 
In this their experience?
Collateral weightings Fallout rate:
3.1% maximum2 
1% minimum3
Would you prefer the 
repeal of Section 115 of 
1986 Finance Act4 or 
introduction of a 
government backed 
guarantee?5
Displacement effect of 
Access to Finance Scheme
Use of charge on house % of bad debts accruing 
from riskier SMEs 
(AA category) >
Expertise of Special 
lending Units 
Outsourcing of loan 
officers
1 D eloitte and Touche, 1993
2 Sm all B usiness A ssociation , 1989. Fallout rate o f  SM Es participating in loan guarantee schem e
J “ “ “ “ .Loss bank incurs on total claim s outstanding with a 70%  governm ent guarantee.
4 Charge on debtors w ould assist provision o f  short term w orking capita! by allow ing banks use com pany book debts
5 G overnm ent guarantee facilitates provision o f  long term finance for SM Es w ho lack fixed sufficient assets
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To begin w ith, one m ust establish upper param eter of small business fallout 
rate w hich an  Irish bank can sustain. The Small Business Association in the US 
estim ated that in  1989, for every $100 dollars of ou tstanding  claims, $3.1 turned  
ou t to be unrecoverable debts. (Deloitte and  Touche, 1994). In  other w ords, the 
American banks involved in  this scheme could not sustain  a loss of 3.1 percent 
of claims b u t a proportion  of 0.93 percent w as conceivable.
Irish bankers w ere asked if they w ere offered a 70 percent guarantee could this 
fallout of 0.93 percent be entertained.
The Irish banks w ere presented  w ith  the scenario of "deserving firms" who 
could become viable bu t w ere risky from  the view point of a banker. According 
to the theory of banking, bankers prefer to ration credit rather than  indefinitely 
increase the risk prem ium . (Stiglitz and  Weiss, 1981). A ssum ing that this is true, 
these m arginal cases will be declined as Kinsella has revealed. Kinsella et alia
(1994) alluded to a certain percentage of fast grow th firms in N orthern Ireland 
and  the Republic being denied bank loans.
"O ut of the tw elve sources of finance for w hich founders were turned down, 
five w ere loans from  the banks; of these four were fast grow th firm s"5.
Inform ation supplied from  new spaper cuttings w hich released risk provisions 
of several m ain Irish banks was also contained in  the questionnaire. The
5 K insella et alia. (1 9 9 4 ) “ Fast Growth Firms: An Irish Perspective.” P .61
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relationship betw een the bank 's exposure to high risk small businesses and the 
m agnitude of the general risk provision was discussed b u t no t found to be very 
conclusive since risk provisions represent an  aggregate of m any other 
exogenous variables, m any of w hich are macroeconomic e.g. general economic 
conditions.6
For this reason the actual fallout rate w hich a bank w ould  entertain  was 
deem ed to be a m ore descriptive m easure of a bank's lending behaviour.7
Sectoral lending w as an  issue raised by the Deloitte and  Touche study of (1993), 
w hereby SMEs in the engineering and  electronics sector exhibited higher 
rejection rates com pared w ith  their counterparts in  the food and  drink sector. 
Irish banks w ere asked if these statistics conform ed to their ow n lending 
experience and  could they explain this sectoral variation.
Allied to this question was the issue of how  they dealt w ith  small firms who 
w ere in the start u p  or developing stage and had  an innovative product. To cite 
an example of this, an entrepreneur, Mr. Ken Carroll8 w rote to Seamus Brennan 
in 1993 because he had  to start the com pany by getting an  overdraft w hich he 
had  to guarantee. This product w hich could belong to the engineering and 
electronics sector represented som ething innovative in that it w as a new  CAD
6 See 4.4
7 An exception  to this general tendency was w here one bank did d isclose by how  m uch his bank’s general 
provision w ould  rise in the event o f  an increase in riskier corporate borrowers.
G overnm ent Task Force Report, 1994
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software program m e used in the m aking of injection m oulds. H ow  w ould  an 
Irish bank deal w ith  such a proposition? W ould it outsource some technological 
guru  w ho could explain the viability of the project to those no t familiar w ith 
CAD softw are or w ould the bank use its ow n personnel?
The area of collateral had  often been one of contention although not one rated  
as highly by entrepreneurs as a concern. (Deloitte and  Touche, 1993) The 
im portance attached collateral as a major concern has dim inished since the SFA 
survey in  1989.9
This area has evolved in  two ways. The first and  m ost im portant policy change 
on the part of the banks is since the introduction of the Access to Finance 
Scheme, a reluctance to take the ow ner's house as security. Bankers w ere asked 
about the policy of their bank tow ards the house. The second issue was the 
proposition of the G overnm ent Task Force in 1994 to repeal section 115 of the 
1986 Finance Act w hich gives the Revenue Com m issioners precedence over the 
books debts on liquidation of the firm. The Task Force m em bers suggested that 
the repeal of this provision should  go in tandem  w ith  the long term  loans 
adm inistered by the ICC bank in 199410. It is suprising that the Com m ittee 
proposed this change in  legislation in order to enhance long term  lending since 
the book debts of a firm  are looked upon as having an  expiry date of at m ost 3 
m onths. In accordance w ith  norm al banking principles, long term  assets such as
9 See 2 .4
10 Sm all B usiness Expansion Loan Schem e
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fixed business assets or premises com plem ent long term  lending. Similarly 
assets w hose value can be realised in  a short tim e period, such as com pany 
debtors are used to securitise a short term  lending facility.
A very sensitive question which relates to the issue of collateral is the ratio of 
collateral to principle. The m oral hazard  problem 'here is that while firms may 
be inclined to be forthcom ing on how  m uch collateral they have been requested 
to provide the banks, it is no t in the bank's interest (unless the ratios appear 
equitable) to disclose this information. The m ethodology sought to m ake this 
question m ore acceptable by asking banks to assign w eightings to different 
collateral types. It follows that one can m ake inferences about the policy of the 
bank as regards collateral going on the m agnitude of the weighting. If, for 
example, a bank deducted  20 percent autom atically from  the m arket price of a 
house11 to allow  for the fact that a house being auctioned by a bank is regarded 
by the public as an  asset w hich m ust be disposed of quickly, it follows that the 
bidding price m ay be therefore depressed. The bank also has a policy of lending 
a proportion of the rem aining 80 percent of the adjusted house value. In the 
case of two hypothetical banks one may have a m ore conservative and 
consequently less generous (from the small business point of view) m ethod of 
evaluating a house. The first bank and the second bank assign w eightings of 100 
percent the adjusted m arket price and  80 percent the adjusted m arket price 
respectively. This is assum ing that both deduct 20 percent to com pensate for
11 A ssum ing it had the house valued by a professional
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underb idd ing  and disposal costs. The same procedure of applying w eightings is 
used for the different categories of collateral w hich constitute the "basket of 
entrepreneur assets" w hich could be used as collateral. These w eightings are 
then p u t in  context w ith  the frequency of use of each collateral type by the bank. 
One then  has a clearer picture of the collateral policy of the bank by adding  
together each com ponent in  the collateral basket. This question can lead to 
better com pliance from  bankers than  the m ore direct, "W hat is the average 
p roportion  of collateral to principle of your bank for 1996?"
The Irish banks w ere also asked to elaborate upon  w hat exactly Mr. Thomas 
M ulcahy of the AIB bank had  m eant by stating that the Irish banks had 
in troduced better grading systems. In other w ords w ould loan term s be 
negotiated on a case by case basis and therefore w ould the bulk of small 
businesses be extended loans a t rates below the now  discarded AA rate?
Banks w ere also asked w hether the Access to Finance Scheme w ere a publicity 
exercise w hich cross- subsidised on loans to riskier small businesses in order to 
extend loans on m ore favourable terms to firms w hich had  no problem  
obtaining finance at reasonable term s in the first place. This question sought to 
elicit from  banks w hether these new  schemes have any real impact. The Access 
to Finance scheme, being initiated by the banks themselves represents one of 
their responses to pressure from  governm ent.
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The other innovation in  lending to small businesses is the Enterprise 
Developm ent Units w here firms w ith  grow th prospects are elected for special 
attention from  bank personnel and  conferred m ore favourable long term  
lending rates. Since this is rem iniscent of the house bank relationship pursued 
by G erm an banks, banks w ere asked about the profitability of such a venture. 
One bank supplied estim ates of the percentage loss on funds lent to firms in this 
Unit which is considerably higher than  the norm al bank threshold level. This 
was used as a yardstick against w hich to m easure the capacity of the German 
banks to support potentially viable b u t fragile enterprises.
A final area discussed w ith  the banks was w hat support from  the State w ould 
they m ost welcome w hich w ould  assist in  their lending to developing small 
enterprises. The tw o broad m easures w ere the in troduction of partial State 
guarantees and the repeal of section 115. The first m easure w ould  assist in  the 
area of long term  lending and  the second w ould facilitate short term  lending.
4.3 Research content: stage three
This stage involved m ore in-depth  interview s w ith  8 G erm an bankers, a 
representative from  a G erm an state funded  institution w hich has a m andate to 
chart the perform ance of small G erm an enterprises and  lastly the representative 
of a G erm an partnership of auditors.
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The issues exam ined w ere as follows, portfolio com position, collateral, risk, 
duration  of finance and service. Table 4.3.1
These issues varied in  some aspects from  those presented to the Irish bankers. 
This was to accom m odate differences betw een the tw o systems particularly in 
relation to there being a m ore decentralised and varied banking system  in 
Germany. Consideration m ust always be taken of differences w hich could lead 
to erroneous conclusions being drawn. An example of an  erroneous conclusion 
alluded to in the first chapter w ould be to say that G erm an banks w ere better 
lenders because on  average the interest rate paid by small business owners 
w ere considerably lower than  that paid in Ireland w hen  in fact this could be a 
consequence of a lower Bundesbank discount rate or low er w ithholding taxes 
on deposit accounts w hich could cause banks to have low er cost funds for 
refinancing their lending transactions. The translated questionnaire can be 
seen in the appendix to this section. (Appendix 4.3.1)
A m odified questionnaire was given to the two guarantee banks participating 
in this survey since their orientation and disclosure requirem ents w ould differ 
from  those of the norm al commercial banks.
Some of the G erm an commercial banks unprom pted  cited figures relating to 
their small firm  default rates bu t this was the exception and these findings had 
to be obtained in the m ore indirect way.
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Table 4.3.1 The Interviews w ith German banks
C om position  of 
portfolio
Collateral Risk Long term  or Short 
term  finance
Service
Artesian sector 
partnerships 
blue chip companies 
owner managed
Collateral weightings: 
Cash balances, bonds & 
Shares
Business assets 
House
Guarantee bank
Fallout rate of one Irish 
bank:
3-4%  maximum1 
1% minimum2
Would you experience a 
similar fallout rate in both 
these risk categories?
% fixed asset vs. working 
capital loans in portfolio Main bank relationship: 
SME better served in this 
arrangement?
Have you a State mandate 
to cater for a specific 
sector?3
Use o f :
charge on house 
book debts of firm 
guarantee by 
guarantee bank
Advice
Financial advice
Legal
Industrial
Expertise of advisor
Financial
Industrial
1 Fallout rate experienced by Irish bank in a h igh  risk category
2 A ggregate fallout rate experienced by sam e Irish bank in A A  and A A A  categories
3 establish differences ( i f  any) in orientation o f  various German banks
The sam ple of banks w ith  w hom  the author conducted the two hour interviews 
w ere located predom inantly  in the Baden W ürtem burg region. This focus on 
the Baden W ürttem burg area was occasioned by the area's relatively large 
num ber of small businesses com pared w ith  the m ore stagnating, larger, and 
capital intensive enterprises located in  the Ruhr area of N orthrhine Westfalia 
w hich is renow ned for its industry. (Cooke, M organ and  Price, 1995) It follows 
that it w ould  be m ore logical to focus this survey on the local banks in an  area 
replete w ith  a grow ing small business base, yet not as under developed and 
subsidised as the form er Eastern states. Bavaria w ould  also have fulfilled the 
criteria b u t for ease of accessibility and  its relative proxim ity to the commercial 
centres of Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Cologne and Bonn, it w as chosen.
The sam ple com prised banks at both  local, regional and  representative body 
level. The local banks w ere confined to the Baden W ürttem burg area as were 
the regional clearing banks or giro institutions. The Verbände12 w ere located in 
the commercial centres. Table 4.3.2
A separate questionnaire w as also com piled for a representative of the IfM.
A different question set w as used in the case of the accountant of W arth & Klein 
w ho was fam iliar w ith the issue of allocating risk provisions.
12 S ince savings banks and co-operative banks are not governed by a central head o ffice , their respective 
A ssociation  Headquarters were interviewed
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Table 4.3.2 The German banks and institutions interviewed
Bank R epresentative Location/ type of b ank
Dresdner Bank Jürgen Huber 
Martin Buck
Head Office/ Frankfurt
Local branch/ Baden Württemburg
State Guarantee Banks Rupert Hukle 
Otto Züffle
Dealing with large corporates/ Stuttgart 
Dealing with SME's/ Stuttgart
Savings Bank Sector Dr. R Landrock 
Kogel
Roberto Nernosi 
Jens Heinert 
Walter Schmid
Head office/ Bonn 
Dealing with larger corporates
Clearing banks to savings bank/ Baden Württemburg 
Dealing with SME's/ Freiburg 
Dealing with SME's /  Reutlingen
Coöperative Bank Sector Armin Horning 
Frank Unversagt
Regional head office/ Baden Württemburg 
Dealing with SME's/ Reutlingen
Bayerische Vereinsbank
Hösel SMEs and large corporates/ Munich
Schwäbische bank Maximilian Wölfle All corporate types/ Stuttgart
Baden Württemburgische Bank
Peter Finkbeiner Larger corporates/ Reutlingen
Warth & Klein Dr. Gernod 
Hebestreit Auditor and accountant/ Düsseldorf
Institut für Mittelstands- 
-forschung
Dennis Dee Writes for European Commission on SME issues in Germany/ Bonn
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It w as necessary to interview  some association w hich transcends the boundaries 
of Baden W iirttem burg in order to establish w hether policies pursued for 
example in  S tuttgart by local savings banks could be equated w ith  those in 
Schleswig H olstein or Brandenburg. By interview ing the supra  regional bodies 
and  lobby groups attem pts are m ade to elim inate bias w hich m ay otherwise 
result from  focusing on banks in  a particular area.13 In the case of the two m ain 
banks interview ed, care w as taken to interview  in  add ition  to branches at local 
level, the head  offices in Frankfurt and Munich.
It is beyond the scope of this survey to interview  the population  of Germ an 
banks since there are four m ain banks in Ireland catering to small businesses 
w ith  grow ing com petition from  about 6 non - banks com pared w ith  3,880 
G erm an banking institutions14. The autonom y of the com m unity savings banks 
and  co-operatives is reflected in the high num ber of reporting  institutions.
As described in the introduction to this chapter, inform ation arising from  the 
interview s w ith  Irish banks was used as an  inpu t into the later Germ an 
interviews. G erm an bank representatives were exhorted to judge the Irish 
figures in the light of their ow n experience.
13 A n exam ple o f  this occurred in the case o f  a Regional co-operative bank located in Stuttgart. It 
provided the author with com prehensive information concerning gu idelines and legislation w hich govern  
lending by co-operative banks. The “ Handbuch der Volksbanken und R aiffeisenbanken” w as used to 
evaluate how  German co-operative banks collateralise loans.
14 1994 figures from  Bundesbank Report. This is the number o f  credit institutions reporting to the 
German Bundesbank and not all o f  these lend to SM Es.
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The first question, w hich presented the h igh gearing levels cited by the 
Bundesbank for 1995 w as included in order to ascertain if G erm an banks are 
satisfied w ith  an  average proportion  of ow ners equity for small businesses 
am ounting to 15 percent of bank gearing. This was also included as control 
question since the Bundesbank estimate relates to an average for all banks and 
m ay m ask differences am ong different banking types. In other w ords, a local 
savings bank m ay no t exhibit the same average equity as a proportion of 
gearing as a large commercial bank such as the D resdner bank.
The second issue dealt w ith  collateral. The procedure w as the same as that used 
for the Irish banks w hereby respondents assigned a particular w eighting to 
different collateral types and  also indicated w hich type of loan w ould normally 
be covered by such collateral. As a separate question and  one w hich was not 
included in the questionnaire, bankers were asked about their preference for 
and  the frequency w ith  w hich their banks applied different types of collateral. 
The fact that there seems to be a m ore structured response given by Germ an 
bankers to this question is discussed in the section dealing w ith the limitations 
of this research15.
The th ird  section concerned risk provisioning. It presented the general risk 
provisions of an Irish bank and G erm an banks were asked if they thought this 
to be conservative (m eaning they had  lower provisions) or liberal (meaning
15 See 4.4
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they had  higher provisions). The fact that m any bankers w ere involved in 
lending and  not com piling financial accounts detracted from  the usefulness of 
this question. A nother issue detracting from  this question w as the form at of 
provisioning in G erm any w hich will be discussed in  the lim itations to this 
research16.
The second part of the th ird  section in the questionnaire dealt w ith  the issue of 
small business default rates. One Irish bank had  disclosed the losses it sustains 
on norm al consum er borrow ing in addition to the losses accruing on loans to 
riskier, m ore cash flow based enterprises located in  its Special Unit. Both 
categories of custom er and  the respective fallout ra te  w ere presented to the 
G erm an banks. It was necessary to explain to them  w h at is m eant by a Special 
Unit since they had  no t encountered the concept before. The Germ an 
respondents w ere asked w hether their losses sustained w ere higher or lower 
than those experienced by the Irish bank in bo th  categories.
The fourth  extract was self explanatory in that it sought to establish w hether 
G erm an banks have assigned lending personnel to small businesses and the 
qualification of this personnel. This w as parallel to the question posed to Irish 
banks w hich w ere asked if they had  personnel fam iliar w ith technological 
aspects of a business proposition w hich could be useful in evaluating the 
viability of a loan.
16 See 4.4
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The fifth question asked generally about how  the recession in G erm any had 
affected bank lending behaviour and  margins. Again, there was a problem  w ith 
this question w hich will be discussed later.
The sixth section was subsequently discarded further to receiving inform ation 
from  a guarantee bank that the question had  been based on incorrect 
inform ation.17
The seventh section concerned the com position of lending to small businesses. 
The objective of this question was to establish the percentage of lending which 
is for w orking capital as opposed to that for fixed assets.
The eighth section in the questionnaire com prised an  unprom pted question 
w hich asked G erm an banks how  they deal w ith  small businesses lacking fixed 
assets w hich could be used  to secure a loan. The reason this was unprom pted  
w as that the following extract w hich dealt w ith  the contribution of guarantee 
banks m ight induce bankers to answ er differently. It w as therefore im portant to 
ask bankers about the procedure they use before m entioning one of the 
possibilities. This question preceded the final extract.
17 This section  asked banks to cite the number o f  proportion o f  loan applicants referred to them by 
guarantee banks. This event does not arise since the bank initiates the contact with the guarantee bank
and not v ice versa.
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The final extract, as has been m entioned above, dealt w ith  the raison d ' etre of 
guarantee banks. Banks w ere asked if they perceived them  to be purely a State 
intervention or a synthesis of commercial and  State d riven  finance.
4.4 Limitations of the Research
The first and forem ost lim itation is the difficulty of obtaining tru thful 
responses. There is the m oral hazard  problem  alluded to in Kinsella (1994) 
w hen he w as asking fast grow th firms if they had  had  a loan application 
rejected by a bank in  the past. Those w hich had  had  an  application declined by 
the bank and  subsequently w ent on to become successful despite having their 
business proposition rejected, m entioned w ith  a certain "relish" this "apparent 
lack of foresight" by the banks. The converse w as true for firms w hich had  been 
rejected by banks. These m ight not have been so forthcom ing about m entioning 
the reluctance of bankers to support them.
The veracity of responses can be underm ined by respondents w anting to show 
themselves in a better light. The general theory on research techniques urges 
the interview er to examine issues in  advance of the interview  w hich could 
prom pt the respondent to embellish or w ithhold the truth. These distortions, 
the causes of w hich are recognised ad  priori, perm it aberrations from  the tru th  
to be pu t in  the context of the respondent's individual circumstances. According 
to Taylor and Bogdan, (1984):
"...the issue of "tru th" in qualitative research is a complicated one. W hat 
the qualitative researcher is interested in is not tru th  per se, but rather
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perspectives. Thus the interview er tries to elicit a m ore or less honest rendering 
of how  inform ants actually view  themselves and  their experiences"18.
In the case of this survey, evidence supplied by and  Irish bank concerning the 
losses accruing on  its lending to riskier enterprises is considerably higher than 
those losses accruing on  lending to norm al customers. The m oral hazard  w ould 
be that these estim ates are inflated in order to overestim ate the willingness to 
take on risk in  this Special Unit.
O n the other hand, G erm an banks have never been criticised to the same extent 
as their Irish counterparts. It follows that they m ay not have to em ploy 
defensive tactics. They m ay therefore underestim ate the risk they are prepared 
to enter into. O thers m ay w ish to im press the interview er w ith  a show  of 
largesse. This elem ent of interview er bias is difficult to prevent against.
Some of the questions w ere sensitive in nature. This w as particularly true in  the 
case of bank m argins in Germ any.19 It had  been hoped that the proceeding 
question w hich m entioned the grow th of com petition am ong banks in  Germ any 
and the recession w ould  function palliate the question as to w hether banks 
w ould now  lend at m ore favourable rates to samll businesses. This question 
achieved a low com pliance rate due to the sensitivity of this area.
18 Taylor and B ogden, 1984. “ Introduction to qualitative research methods: the search for m eanings” .P.98
19 Section 5, A ppendix, 4 .3 .2
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In the area of collateral, Irish banks are reluctant to take an entrepreneur's home 
as security. In the G erm an questionnaire, one had  to be careful not to m ention 
this fact in  case it prom pted  Germ an bankers to say likewise. In fact, the author 
was careful no t to allude to the policy of Irish bankers in case it w ould colour 
the statem ents m ade by their G erm an counterparts.
Again, in the area of collateral, it w as thought expedient to present m ore 
sensitive small business assets such as the house and business assets together 
w ith other less contentious collateral types such as bank savings, bonds, gilts 
and shares. This presentation was used  in order to appear less threatening to 
bankers and  not p u t them  on their defensive.
The second m ain problem  concerns the issues being com pared and 
investigated. Risk provisions are notorious for fluctuating from  year to year and 
m ay not bear m uch relation to a bank 's conservatism  in lending. They are also 
aggregate figures w hich cannot be analysed separately to account for the 
com ponent of risk exposure tow ards growing, capital deficient small 
businesses. For this reason it was thought m ore expedient to use the fallout rate 
on Special U nit loans which had been cited by an  Irish bank. This bears a better 
relationship to riskier small businesses and  the propensity of the banks to 
support risk than  an aggregate figure w hich encompasses other borrower 
categories. Similarly, it was thought that the estimates supplied by the German 
guarantee bank w hich deals specifically w ith small and riskier borrower
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categories could be used as a G erm an proxy of fallout rate. The guarantee bank 
has also an  official m andate to disclose such inform ation being in receipt of 
State funds. This can help to elim inate som e of the m oral hazard  problems 
described above in addition to overcom ing the problem  presented by aggregate 
figures.
The final observation which can be m ade is th a t on the w hole, G erm an bankers 
preferred a structured questionnaire and tended no t to deviate from  the 
questions so much. This was very evident in  the question concerning collateral 
w hich w as presented to both G erm an and Irish bankers. The G erm ans d id  not 
have a problem  assigning w eightings to different types of collateral. The Irish 
bankers, on the other hand, could no t or w ould  not com ply w ith  this question. 
Perhaps G erm an culturally adhere to a m ental yardstick and thus have no 
difficulty in  supplying threshold levels and  param eters. This issue will be 
discussed m ore fully in the chapter dealing w ith  collateral.
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Chapter 5 Comparison of bank lending in  
Ireland and Germany
5.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the research. It also endeavours to 
com pensate for inform ation gaps w hich arise from  non-response to particular 
questions by referring to the firm  specific studies of the SFA (1989) for statistics 
relating to Ireland and a study by Drukarcyk (1985) w hich furnishes 
inform ation relating to Germany.
It also investigates the allegedly better relationship small firms in  Germany 
enjoy w ith  their banks in the form  of implicit, p rom inent banking relationships. 
Such close relationships referred to as " H ausbankverhaltnisse" or house bank 
relationships, are repu ted  to be instrum ental in  perm itting G erm an businesses 
access to bank finance on  m ore favourable terms than  in the absence of such 
tacit agreem ents. The theory behind such relationship banking w as presented in 
C hapter 1. The au thor's  interview s w ith  G erm an banks from  across the banking 
spectrum  perm itted  to conclude if such close relationships betw een Germ an 
banks and  small businesses are w itnessed in reality. If they do exist, this survey 
investigates w hether close ties betw een Germ an banks and small businesses 
have a positive im pact on lending term s accorded G erm an businesses on the 
prem ise that heightened tru st betw een banker and entrepreneur results in 
relaxed security requirem ents on bank loans.
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5.1 A com parison of uncollateralised lending
5.2 C om paring the ratio of collateral to loan for selected types of 
collateral
5.3 C om paring default rates of different type of small enterprises
5.4 H ow  G erm an bankers and  econom ists evaluate h igh gearing and  long 
term  lending
5.5 Are G erm an bankers m ore selective than  than  Irish bankers?
5.6 Com parison of branch discretion and bank m onitoring
5.7 Relationship betw een small businesses and  their banks
5.8 Implications of the results
5.1 A comparison of uncollateralised lending
Bannock and  D oran (1991) in their conversations w ith  bankers alluded to the
difficulty in eliciting inform ation from  bankers concerning the am ount of
uncollateralised loans being advanced to firms;
"M ost respondents w ere unw illing to talk about the extent to which they
were w illing to lend w ithout collateral, although there w as w idespread
agreem ent that in some countries com petition had  lead to a higher proportion 
of lending being unsecured"1.
The results are categorised under the following extracts:
1 G. Bannock and A Doran, (1991) "Small business policy in Europe: a new era of competition". 
P.71
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Due to the understandable reticence of banks in this area, it was deem ed 
necessary to refer to tw o firm  specific studies w hich examine the num ber of 
uncollateralised loans in  Ireland and Germany. Table 5.1.1
Both studies categorise collateral differently. For exam ple Drukarcyk (1985) 
uses the descriptions real estate and mobile assets'w hile the SFA (1989) employ 
the classifications business collateral and personal collateral. The im portant 
point is tha t both  studies take cognisance of the num ber of uncollateralised vis a 
vis collteralised loans in  bo th  countries. This am ounts to 20.5 percent in  the case 
of Germany. The corresponding figure pertaining to Ireland is 20 percent. The 
difference betw een the tw o figures is negligible. It is fortuitous that D rukarcyk's 
study confines to loans of betw een 1 and  7 years inclusive. This is due to the 
fact, as has been seen in the first chapter, G erm an banks' propensity to lend 
long term  exceed long term  lending in Ireland considerably. In Germ any the 
percentage of com panies w ith  long term  loans of m ore than 4 years duration 
am ounted to 42 percent vis a vis 16 percent in Ireland.2
Due to the bias inherent in  G erm an long term  lending, it is likely that the 
num ber of uncollateralised loans in Ireland is higher than  it appears. This is due 
to the fact that there are also long term  loans present in the SFA (1989) sample 
which w ould tend to d isto rt the result since long term  loans are m ore likely to 
be secured.
2 See 1.3
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Table 5.1.1 Comparison of uncollateralised loans by number in  Ireland and Germany.
Research
study
Total
collateralised
loans
Unsecured
loans
Real estate Mobile assets Other Business
collateral
Personal
collateral
Ire land  
SFA (1989) 80% 20% NA NA 24% 36% 19%
G erm any
D rukarcyk1
(1985)
79.5% 20.5 26.9% 34.4% 3.8% NA NA
1 In the case of Drukarcyk et al (1985), medium and short term loans are examined. Medium term is a loan of 7 years or less..
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Despite the lim itation im posed by the fact that D rukarcyk 's (1985) sam ple refers 
to loans of betw een 1 and  7 years while the SFA survey (1989) does not 
distinguish am ong loans of different duration, the evidence suggests that a 
similar p roportion  of lending is unsecured in  G erm any and Ireland.
5.2 C om paring  th e  ra t io of collateral to loan  for selected types of 
collateral
As w as discussed in the last chapter, bankers w ere asked to supply  inform ation 
relating to the frequency of use of certain types of assets used  to secure a loan 
w eighting. They w ere also asked to assign a w eighting w hich relates to the 
capacity of this asset to cover a loan. A high w eighting of close to 100 percent 
such as in the case of cash balances held at the bank, could be indicative of the 
ability of the bank on disposal of the asset to realise the value of the loan 
principle. If m any respondents gave a similar set of w eightings to a certain asset 
this could suggest that this asset is one w hich could be readily liquidated and 
its value realised by the bank.
A high value could also suggest that the individual bank in question pursues a 
less conservative lending strategy and  is prepared to extend the small business 
ow ner a loan on  less onerous terms. This alternative in terpretation of a high 
security value w ould  arise if the same series of bankers interview ed followed 
different guidelines concerning the evaluation of an asset to be used as 
collateral.
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Three of the four Irish bank representatives participating in this survey could 
not assign w eightings to the different types of collateral used in securing a loan. 
One of the banks ventured  an estim ate as to w hat extent an entrepreneur's 
house could cover a loan. In  other w ords, an  en trepreneur's residence valued at 
£100,0003 by a bank could be taken as security on a £50,000 long term  loan for 
fixed capital purposes by one bank vis a vis another bank 's policy of taking an 
equivalent asset as security on a loan of £40,000. In the form er case, the bank 
pursues a m ore conservative lending strategy w hich is dem onstrated by a 
collateral to loan ratio of 0.5 com pared w ith  a lower ratio of 0.4 in the case of the 
latter bank. This exam ple is intended to illustrate how  different bank assign 
collateral to loans.
The reticence of Irish bankers in providing estimates as to the ability of 
collateral to secure a loan differed from  the responses of Germ an bankers who 
cited param eters w hich indicated the ability of various classifications of 
collateral such as residential property  and  charge on debtors to secure a loan. 
The w eightings relating to residential property  can be translated into collateral 
to loan ratios. These in turn, as shall be seen at a later stage, will be em ployed in 
a com parison betw een ratios exhibited in Ireland and those evolved from  the 
author's interview s w ith G erm an bankers. Tables 5.2.1a.
3 Net of a margin detracted to account for expenses incurred on the disposal of the 
entreprensur's home
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Table 5.2.1a Weightings of selected assets used as collateral in Germany 
and Ireland
German Bank Collateral cover of house Duration of loans 
covered by house
Head Office of a main bank 45 - 64% NA
Branch of a main bank approx. 60%l -
Regional guarantee bank 60% -
Head office of savings bank up to 60%
80% on good house?
Long term loans
Branch of savings bank up to 80% Long term and short term 
loans
Branch of savings bank 60% Long term loan
Regional head office of 
cooperative bank
Branch of cooperative bank 48% approx2 -
Regional bank head office 48 - 58 %3 Long term
Regional bank head office up to 80%? -
Branch of regional bank 54% - 72%4 Short term and medium 
term
Irish Bank
Headquarters of main 
bank
Collateral cover of house5 Duration of loans 
covered by house
50% Long term but also for 
working capital loans
1 75%  o f  the market value assum ing a market value o f  80%
2 60%  o f  loanable value w hich is 80%
3 60% market value assum ing market value o f  80 - 90%
4 10% deducted for risk. 60 - 80% o f  the remainder.
5 Irish bank does not favour taking house because o f  “adverse im age”effects. It is bad policy  to rely on an 
asset w hich is not frontline security
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G erm an bankers also indicated the nature and purpose of such a loan i.e. short 
term  for w orking capital purposes.
Despite the fact that only one bank of the four Irish banks provided a tentative 
estim ate as to the capacity of an  en trepreneur's  residence to cover an  advance 
from  his bank, this setback could be overcome by referring to the sam e study 
m entioned earlier in  w hich the SFA investigated inter alia the collateral to loan 
ratios of small, Irish businesses. This is another instance of a survey of small 
enterprises being sourced to supplem ent research on the banks.
The w eightings supplied by the G erm an banks were converted to ratios which 
perm itted com parisons w ith  ratios obtained by the SFA in 1989.
The w eighting assigned by an Irish bank of 50 percent indicating the adjusted 
value of residential property  to cover a loan translated into a ratio of 2. In other 
w ords, a house w ith  a m arket value of £100,000 could be used to secure a long 
term  loan of approxim ately £50,000. This was also included for purposes of 
com parison w ith  the G erm an ratios. F igure 5.2.1
It can be seen that the SFA ratios show  a w ider spread than  the G erm an values. 
The SFA ratios fall along the continuum  from "less than  1" to "greater than 3". 
51 percent of Irish firms exhibited ratios of between 1 and 3. According to the
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Figure 5.2.1 C om paring  the results of the collateral to loan ratios of G erm an banks w ith  Irish  ratios from  the SFA survey 
(1989)
Irish collateral ratio of 2 for 
house cited by one bank
Threshold value for collateral 
to loan ratio in  G erm any
1.4
T
2
y
2.7
G erm an collateral to loan ratios fa ll w ith in  th is range
*§FA Survey (1989); 54% of sm all firm s responding  to survey had  collateral to loan ratios betw een 1 and  3.
10% of loans exhibited ratios of less than  1. 36% exhibited  ratios of greater th an  3
>
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SFA (1989) survey, a m inority of Irish loans estim ated at 10 percent w ere 
secured by a p roportion  of collateral equal to or less than  the value of the loan.
None of the G erm an banks interview ed secured loans in a 1:1 collateral to loan 
proportion. All spreads cited by G erm an bankers fell w ith in  the com paratively 
narrow  range of 1.4 and  2.7.
Similarly, the one Irish bank w hich com plied by providing a w eighting, cited a 
value w hich fell w ithin the 1.4 to 2.7 param eter.
The guidelines governing the lending latitude of the co-operative bank sector, 
w hich in tu rn  are dictated by the provisions of the K reditwesengesetz1, 
stipulate a m axim um  ratio of 2.7 times the am ount of collateral to loan. This 
legal provision m eans that, in  the case of real estate valuations, that the 
proportion  of collateral to loan cannot exceed this collateral threshold level.
As will be discussed in  the section dealing w ith  the implications of this 
research, the fact that collateral has ceased to be ranked as the second m ost 
im portan t concern by Irish small enterprises since the SBA survey in 1989, 
indicates th a t in  the interim , Irish banks have become m ore accom m odating in 
this respect.4
4 Sec 5.7
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Before em barking on  a description of the types of collateral used  to secure loans 
in G erm any w hich are no t used  in Ireland, a brief description of how  Germ an 
bankers assign collateral w eightings follows.
The legal provisions w hich govern the am ount of collateral a Germ an loan 
officer can take on a loan are delineated ' u nder Article 18 of the 
Kreditwesengesetz. As m entioned earlier, these provide for a m axim um  
collateral to loan ratio of 2.7.
The procedure for allocating collateral to loan is as follows.5
Firstly a m arket value for residential property  is established by reference to a 
statistical price index w hich is circulated to all credit institutions.
Following this, a deduction is m ade from  this m arket estim ate to account for 
the processing costs and  the event w hich could arise of a depressed auction 
price should  the bank be com pelled to liquidate the asset. N o G erm an banker 
cited a deduction exceeding 20 percent of the m arket value. The various 
deductions are m ade in  accordance w ith  the quality of the type of residential 
property  in question. T able 5.2.2
5 This procedure is one used by the co-operative banks and complies with the 2.7 threshold 
level. It is illustrated in the handbook circulated to their members entitled, "Handbuch der 
Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisenbanken", 1995
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Table 5-2.2 Calculating value of assets for loans1
Property Description Market Value 
Deductions
Loanable value 
deductions
Residential property
New houses at most 20 years old of 
solid constructions and large 
proportions of contempory building 
style in middle to upper class districts
80% of the loanable 
value
0 -10%
Buildings older than 20 years of age // 5 -15%
New buildings of less sophisticated 
construction, in less favourable 
locations
ti 5-15%
Social welfare buildings H 5-15%
Commercial Property
Commercial and semi - commercial 
property
70% the loanable 
value
0 -10%
New multipurpose buildings, at most 
10 years of age in stable locations
70% of the loanable 
value
10-20%
Buildings over 10 years of age 60 - 70% of the 
loanable value
10 - 20%
New buildings with restricted 
functions in less favourable locations
60 - 70% of the 
loanable value
10 - 20%
Source: Extract translated from ",Handbuch der Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken", 
January 1993 edition.
1 A ccording to A rticle 20 , Section 2 o f  the 
German Banking R egulations
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W ith respect to the deductions m ade by co-operative banks in  this example, it is 
clear that an en trepreneur possessing a well built house of less than  20 years old 
in a good location could leverage m arginally m ore finance from  the bank than 
an en trepreneur possessing a social welfare residence. In the case of the former 
the proportion  of collateral to loan could be a t m ost 1.386 and  in the case of the 
latter 1.57. The fact that the entrepreneur in  possession of a social welfare 
residence has to place proportionately m ore collateral at the disposal of the 
bank reflects the higher disposal cost of such a residence.
It is also apparen t that the value of residential property  as an  asset is easier to 
realise than  that of commercial property. This is reflected in the fact that 
deductions of at least 30 percent are m ade on commercial p roperty  com pared 
w ith  20 percent in  the case of residential property. These deductions from the 
m arket value of the asset increase in  the case of old prem ises or prem ises which 
require conversion before being reused.
Germ an bankers cited a m axim um  deduction of 20 percent in the case of 
residential property. How ever, there w as less unanim ity in the value of cover 
each residential p roperty  could provide as security for borrow ed funds.
Table 1.2.1a.
6 100 / 100- 10*0.8
7100/100-15*0.8
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To cite a case in point, the head office of a large G erm an bank w ith its office in 
Frankfurt operates w ith in  a band of 45 percent to 64 percent of the loanable 
value for residential property. Converting this into a collateral to loan ratio 
following a 20 percent deduction from  the m arket value evolves a ratio of at 
m ost 2.8.
O n the other hand, a branch of a co-operative bank pursues a m ore lenient 
policy. This bank cited a value of 48 percent of the loanable am ount. The 
loanable am ount is again 80 percent of the m arket value. This bank cited a value 
of 48 percent of the adjusted m arket price or loanable value. This converts to a 
collateral to loan ratio of 2.6. This bank could legitimately request m arginally 
m ore collateral because it has not yet reached the 2.7 collateral to loan ceiling.
There w as consensus am ong all G erm an bankers as regards the im portance of 
residential p roperty  as collateral. This signalled, according to one Germ an 
banker, the "com m itm ent" of the entrepreneur to the project.
Low house ow nership figures in G erm any imply that, despite the desirability 
for G erm an bankers of taking a charge on an ow ner's residence, from  the 
perspective of G erm an bankers, its availability as an asset was restricted. A 
representative from  a savings bank in Baden W iirttem burg indicated that in the 
case of start ups, 90 percent of entrepreneurs live in rented accommodation.
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One can conclude that, although the house is regarded  as being an im portant 
asset in G erm any w hich can be used to secure a loan, in reality m ost bankers 
are precluded from  applying this m easure due to low  residential ow nership 
figures. This is particularly true in the case of younger enterprises.
Both Irish and Germ an bankers1 alluded to the adverse im age effects arising 
w hen a bank auctions a house8. For this reason it w as thought m ore expedient 
to observe cash flows and  the qualities of m anagem ent than resort to using an 
ow ner's residence as security.
All G erm an bankers expressed suprise at the decision of Irish bankers not to 
use the entrepreneur's  residence as collateral under several schemes9.
IBIS intim ated in 1995, that Irish banks had  agreed in  principle not ask for the 
family hom e as collateral.10 According to one Irish bank, a value of 50 percent 
w as placed on the proprietor's hom e bu t that his bank did no t favour taking a 
charge in practice due to averse im age effects. Protracted legal disputes made 
using an  entrepreneur's  house as collateral m ore tedious.
The Enterprise Developm ent Units which ensure close surveillance of fast 
grow th firm s w ith  potential do not require guarantees either. A representative
8 Edwards and Fischer (1992) noted that this was especially true in the case of the savings bank 
and co-operative bank sector due to the presence of their close community ties.
9 Examples of such schemes is the Access to Finance Scheme administered by the 4 main Irish 
banks and which is described in 1.4.1
10 Management. "Angel or Devil?. 31. January, 1995
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W ith respect to the deductions m ade by co-operative banks in this example, it is 
clear that an  entrepreneur possessing a well built house of less than 20 years old 
in a good location could leverage m arginally m ore finance from  the bank than 
an  en trepreneur possessing a social welfare residence. In  the case of the form er 
the p roportion  of collateral to loan could be at m ost 1.386 and  in  the case of the 
latter 1.57. The fact tha t the entrepreneur in possession of a social welfare 
residence has to place proportionately m ore collateral at the disposal of the 
bank reflects the higher disposal cost of such a residence.
It is also apparen t tha t the value of residential p roperty  as an  asset is easier to 
realise than  that of commercial property. This is reflected in the fact that 
deductions of at least 30 percent are m ade on  commercial property  com pared 
w ith  20 percent in  the case of residential property. These deductions from  the 
m arket value of the asset increase in the case of old prem ises or prem ises which 
require conversion before being reused.
G erm an bankers cited a m axim um  deduction of 20 percent in the case of 
residential property. H ow ever, there w as less unanim ity in the value of cover 
each residential p roperty  could provide as security for borrow ed funds.
Table 1.2.1a.
6100/ 100- 10*0.8
7100/100-15*0.8
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To cite a case in point, the head  office of a large G erm an bank w ith  its office in 
Frankfurt operates w ithin a band of 45 percent to 64 percent of the loanable 
value for residential property. Converting this into a collateral to loan ratio 
following a 20 percent deduction from  the m arket value evolves a ratio of at 
m ost 2.8.
O n the other hand, a branch of a co-operative bank pursues a m ore lenient 
policy. This bank cited a value of 48 percent of the loanable am ount. The 
loanable am ount is again 80 percent of the m arket value. This bank cited a value 
of 48 percent of the adjusted m arket price or loanable value. This converts to a 
collateral to loan ratio of 2.6. This bank could legitim ately request marginally 
m ore collateral because it has no t yet reached the 2.7 collateral to loan ceiling.
There w as consensus am ong all G erm an bankers as regards the im portance of 
residential property  as collateral. This signalled, according to one Germ an 
banker, the "com m itm ent" of the entrepreneur to the project.
Low house ow nership figures in Germ any im ply that, despite the desirability 
for G erm an bankers of taking a charge on an ow ner's residence, from the 
perspective of G erm an bankers, its availability as an  asset w as restricted. A 
representative from  a savings bank in  Baden W iirttem burg indicated that in the 
case of start ups, 90 percent of entrepreneurs live in rented  accommodation.
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One can conclude that, although the house is regarded  as being an im portant 
asset in  G erm any w hich can be used to secure a loan, in reality m ost bankers 
are precluded from  applying this m easure due to low  residential ow nership 
figures. This is particularly true in the case of younger enterprises.
Both Irish and G erm an bankers1 alluded to the adverse im age effects arising 
w hen a bank auctions a house8. For this reason it w as thought m ore expedient 
to observe cash flows and  the qualities of m anagem ent than  resort to using an 
ow ner's residence as security.
All G erm an bankers expressed suprise at the decision of Irish bankers not to 
use the en trepreneur's  residence as collateral under several schemes9.
IBIS intim ated in 1995, that Irish banks had agreed in principle not ask for the
family hom e as collateral.10 According to one Irish bank, a value of 50 percent 
was placed on  the p roprieto r's  hom e bu t that his bank did  not favour taking a 
charge in practice due to averse im age effects. Protracted legal disputes m ade 
using an  en trepreneur's  house as collateral m ore tedious.
The Enterprise D evelopm ent Units w hich ensure close surveillance of fast 
grow th firms w ith  potential do no t require guarantees either. A representative
8 Edwards and Fischer (1992) noted that this was especially true in the case of the savings bank 
and co-operative bank sector due to the presence of their close community ties.
9 Examples of such schemes is the Access to Finance Scheme administered by the 4 main Irish 
banks and which is described in 1.4.1
10 Management. "Angel or Devil?. 31. January, 1995
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of a G erm an savings bank expressed an interest in  such a venture. A 
com m unication from  the G erm an savings bank association announced the 
proposed introduction of such Units on a pilot scheme in September, 1996.
The views of Irish banks regarding taking a charge on  residential property were 
at variance w ith  those of G erm an bankers. N one of the Germ an bankers 
interview ed hesitated to em phasise the usefulness of an entrepreneur's house 
as collateral since it signalled the ow ner's personal commitment.
The next item  of collateral w hich G erm an bankers rated w as that of taking a 
charge on the book debts of the small firm. This was assigned a m inim um  
w eighting of 0 to 20 percent by a private bank in S tuttgart and  a m axim um  
w eighting of 80 percent declared charges as opposed to undeclared charges by 
a local branch of the D resdner bank. An average value seems to lie in the range 
of 25 to 30 percent. Table 5.2.1b
The taking of a charge on book debts of a com pany was proposed by the 
G overnm ent Task Force in 1994 as a way to supplem ent the Enterprise Loan 
Scheme. For this reason it was im perative to establish how Germ an banks 
w hich are not precluded from  using this facility rate this category of collateral. 
It was also deem ed useful to establish the duration of loans for which a charge 
on book debts are m ost frequently used.
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a local branch of the D resdner bank. An average value seems to lie in the range 
of 25 to 30 percent. Table 5.2.1b
The taking of a charge on book debts of a com pany was proposed by the 
G overnm ent Task Force in 1994 as a w ay to supplem ent the Enterprise Loan 
Scheme. For this reason it was im perative to establish how  G erm an banks 
which are not precluded from  using this facility rate this category of collateral. 
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Table 5.2.1b W eightings of selected assets used  as collateral in  G erm any 
and  Ireland
German Bank Collateral cover of charge 
on debtors
Duration of loans covered 
by charge on debtors
Head Office of a main bank 100% of net value1 “
Branch of a main bank 60- 70% Current account
Regional guarantee bank 20 - 50% 
average 30%
Head office of savings bank up to 80% Medium term to long term 
loans
Branch of savings bank up to 80% -
Branch of savings bank up to 80% on open 
(declared?) accounts 
undeclared are worthless
Regional head office of 
cooperative bank
Branch of cooperative bank depends on 
creditworthiness of 
accounts
Regional bank head office 80% on an open 
(declared)2
50% on a still (undeclared) 
account
Short term loans
Regional bank head office 10-50% 
Sometimes 0%
Branch of regional bank 0 - 40% Short term
Irish  b an k Collateral cover of charge 
on debtors
Duration of loans covered 
by charge on debtors
H eadquarters of Irish  bank 52.5% - 60%3 Short term  lending
1 This net value is unknown
2 Evidence from another bank affiliate puts the value at 40% . This depreciation on the value o f  book 
debts has been prompted by poor paym ent by debtors and the recession
3 This main bank with large operations in Ireland lends using charge on debtors in the UK. The w eighting  
amounts to 75% o f  book debts but a charge can on ly  be on average applied to 70 - 80% o f  a firm ’s 
portfolio
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The representative of the four m ain banks in Ireland w hich conducts m ost of its 
operations overseas, m entioned that his bank already took a charge on book 
debts in  N orthern  Ireland and  the UK. He cited a w eighting of 75 percent for 
this facility. This 75 percent w eighting refers only to the accounts in the small 
business portfolio w hich are viable. This w ould  m ean that on average the 
w eighting applies to 75 percent of between 70 and  80 percent of the small firm 's 
portfolio. A sm all business could expect on average to secure a short term  loan 
of £1000 having betw een £1604 and £1904 and w orth  of debtors. This average 
w eighting of 56 percent on the portfolio of a business com pares favourably w ith 
selected estim ates from  G erm an banks which are delineated below.
There is evidence tha t databases which keep a current tabulation of a 
com pany's debts are extensively used in  Ireland.
"M any small custom ers even w ith a w ide custom er base have a com puter 
debtor system. These provide the bank w ith  m onthly statistics on the age 
profile of the debts11"
The values cited by G erm an banks for a charge on debtors are low. It follows 
that w ith  an  average value of 25 p e rc en t1 , trad ing  assets of a small business to 
the value of £1000 could expect to leverage an overdraft or short term  loan to 
the value of £250. Evidence from  the Germ an bankers suggests that due to the 
fragm ented and  not so transparent nature of m any small businesses trading
11 Lending officer from international bank with large operations in Ireland.
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accounts, the m onitoring of individual debtors by banks is no t cost effective. 
For this reason, book debts w ere never used alone as collateral bu t rather to 
supplem ent some other collateral item  such business assets. As one Germ an 
banker stated;
"It (a charge on debtors) is used as an indicator of the health of the firm 
to leverage short term  debt. This is because of the im m ense portfolio risk in the 
case of a small firm  w hich has only a few debtors. Daim er Benz, for example 
has a m uch w ider spread of risk. The individual accounts are too time 
consum ing and expensive to m onitor12".
The evidence of several G erm an bankers indicated that their relative 
im portance as an asset has dim inished in  recent years. One large Germ an bank 
in M unich discounted the value of book debts from  40 percent to 20 percent 
w hich represents a considerable decrease in their value as collateral. This is 
largely due to the im pact of the recession, w hereby paym ent periods have 
lengthened. The trend  tow ards dow nw ard  revisions of com pany book debts in 
the case of small com panies in  Germ any has been precipitated by delayed 
paym ent periods w hich is m ost profoundly felt by smaller enterprises which 
have less bargaining power. Table 5.2.3
To conclude this section dealing w ith  security on loans, reference is m ade to the 
criteria w hich G erm an bankers em ploy in assessing loans. H ow  w eighted are 
they in a decision w here a firm  m ay have adequate cash flow but inadequate 
collateral w ith  w hich the loan can be secured?
12 Employee of a Stuttgart savings bank responsible for clearing operations
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Table 5.2.3 Average Payment Periods (all enterprise sizes)
Days to Payment
Average
1993
Days
1992
7-14
%
15-29
%
30-59
%
60-89
%
90 -119
%
120+
%
Germany 43> 34 15 37 40 6 1 1
Ireland 56 56 3 8 41 35 11 1
EU Average 66 65 6 11 30 30 17 7
Source: Grant Thornton, European Business Survey, 1993 and 1994. Distribution of average days for 1992 only
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The im portance attached to collateral lies in the w eightings accorded collateral 
in the bank scoring system. According to the loan scoring system  of a head co­
operative bank, individual borrow ing characteristics are evaluated. According 
to the scoring sheet, collateral w as assigned a w eighting of 8/90. A loan is 
approved if the applicant attains 65 out of 90 points so collateral really do not 
im pinge upon  a lending decision.
The m inor role played by security in Germ any is also evidenced by Bannock 
and D oran (1992) w ho also conducted interviews w ith  G erm an bankers. A 
G erm an banker had  the follow ing to say:
"SMEs generate m ore sight deposits which, w hen built into the 
custom er's calculation, can allow  some shading in loan pricing. We pay m ore 
attention to the quality of m anagem ent and no t so m uch to the security, which 
in general dow nturn  becomes less valuable anyw ay"13.
This w as also evidenced by Clem ents and Burns (1992) w hereby Germ an 
entrepreneurs were asked to rank  the criteria by w hich G erm an banks access 
loans. G erm an SMEs w ith  no m ore than 250 em ployees ranked guarantees in 
fourth  place behind the value of overall assets of the business, the long term  
health of the business and  interest and dividend cover. O w ner m anaged 
com panies w hich are m ore closely related to Irish small businesses in terms of 
size, ranked guarantees in second place.14
13 Bannock and Doran, 1990. P. 76
14 See Chapter 2
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The final section of the three sections presenting the results of interviews
conducted w ith  bankers in  Ireland and  Germ any concerns the default rates of
small enterprises.
Two indicators w ere used  to estimate how  liberal or alternatively, how 
conservative banks w ere in lending to small enterprises.
Specific risk provisions operate to cover a bank in  the contingency that a 
particular firm  fails. It is discretionary on the part of bankers in  Germany. This 
am ount is subtracted from  the liability side of the balance sheet according to 
regulation 340g of the Kreditwesengesetz. The advantage of using specific risk 
provisions rather than general provisions is that they are directly related to the 
confidence a bank has in a particular firm  or type of firm. Specific risk 
provisions are values w hich give an indicator of how  enterprises themselves 
perform  and the likelihood of them  being able to redeem  their loan from  the 
bank.
G eneral risk provisions represent aggregates and  so it is not possible for 
instance, to isolate the com ponent of risk related to start ups or young 
m anufacturing companies. O n the other hand, the clearing bank to the Germ an 
co-operative banks in Baden-W ürttem berg cited the specific risk relating to 
start ups which is based on  the historical default rate of such risky investments.
5.3 Comparing default and specific risk provision rates of different type
of small enterprises
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The com ponent of the risk provision w hich covers the exposure of banks 
tow ards younger, technologically innovative small businesses, as in this case, 
w ould ideally be show n in  isolation as opposed to it being contained in  an 
aggregate provision.
It m ight be expected ad priori, that banks w hich are  in  receipt of governm ent 
funds such as guarantee banks w ould  exhibit h igher firm  default rates and 
specific provisions if their custom er profile represented young riskier firms 
than  a bank w hich operated  on  a m ore commercial basis.
Closely allied to the concept of specific risks is the m agnitude of the default rate 
dem onstrated by various banks. The extent of firms defaulting on their loans is 
a useful piece of inform ation since it reflects both  on the health of firms 
(attrition rate) and  on the w illingness of banks to finance "deserving" firms 
w hich m ay result in a riskier bank portfolio.
As explained in  the M ethodology, an  Irish bank provided default rates for 
"norm al" business risks and small riskier businesses w hich were catered f or by 
its Enterprise D evelopm ent Unit. Both these estim ates w ere presented to 
G erm an bankers. It was envisaged that these inputs into the discussions w ould 
prom pt them  into giving indicators as to how  their exposure to riskier 
custom er groups such as grow ing industrial com panies w ould be reflected in 
their provisioning. Table 5.3.1
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Table 5.3.1 Responses of German banks to selected Irish banks' risk provisions and default rates
German Banks using Irish 
provisioning and fallout as 
proxy
Irish Fallout rate of;
Do you have a Special enterprise 
department?
"normal credit risks" 
1% of claims
"Special enterprise department 
risks"
3 - 4% of claims
Association of savings 
banks
NA Irish rate higher From 1.09.1996, pilot project to 
spearhead similiar enterprise units
Regional head of 
cooperative banks
Specific provisions could amount 
from 3% to 10% for start ups
No
Savings bank branch German fallout higher Irish maximum loss rate 
equivalent for riskier groups
Branch of main bank German fallout higher German loss rate exceeds this for 
riskier groups i.e 6 - 8% of claims
No
Each loan officer has palette of clients
District savings bank German fallout lower 
0.7% = breakeven point
Specific risk = 3% max. See entry of savings bank association
Head office of a main bank Irish fallout higher 
1995 fallout = 0.21%
Irish fallout higher *
Cooperative bank branch Department which deals with small 
businesses in general
Headquarters of main bank German fallout lower German fallout lower
Guarantee bank dealing 
with SMEs
No normal customers German fallout is 3% Clients correspond to clients of Irish 
banks' special enterprise departments
1 5 3
The results can be in terpreted  by aid of diagrams.
Figure 5.3.1
It can be seen that the Irish Enterprise D evelopm ent U nit sustains a small firm 
loan default rate am ounting  to between three and  four percent on loans.
According to the responses of Germ an bankers, 37.5 percent of these banks 
incurred less loan fallout than  these Units w hile 37.5 percent of G erm an banks 
incurred a fallout equal to that sustained by the U nit15. A m inority of Germ an 
banks, corresponding to 25 percent of those responding to the question, 
sustained a firm  default rate greater than that exhibited by the Enterprise 
D evelopm ent Unit.
Com parisons could then be m ade betw een the fallout of riskier small business 
categories w itnessed in  the Enterprise Developm ent Unit of one Irish bank and 
that corresponding to the default rate on "blanko riskio" small businesses in 
Germany. This description of a "know  how-no capital" enterprise in Germ any 
corresponds approxim ately to the definition of firms which have been enlisted 
into the Enterprise D evelopm ent Unit. In other w ords, "blanko risiko" implies a 
firm  w ith a high p roportion  of intangible assets bu t little to offer a bank in 
terms of tangible assets w ith  which to secure a loan.
15 Since German banks do not have Enterprise Development Units, German bankers were asked 
to refer to specific loan provisions or fallout rates covering their exposure towards riskier, small 
enterprises. Figures cited by German bankers invariably did not distinguish between fallout 
thresholds as in the case of Irish banks but rather referred to an aggregate threshold.
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Figure 5.3.1 Default rates on riskier, small enterprises with growth potential
1% 3%
D efault rate of young, potentially  viable enterprises 
lacking in  fixed asset collateral catered for by 
Enterprise D evelopm ent U nit of an Irish  b an k  falls in  
this range.
/3 7 .5% of G erm an banks 
incur less fallout th an  Irish  
Enterprise D evelopm ent 
U nit
4%
25% of G erm an banks 
experience h igher default 
^ates
37.5% of G erm an banks 
includ ing  a State subsidised 
guarantee bank  experience sim ilar 
default rates in value terms
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The m ajority of G erm an banks, corresponding to 75 percent m anifested loan 
fallout on their advances to riskier small businesses w hich was equal to, or less 
than that exhibited by the Enterprise Developm ent Unit.
A suprising fact to em erge w as the disparity  in response rate betw een branches 
of big G erm an banks and  their subsidiaries. O ne branch of a big G erm an bank 
experienced a fallout on its portfolio of advances to small, local com panies of 
betw een 6 and 8 percent. The reason w hy this is suprising, is that big Germ an 
banks such as the D resdner, Deutche and Com m erzbank are typically believed 
to be m ore conservative in  their lending com pared w ith  savings bank and co­
operative banks16. The tw o head offices of big banks w hich responded to the 
question concerning fallout d id  no t incur fallout rates on loans to small 
businesses equal to that of the Irish bank in  this example. Similarly, the local 
branch of one of these banks incurred a fallout rate far in excess of that 
exhibited by its F rankfurt head office.
This suggests th a t the branches of big banks in Germ any m ay pursue lending 
policies divorced from  their head offices. Less conservative landing practices 
am ong local banks, including savings banks and co-operative banks was 
corroborated by a representative of a Cham ber of Commerce in the Baden- 
W ürttem berg area. He contended that in times of recession such local banks 
had taken m ore risks than  big banks in supporting  small enterprises.
16 Edwards and Fischer, 1994
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The fact that loan officers at G erm an savings branches have discretion to 
sanction loans of up  to 2.8 million DM (£1.75 m illion approxim ately) com pared 
w ith  a discretion of £50,00017 in certain instances in  Ireland facilitates this 
autonom y. W hether this is desirable or not, is a separate issue.
W ith respect to "norm al business custom ers" or corporate borrow ers posing 
"norm al commercial risks", estim ates of three Irish banks are available for 
com parison w ith  G erm an banks. The first Irish bank had  an  upper lim it for loan 
fallout of 1.2 percent of loans by value, the second 1 percent w hile the third 
bank, w hich on  its ow n adm ission had  a high cost to income ratio 
dem onstrated a value of 0.93 percent of advances w hich corresponded to its 
upper limit. T able 5.3.2
These values w ere elicited from  Irish banks by asking them  if they could 
sustain a fallout of 0.93 percent on a guaranteed  loan. This loan w ould  entail a 
70 percent governm ent subsidised guarantee similar to the guarantee 
adm inistered by the Small Business A dm inistration (SB A) in  the US18.
The Irish banks' fallout on norm al credit risks corresponded to that of Germ an 
banks. Of those G erm an banks responding to the question; "Do you incur a
17 Estimate cited by Mr. Felix O'Regan from the Irish Bankers' Information Service. 
Management. "Angel or devil?". 01 January, 1995
18 A description of this guarantee is given in Kinsella, 1995. Irish Banking Review. P.29
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Table 5.3.2 Responses of Irish bankers to 70% US Small Business Association Guarantee
Bank 3.1% Special Unit 
Guarantees at 70% 
(loss 0.93% of claims)
Loss rate threshold Reservations about 
guarantees
Suggested modifications 
to scheme
Bank 1 Yes NA
Bank 2 Yes. Would be happier 
with 85% cover = 0.46% 
loss instead of 0.93%
1%
( in riskier cases 3-4%)
Suspects that 
administration costs not 
included in 3.1%
Bank 3 Yes. Could sustain this 
guarantee
1.2% of claims In use in the UK but 
underused due to 
excessive red tape. 
Problems with 
indivisibilities regarding 
collateral. Businesses tend 
to find 1.5% premium 
prohibitive
UK tiered system of 85% 
cover for start ups and 
70% for development 
capital
Bank 4 Yes
(Cost to income ratio high 
in this bank)
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higher or low er firm  fallout rate on loans to corporate borrow ers which 
constitute norm al commercial risks than one percent of advances?", three 
sustained higher fallout while another 3 incurred lower fallout.
It is no t suprising tha t one of the guarantee banks w hich supplied inform ation 
w hich related to its provisioning against general risk, cited a percentage far in 
excess of the param eter cited in the questionnaire. W ith 5.3 percent of 
outstanding loans being set aside to defray against the risk of firms defaulting 
on their loans, this bank confirms w ith  the notion of bank w hich have a state 
m andate supporting  higher risk. According to a representative of this bank; 
"The guarantee bank has a level of loan defaults higher than the 1 percent 
breakeven poin t (breakeven poin t of Irish bank). This is because this bank does 
not have any "norm al custom ers". Its custom ers are essentially those w hom  a 
norm al commercial bank w ould  refuse a loan because of a lack of security".
This w ould  seem  to substantiate the proponents of interventionist policies who 
argue for the nu rtu ring  of "deserving cases".
The head offices of two big G erm an banks did  not yield figures comparable to 
the Irish figures for fallout on loans. One cited a threshold level of 0.7 percent 
and  another 0.21 percent although this can change on an  annual basis19. In other
19 Head office of a big German bank. Default rates for 1993 and 1994 were 0.3% and 0.29% 
respectively. These default rates refer to all businesses, including larger corporations and 
therefore the component relating to smaller, riskier enterprises would most likely be higher. 
However, smaller, riskier enterprises do not comprise a large proportion of their lending. 
(Edwards and Fischer, 1994)
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w ords, a threshold  level of 1 percent in Ireland was considered by head offices 
of two large G erm an banks as com parable to liberal.
Again the response of the G erm an branches of big and  other banking types 
seems to differ on the m axim um  allowable loss rate on outstanding loans. A 
branch of a m ain  bank and a savings bank claimed to experience higher fallout 
on loans.
5.4 H ow  German bankers and economists evaluate high gearing levels and 
long term lending
Long term  lending facilitated by house bank relationships is one of the m ost 
frequently cited reasons in  the literature as to w hy G erm an banks can overcome 
the risk of the firm  m oving off to another bank following heavy investm ent by 
the original housebank. M uch of this debate has also revolved around the 
proxim ity of the savings bank and  co-operative bank branches to the 
custom er.20
The first com m ent to m ake on the issue of long term  lending is that Germ an
bankers are indisputably long term  lenders21. H ow ever there had  not been
unequivocal support for this practice of long term  lending even from  experts
engaged in  the area of research into SMEs. To cite from  K aufm ann and Kokalj
(1995)22 w ho examine this issue of G overnm ent intervention;
"A w eakening in the stipulation by the banks for ow ner's equity over the 
past few  years can be the consequence of an efficient system  of credit appraisal
20 See 1.4
21 See 1.2
22 Report commissioned by the Institut fur Mittelstandsforschung (Institute for SME research)
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by the banks. One the o ther hand  there is the hazard  that certain types of 
enterprise due to the presence upper risk limits and the reliance on  established 
bank firm  relationships, m ay be precluded from  obtaining sufficient external 
capital. Risky proposals (Start ups, m arketing expenditure and  product and 
process innovation) fall th rough  the financial net in particular w hen w ith 
inadequate am ounts of ow ners equity w ith  w hich to dem onstrate their 
com m itm ent and reduce the risk encountered by the bank. The banking system 
is not especially geared at financing enterprises w ith  particularly high risk 
profiles. This particularly affects grow ing firms or firms w hose assets do not 
consist of the traditional, calculable assets or whose w orking capital is not of the 
type norm ally used by banks as security. It is to be expected that the 
im portance of intangible investm ents is to grow  in  the future (OECD 1995,a, 
S.29). The suitability of the G erm an financial system  th rough  the system  of 
universal banking rem ains to be evaluated (OECD 1995a)"23.
The banks have been facilitated in this long term  lending by Governm ent 
through  several m easures. The m ost im portant m easure w hich pu ts together a 
package for start ups and developing com panies is the so called 
Eigenkapitalhilfeprogram m . This literally m eans the Program m e for 
D evelopm ent of Ow ners Equity. It shall be referred to as the EKH program m e 
for brevity. This scheme is adm inistered by a State Bank know n as the 
Ausgleichsbank. In  effect the program m e delays the repaym ents of both 
principle and interest in order that the firm  consolidate its resources at the 
embryonic stage. This scheme is of 20 years duration, for the first 10 years of 
w hich no repaym ents of the loan principle are made. The first two years are 
interest free after w hich increm ental interest rates are charged to a period of six 
years. A t the sixth year the level of successive interest rates over the rem aining 
14 years is decided24.
23 P. 58. Kaufmann and Kokalj, 1995. Schriften zur Mittelstandsforschung, N.68.
24 See 1.3
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This package has a 50 percent State inpu t w hen the contribution of the 
Cham ber of Industry  and  Commerce is added  to th a t of the guarantee bank. 
This scheme assum es a m inim um  of 15 percent ow ners equity, a level which 
startled tw o Irish banks because it w as very low. The rem aining 18 percent of 
the package is supplied by the house bank norm ally in  the form  of an expensive 
overdraft.
It has been said by bank sources in Germ any that the  dow nside of this scheme 
is tha t once start ups have been extended this finance package, that they are at 
m axim um  gearing and  so it is difficult to obtain additional borrow ing for the 
purposes of w orking capital over the first few years of the scheme.
The existence of this very generous scheme m ay be one of the reasons w hy 
Germ any boasts such a h igh proportion of start ups.25 The low  permissible 
ow ner equity levels have no t only "startled" an Irish banker, however. Of the 
Germ an bankers surveyed, the m ajority were no t satisfied w ith  levels of 
ow ner's equity in Germany. Table 5.4.1
It is interesting that of the two bankers w ho regarded a proportion  of 15 percent 
owners w ith  equanim ity, one w as the representative of a savings bank branch 
and another of a co-operative bank branch. In the form er case, gearing was very 
flexible and  contingent on the total balance sheet of the firm. If the balance sheet
25 European Observatory for SMEs. First Report.
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Table 5.4.1 Evaluation by German bankers of low equity levels
Savings bank association
Does a percentage of owners' equity of 15% 
for smaller enterprises in Germany cited by 
the Bundesbank reflect your experience?
Are you satisfied with the level of owners 
equity?
No No
Regional cooperative bank NA Yes. 15% owners equity is alright.
Chamber of Commerce No No. Some start ups have 0 - 10% owners' 
equity. 50-60% would be more appropriate.
Local savings bank Yes. Gearing is flexible. If firm has a good 
balance sheet there should be no anxiety.
Yes
Local big bank dealing with larger SMEs No No
Headquarters of a big bank No Yes
Local cooperative Yes. It depends on the industrial sector. 
Ausgleichskapitalhilfeprogramm63 aims for 
50% own capital over 20 years.
Yes. Bad cases are filtered out by the banks.
Guarantee bank dealing with smaller SMEs Yes No
6a This program m e is administered by the State banks and aim ed at start ups and young SM Es. It m eans literally, “Com pensational Capital A ssistance” .
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w ere in order, there w as no reason to fear high gearing. In the latter case, 
gearing depended m ore on the industry  concerned.
This could be in terpreted to m ean that in  the case of partnerships of lawyers, 
doctors or accountants w ho m ay have a low  am ount of tangibles in the balance 
sheet bu t w ho otherw ise have a prospering business, that higher gearing is 
tolerated. Concessions m ade by G erm an banks tow ards partnerships w ho are 
also included in  the definition of an  SME m ust not create distortions.
This representative of a co-operative bank branch also pointed out that the EKH 
program m e aim ed at an  en trepreneur attaining a level of 50 percent ow ners' 
equity w ith in  20 years.
5.5 Are G erm an banks m ore selective th an  Irish  b ankers?
There is reason to believe tha t G erm an banks are just as selective as Irish banks 
in  the event of advancing loans. A representative of a Cham ber of Industry and 
Commerce m aintained that in 1995, 50 to 70 percent of all start ups failed. In 
gastronom y w hich includes the hotel and  restaurant industry  failure peaked at 
90 percent. This inform ation can be p u t in  context w ith  the inform ation 
supplied by a savings bank branch representative. This savings bank branch 
w hich is located in a predom inantly  tourism  area, had  an above average 
proportion  of hotel and restaurants in  his portfolio. Yet he m aintained that only 
40 to 50 percent of start ups fail. While this figure in itself is considerable, it
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does testify to the fact that being less than the industry  average of 90 percent 
for the area of gastronom y, an  intense filtering ou t of bad  cases has been 
undertaken.
The issue of credit rationing can be investigated by referring to specific risk to 
default rates. The regional head  office of a cooperative bank cited the case of a 
firm  founded in 1990 having a provision for specific risk of 3 percent. According 
to this source, this provision w hich was arrived at by an  external accountant at 
considerable expense26 is unusually  low. M ost risk provisions in the case of 
start ups are in  the region of 10 percent. Given that the average failure rate for 
start ups is 50 - 70 percent, specific risk provisions as low  as 10 percent m ust 
indicate that quite a few bad  cases have already been screened out. In other 
w ords, G erm an banks m ust practice some form  of credit rationing if one is to 
infer from  the tw o cases above.
In Ireland there is m ore direct inform ation w hich relates to screening by banks. 
Unfortunately this screening relates to all loans and does no t isolate start ups as 
a separate classification. 69 percent of loan applications are accepted on first 
presentation and a further 14 percent are renegotiated.27 It is to be assum ed that 
m any of the renegotiated loans are advanced albeit on less favourable term s on 
the part of the entrepreneur. One can also assum e that the rejection rate for start
26 Suggests that company has now achieved blue chip status if it can afford the cost of this 
report
27 See 2.2. Internal report cited by an Irish bank.
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ups is higher than  for business loans as a w hole since s tart ups represent one of 
the m ost risky transactions a bank could enter into. It can be said that m ore than 
31 percent applications for start up  finance in  Ireland are screened ou t if the 
above assum ptions hold true.
This discussion w hich relates to start ups has so far exam ined the result of bank 
decisions in issuing lending decisions. In other w ords it is necessary to change 
the causality and  now  exam ine the issue of w hether G erm an firms are perhaps 
m ore deserving of bank finance. It has frequently been said that the problem  is 
not a dearth  of finance b u t rather of good business projects.
Kinsella (1994) referred to the quality of business projects in  relation to the 
reason behind the start up. Accordingly, entrepreneurs w ho have been m ade 
redundan t or have never h ad  a job m ay be com pelled to start up  their ow n 
business. This phenom enon w hich is know n as unem ploym ent push  is less 
desirable from  a banker's poin t of view. A lternatively, entrepreneurs w ho w ish 
to exploit a business idea and  w ho voluntarily leave a safe and  pensionable 
em ploym ent in order to em bark on a com paratively risk venture m ay find their 
business plans a subject of interest. Bankers therefore do try to ascertain if 
unem ploym ent push  or em ploym ent pull factors are present in an 
en trepreneur's proposal.
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prom pted  m any start ups which have been m otivated by em ploym ent push
factors. Typically, s tart ups occur in easy to enter industries such as gastronom y
w hy no t suprisingly also exhibits the highest failure rate.
"Because of the poor economic conditions, people w ith w eaknesses are 
m ade red u n d an t and  try to set themselves up  in business. They are not the 
best...Some services such as the hotel industry do n o t have this qualification 
(artesian "M eistertitel") and  w e have had  bad experiences w ith  them "28.
A nalogously, one Irish banker indicated that equity houses to w hom  his bank 
referred clients, signaled to h im  a lack of good projects in w hich to place their 
investm ent. These equity houses w hich or funds w ere not confined to larger 
enterprises b u t sm aller com panies in need of developm ent capital.
"Several venture capital companies have approached m e looking for 
clients bu t there are no takers. These com panies w ould  also be dealing w ith 
small enterprises"29.
A dearth  of good projects does not appear to confined solely to Ireland bu t is on 
the increase in  G erm any as a result of the recession. This is true if one interprets 
a grow th in  unem ploym ent push  projects as being precipitated by factors other 
than  the purely commercial.
It is true that in G erm any great faith is placed by bankers in the artesian 
qualification. The artesian sector in Germ any exhibits a very low attrition rate
28 Quote from German banker in district savings bank
29 Quote from one of 5 Irish banks interviewed.
Some German bankers alluded to the fact that the present recession has
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of 30 percent of start ups. Projects therefore, which are presented by 
entrepreneurs from  this sector are given greater credibility than  those w ithout 
such a m inim um  qualification. The fact that G erm an bankers fear the dem ise of 
this m inim um  qualification w ith  the advent of converging EU standards, 
suggests that entrepreneurs m ay be screened by institutions other th an  the 
banks. For example the title of "artesian"30 is only bestow ed subject to the 
applicant m eeting m inim um  standards set ou t by the Cham ber of Industry  and 
Commerce.
5.6 C om parison of b ranch discretion and  bank  m onito ring
Loan officers at G erm an savings banks have discretion to sanction loans of up 
to 2.8 m illion DM (£1.75 million approxim ately) com pared w ith  a branch 
discretion in  Ireland of £50,000 in certain instances31.
If it is true that G erm an branches of m ain banks, cooperatives and  savings 
banks are m ore autonom ous than their Irish counterparts, it follows th a t they 
have m ore discretion to adm inister loans divorced from  the decisions of a  head 
office. As a corollary to this, it is possible for them  to enter riskier transactions 
assum ing that they can sink the costs involved in providing for risk through 
enhanced m onitoring. This enhanced m onitoring is facilitated via long term  
lending w hich ties the custom er to the bank.
30 Handwerktitel
31 Statement made by Mr. Felix O'Regan of the Irish Banking Information Service in response to 
criticisms made by Mr. Frank Mulcahy of the Small Firms' Association. "Angel or Devil?" 
Management. 31 January, 1995.
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Clements and  Burns (1992) m ade a valid point w hen they claim ed that links in a 
Germ an banking relationship are no t as form alised or structured  as one 
believed.
"Contact w ith  the bank seem ed informal w ith  only 53 percent of firms sending 
them  (banks) annual accounts (92 percent of ow ner m anaged firms) and  only 26 
percent sending them  business plans or budgets"32.
There is certainly greater control exercised by the loan officers of one m ain Irish 
bank w ho require firms accounts on a m onthly or quarterly  basis. Since this 
D epartm ent is only in  its infancy and covers at m ost 2 percent of riskier (AA 
category) custom ers, one cannot argue that it is equivalent to house bank 
relationships in G erm any which are a long standing p art of G erm an banking.
If this is the case, G erm an savings banks and  cooperatives will have to deploy 
all their inform al inform ation channels to survive the onslaught of the big m ain 
banks on their m arket share. O n the other h and  they m ay be anticipating the 
difficulties by initiating a pilot Special Enterprise D epartm ent along the lines of 
those operated  by Irish banks.
Even though the Special Enterprise D epartm ents operated by Irish banks cover 
in one case 2 percent of all riskier AA rated clients, the fact that firms are 
com pelled to subm it sum m arised accounts on a m onthly or quarterly basis
32 P.l. Clements and Burns, 1992. The relationship between German SMEs and their banks.
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points to a form alised inform ation channel w hich facilitates lending to riskier 
enterprises.
5.7 Relationship betw een small businesses and their banks
One of the repu ted  advantages of the G erm an banking system  w hich was 
presented in the first C hapter is the view  that G erm an banks nurtu re  close links 
w ith industry  in the form  of dom inant bank relationships called 
Hausbankverhciltnisse. These dom inant banking relations im ply literally that a 
small business has a house bank w hich can com m and a prem ium  interest rate in 
re tu rn  for providing the firm  w ith  the security that if the firm  is experiencing 
liquidity problem s it can recourse to its house bank. The house bank 
relationship postu lated  by Fischer and Edw ards (1994) and  von T hadden (1990) 
represents a tacit understanding  betw een the G erm an firm  and its bank.33
The im puted advantages of such relationships w ould im ply heightened trust 
betw een the G erm an firm  and its bank in  addition to lower m onitoring costs. 
Enhanced trust w ould  perm it the firm  m ore favourable conditions in  securing a 
loan which could be reflected in low er collateral to loan principle ratios than 
w ould otherw ise be the case.
The second advantage has economic implications. In a two period m odel, firms 
which can rely on the bank 's continuing support will be m ore inclined to invest
33 See 1.3
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in their fu ture  in the know ledge that they can redeem  the loan from  returns 
accruing in the second period. Similarly a bank can afford to m ake the heavy 
initial investm ent involved w hen  know ledge about the firm  is scanty due to its 
security tha t the firm  will not become opportunistic in subsequent periods and 
negotiate m ore favourable lending terms from  com peting banks. This two 
period analogy postulated by von T hadden (1990) can also be applied  to the 
advantages associated w ith  long term  lending.
The costs of m onitoring the perform ance of the small firm  w ould  be lessened 
due to heightened inform ation about the activities of the firm  occasioned by 
greater consultation betw een the firm  and  its bank. In  re tu rn  a small firm  which 
had form ed such an allegiance w ith  its bank could be com pensated for its 
loyalty by enhanced advice provided by G erm an banks.
In order to recognise the existence of dom inant banking relationships one 
w ould expect to w itness low er collateral to loan ratios in  Germ any eased 
reporting requirem ents. A greater abundance of long term  loans in Germany 
com pared w ith  the am ount w itnessed in Ireland w ould  be expected to be a 
further testim ony to the existence of close ties betw een G erm an industry and 
their banks.
Finally, the intervention of banks at particularly precarious stages in the firms 
evolution typified by early stage investm ent and sustained investm ent w hen
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the firm  slackened dem and for its product in an economic dow nturn, are 
further indicators of such close ties. (Edwards and Fischer, 1994).
The existence of close ties in Germ any appear in  both the literature and 
interview s held w ith  G erm an bankers by the authors to prevail betw een small 
businesses and  certain local G erm an banks. These G erm an banks belong to the 
savings bank and  co-operative bank classification. From  the banks' perspective, 
as shall be seen, opinion differs as to the desirability of these dom inant bank 
relationships.
The existence of these relationships w as substantiated by all the bankers 
interview ed by the author. Savings banks and co-operative banks w hich are, 
according to Fischer and Edw ards (1994), the traditional lenders to small 
businesses, m aintained dom inant relationships w ith sm all businesses according 
to the testim onies of a representative of a Cham ber of Industry and Commerce 
and a G overnm ent small firm  research body. The form er testified to their 
tenacity as lenders in the present economic crisis. Since bank com m itm ent to a 
long term  relationship is one of the tenets underpinning a dom inant bank 
relationship, it follows that banks w hich consistently come to the assistance of 
small firm s facing liquidity crisis come closest to the definition of house bank.
According to the representative of the small firm research body;
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"It is true that savings banks are m ore com m itted on a local basis than their big 
bank counterparts. This is not suprising because savings banks belong to the 
com m unity (depositors)."
Edw ards and  Fischer (1994) observed tha t banks reluctantly accepted the role of 
dom inant financier since "good firm s" or firms "which presented good risks 
w ould  prefer no t lock them selves into such arrangem ents bu t seek bank finance 
in the firm  of successive short term  loans. In this m anner, no bank could 
m onopolise the credit extended to burgeoning small firm  in successive periods 
bu t the firm  could have the prerogative of bargaining dow n the price of future 
credits. As the authors observed,
"Firm s in the small size category w hich were perform ing well and were 
good risks from  the banks point of view  did  not w ant to have dom inant house 
banks because they desired com petitive conditions for loans and  w anted to 
prevent the influence of any one bank from  becoming too large. The firms 
w hich w ere willing to com m it them selves to a house bank relationship tend to
be the financially weaker and less profitable small businesses M ost banks
interview ed w ere reluctant to seek a house bank position because such 
positions are sought after only by firms w ith  lower creditw orthiness and a need 
for shelter34" .
The results of Fischer and Edw ards (1994) survey do not unfortunately perm it a 
cross section analysis according to the classification of bank. Evidence from  the 
au thor's  interview s suggested that savings and  co-operative banks, w ere not 
averse to prom inent bank relationships. Furtherm ore such close ties were 
presented by a representative of a local savings bank as its unique selling point
34 "Banks, finance and investment in Germany", Fischer and Edwards, 1994. P.137
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to be deployed in stem m ing the incursions m ade by big banks into its small 
business territory;
"Deutsche Bank and other big banks are try ing  to get into the small 
business m arket. This is underm ining the house bank relationship. Firms now  
have higher expectations from  the banks. The advice offered by savings banks 
is superior. Savings banks have recognised the shift in the m arket and are 
try ing to intensify relationships".
As stated  in  the pream ble to this section, long term  lending is facilitated by 
house bank relationships and in some cases m ay be a derivative of tacit links 
betw een industry  and banks. As seen in the first C hapter, 42 per cent of all 
com panies in  Germ any have long term  loans exceeding 5 years while in Ireland 
the percentage was 13 per cent35. A lthough this data does not m ake distinctions 
betw een small businesses and larger corporations, it does suggest that time 
horizons are longer in Germ any. This in term  indicates higher com m itm ent by 
G erm an bankers in the long term  welfare of their firms. Such long term ism  by 
G erm an bankers was also exhibited by bankers interview ed by the author who 
stated that one of their prim ary concerns was the issue of com pany succession. 
In other w ords, w ith the dem ise of the owner, G erm an banks w anted the firm 
to m ake provision for the continuity of the com pany th rough  adopting a more 
perm anent legal form. This concern was not m entioned by any of the Irish 
banks.
W ith regard  to a bank's time horizons, evidence arising from  interviews w ith 
G erm an firms conducted by Clem ents and Burns (1992) reveals that 21 percent
35 European Business Survey of SMEs, Spring 1994. See 1.3
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of the firms believed that the banks operated w ith  tim e horizons in excess of 5 
years. In the absence of statistical significance and ow ing to the small sample 
num ber involved in the survey by Clem ents and Burns, it is m ore useful to 
regard  the high percentages of long term  lending revealed in  the European 
Business Survey of SMEs, Spring 1994 survey as evidence of long term  horizons 
in Germ any. A derivative of long tim e horizons could be stable relationships 
prevailing betw een banks and  firms.
A final indicator as to the role of savings banks and  co-operative banks in 
catering for small businesses th rough  dom inant bank relationships is expressed 
in the testim ony of a co-operative bank representative w ho justifies his bank's 
involvem ent w ith  precarious young firms on the grounds that this custom er 
m ay be induced to rem ain on in such an  arrangem ent;
"It is true that savings banks and  co-operative banks are involved w ith 
start ups w hich are costlier and  riskier. The justification for this is that, although 
we m ay no t earn  as m uch as the Deutsche Bank, one hopes that the costs can be 
recovered if the custom er stays".
This contradicts a statem ent m ade by Fischer and Edw ards (1994) to the 
contrary;
"M any banks clearly do no t regard  the som ew hat higher rates they could 
charge if they w ere dom inant house bank as sufficient to com pensate for the 
greater risk involved in lending to these firms"
175
The authors refer to the theorem  by J. Stiglitz and  A. Weiss (1981) w hereby 
investors prefer to ration  credit than  em ploy interest rate prem ia to defray the 
additional risk presented by riskier investments.
The dichotom y betw een w hat the author observed and  the evidence of Fischer 
and  Edw ards (1994) could possibly arise ou t of the fact that certain banks such 
as savings banks and  co-operative banks w hich cater for w eaker small 
businesses cultivate close ties w ith  small businesses. This w ould also 
corroborate w ith  suggestions m ade by Fischer and Edw ards that only weaker 
small businesses seek ou t banks w hich can afford them  the security of a 
p rom inent bank relationship. The good risks have m ore leverage to bargain 
better conditions from  across the banking spectrum  and  w ould be loathe to lock 
them selves into a house bank relationship.
W hat supposed  advantage, if any, has the existence of prom inent banking 
relationships in G erm any over banking relationships in  Ireland?
In the area of bank inform ation, there is reason to believe that Irish banks are 
better inform ed than  their G erm an counterparts regarding some riskier small 
business segments. In the Bank of Ireland Enterprise Support Unit, participating 
firms are exhorted to present m onthly cash flow statem ents.
O n the other hand, the survey by Clements and  Burns (1992) concluded that;
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"Contact w ith  the (German) bank seemed inform al w ith  only 53 per cent (of 
small firms) sending them  annual accounts and  only 26 per cent sending them  
business plans or budgets."
In the same survey, the authors stated that a h igher proportion of owner 
m anaged firms in G erm any corresponding to 92 per cent subm itted annual 
accounts. In view of the fact that reporting requirem ents have been relaxed as 
of January 1996, w hereby firm s w ith  up  to 250,000 DM turnover36 are required 
to subm it such accounts com pared w ith  the previous threshold of 100,000 DM, 
the percentages supplied  by Clements and Burns (1992) m ay overstate the 
proportion of small businesses reporting in Germ any in 1996.
The same authors indicated tha t 65 per cent of G erm an SMEs w ould  only seek 
advice from  the bank as necessary and a further 19 per cent w ould not seek it at 
all. One should no t infer from  this evidence that firm s w hich are in a house 
bank relationship do no t seek the advice of their bank. This is because the 
interviews conducted by Clem ents and Burns (1992) involved Germ an 
businesses w ith  up  to 250 employees. Since Edw ards and  Fischer (1994) testify 
to the fact tha t larger, blue chip businesses in G erm any tend to emancipate 
themselves from  "close accounting relationships w ith  principal bankers" and 
thence m ay supplant traditional bank advice w ith their ow n in house financial 
m anagem ent techniques, it is likely that the independence of these larger
36 Approximately £100,000
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businesses is captured in the 19 per cent w hich do no t seek a bank 's advice. It is 
therefore plausible that small businesses w hich dem onstrate close ties w ith  their 
bank recourse to them  for advice. In the absence of additional evidence, 
however, this conclusion rem ains tentative.
The presence of close ties betw een a bank and* firm  im plies that collateral 
requirem ents can be relaxed than w ould  otherw ise be the case. The evidence of 
Burns and  Clements (1992) does no t testify to small businesses in  Germ any 
experiencing m ore lenient collateral conditions than  their larger counterparts. 
In  their 1992 survey, the sm aller ow ner m anaged businesses believed that banks 
placed collateral in  second place behind the value of the overall assets of the 
business. To cite from  Clem ents and Burns;
"Firm s w ere convinced that banks w ere concerned w ith  the security of their 
investm ent and the long term  health  of the business w as a secondary 
concern"37.
This contrasts w ith  the verdict of partnerships and  businesses w ith  lim ited 
liability in  Germ any w hich placed collateral in  fourth  place. O w ner m anaged 
businesses in G erm any w ere of the view that the banks dem ote the long term  
health  of the business behind factors such as total balance sheet assets, collateral 
and interest and dividend cover.
37 "The relationship between German SMEs and their banks" Clements and Burns, 1992. P. 3
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Despite this reservation of ow ner m anagers in Germ any concerning the lack of 
em phasis placed by banks on the long term  health  of the business, all 
businesses, including ow ner m anaged firms, believed that the banks w ould 
support them  if they w ere in  short term  financial difficulties. Short term  
support does no t necessarily translate into long term  support in the m anner of a 
prom inent bank relationship.
In the absence of m ore substantial proof, it can be concluded that prom inent 
bank relationships m ay be a characteristic of G erm an bank practice. Such 
relationships m ay also be responsible or arise out of the prevalence of long term  
lending bu t the em phasis place by G erm an bankers on collateral according to 
ow ner m anaged firms w ould  tend to underm ine this view. This em phasis on 
collateral by G erm an banks challenges the house bank arguem ent w hich 
postulates that strong ties betw een firms and  banks should partially dispense 
w ith  the need for heavy m onitoring of investments. A representative from  a 
G overnm ent research body into the performance of small businesses in 
Germ any confirm ed the views of Germ an owner m anaged firms that banks 
place em phasis on collateral in their lending transactions.
It cannot be concluded w hether small businesses w hich are party  to a house 
bank arrangem ent avail of a bank's advice or that this exclusive agreem ent 
w ould entitle them  to consultancy by the bank. The author's ow n interviews 
indicate to the contrary. Banks interview ed confined themselves to advising
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their clients on  financial issues bu t never on  strategy. This reticence stems 
partially from  the hazards of being held liable for extending bad advice and 
partially from  not possessing any special qualifications in this area. This w ould 
support the view  of M acrae (1966) w ho d ispu ted  th a t G erm an bankers w ere 
"great innovating boffins" bu t had  no particular expertise apart from  their 
function as bankers.
As one banker from  a savings bank articulated the view  that it is incum bent on 
the small business to seek its advice from  an institu tion  other than  a bank;
"M ost firms from  the artesian (Handwerk) sector do n o t avail of the services of 
an  accountant. The bank cannot be expected to address this deficiency. The 
bank merely serves to give the business an im pulse".
Clements and  Burns (1992) sum m arise the investigation by Fischer and 
Edw ards (1994) into the nature of the relationship betw een firms and  banks in 
G erm any as follows;
"Recent research by Jeremy Edw ards and Klaus Fischer challenges the 
conventional w isdom  that G erm an banks are m ore generous in their lending, 
m ore loyal and  m ore involved w ith  their business custom ers than  UK banks, 
and suggests that the partnership  betw een G erm an banks and  businesses is 
m ore loosely defined than  is com m only supposed38".
38 "The relationship between German SMEs and their banks", Clements and Burns, 1992. P. 4
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A com parison of uncollateralised lending in Ireland and  Germ any reveals that 
there is negligible d isparity  between the proportion  of loans in both countries 
which are extended w ithout guarantees. O n the basis that the G erm an survey 
by D rukarcyk (1985) does not take account of loans w ith  a duration  of m ore 
than  7 years, there is reason to believe that there is an  even greater proportion 
of unsecured lending com pared w ith  Germany. This is because long term  loans 
such as m ortgages are generally secured by fixed assets and  these are not 
included in  the G erm an estimates. Since the SFA survey in 1989, schemes such 
as the Access to Finance Scheme w hich waive the requirem ent for guarantees 
depending on  the Irish bank in  question w hich adm inisters the fund, the value 
of uncollateralised loans in  Ireland m ay be greater again.
It can be concluded that Irish banks are equally, if not m ore liberal than 
G erm an banks as evidenced by the proportion  of uncollateralised loans.
W ith respect to collateral to loan ratios in Ireland and  Germany, Irish banks 
dem onstrate w ider variations than their Germ an counterparts. This conclusion 
is m ade on  the basis of com paring estim ates from  G erm an bankers evolved 
from  a series of asset w eightings w ith  the results of the SFA (1989) survey. The 
SFA (1989) survey indicated that 36 percent of Irish small businessess exhibited 
collateral to loan ratios in excess of 3. The highest G erm an collateral to loan
5.8 Implications of the results
1 8 1
ratio corresponded to 2.7 since this represents a ceiling. This cap on collateral to 
loan ratios is im posed in Germ any according to the provisions of the 
regulations governing credit institutions.
The only Irish bank w hich volunteered inform ation on  collateral to loan ratios 
cited a value w hich translated into a ratio of 2.2. This ratio fell w ith in  the 
spread of G erm an collateral to loan ratios.
The relatively h igh collateral to loan ratios exhibited by Irish businesses should 
be pu t in context w ith  two m itigating factors. The first relates to the tim e period 
in w hich the SFA (1989) survey took place. The late eighties represented a 
period of recession in Ireland which m ay have had a detrim ental im pact on loan 
security.
The second factor w hich should be acknow ledged, is that personal guarantees 
have ceased to be accorded the sam e significance as a concern by smaller 
enterprises since 1989. The same SFA (1989) survey registered security as the 
second m ost im portant concern. In the intervening period since the SFA survey 
and that of Deloitte and  Touche (1994), the issue of collateral has fallen in the 
list of priorities to occupy fourth place.
On the other hand, ow ner m anaged firm s in Germ any have ranked collateral as 
the second m ost im portant concern according to a survey by Clements and
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Burns (1992). There is reason to believe therefore, that personal guarantees 
represent a m ore salient concern in Germ any than in Ireland.
A nother conclusion w hich can be draw n in the area of residential p roperty  and 
loan guarantees, is the issue of the ow ner's home. G erm an bankers were 
suprised a t the com paratively m ore lenient practice in Ireland of no t taking a 
charge on the ow ner's hom e under the auspices of program m es such as the 
Enterprise Support U nit (Bank of Ireland) or the Enterprise Loan Scheme 
(Allied Irish Bank).
The com parative innovativness of the Special Loan D epartm ents operated by 
the m ain Irish banks is reflected in  the interest expressed by some Germ an 
bankers in  such schemes. The savings bank sector in  G erm any w hich has 
traditionally catered for the needs of small enterprises39 dem onstrated  m ost 
interest. The Association of Savings Banks (Verband der Deutschen Sparkassen) 
has intim ated th a t it envisages setting up similar Special Loan Departm ents on 
a pilot scheme at various locations throughout 1996.
In view  of the fact tha t the G overnm ent Task Force on Small Business (1994) 
urged G overnm ent to repeal Section 115 of the 1986 Finance Act w hich gives 
the revenue Com m issioners precedence over a com pany's debtors in  the event
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of a liquidation, G erm an banks w ere asked to express the value of such a 
security.
It is unusual that the G overnm ent Task Force suggested that the repeal of such 
a provision w ould  alleviate a supposed dearth  in long term  bank funding in 
the context of the G erm an bankers' experiences. A -charge on Debtor's was only 
used as supplem entary  collateral accom panied by additional collateral such as 
cash balances for overdrafts or short term  loans. A charge on  debtors was 
never used  by G erm an bankers to secure a long term  loan.
The value of Charge on  Debtors has dim inished because of a disim provem ent 
in debtors' days of paym ent registered by small firms in  Germany. This has 
prom pted one big G erm an bank w ith  its head  office in  M unich to dim inish the 
value of such collateral by half.
The default rate of betw een three and four percent sustained by an Irish bank 
on riskier custom er categories w ithin  its Special Loan U nit was greater than, or 
equal to the default rates of the majority of the G erm an banks responding to 
this question. There is no reason to believe that Irish banks are any less capable 
of servicing younger or riskier small enterprises.
A G erm an guarantee bank exhibited a fallout on loans similar to that of the 
Irish bank on  borrow ers in its Special Loan Unit. The Irish bank estimates that
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two to three percent of its riskier AA category borrow ers are serviced by this 
Unit. In the case of the guarantee bank, one percent of all s tart ups in Baden 
W ürttem berg are allocated a guarantee from this bank40.
It is interesting tha t a branch of a big G erm an banks m anifest higher firm  
fallout on its portfolio of advances. The head offices of tw o G erm an big banks 
m anifested a fallout on advances less than  that of the Irish bank and 
considerably less than  a local branch of one of these banks. This phenom enon 
w hereby branches of big banks or banks at local level in G erm any manifest 
m ore liberal lending policies is also evidenced in the literature.
G erm an banks are indisputably better at long term  lending than  Irish banks. 
How ever, the traditional role of the banks in  providing long term  lending to the 
detrim ent of the ow ner's equity ratio has prom pted  anxiety in  Germany 
regard ing  the ability of small businesses w ith  low  levels of ow ner's equity to 
w ithstand the recession in the light of potentially high interest rates.
A considerable proportion  of G erm an bankers interview ed corresponding to 50 
percent w ere no t satisfied w ith a percentage of ow ner's equity to m arket 
capitalisation in the case of small businesses am ounting to 15 percent.
40 Calculation based on Annual Report of the "Bürgschaftbank Baden-Württemberg, 1994".
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Similarly, none of the Irish banks interview ed perceived such high  gearing to be 
advantageous from  the poin t of view  of bank or small businesses.
The responses of G erm an bankers reveal them  to be just as selective as Irish 
bankers in  assessing loan applications. This selectivity has been intensified due 
to the incursions m ade by the recession in G erm any. G erm an bankers 
m entioned unem ploym ent push  factors as being the m otivating forces behind 
am ny start- ups in the services sector.
A com parison of a low  specific risk provision pertaining to start ups in 
G erm any in the context of relatively high failure rates indicates that better 
projects w ith  a prom ising future are selected.
Figures referring to screening in  Ireland indicate that approxim ately 14 percent 
of all loan applications are declined and  are no t renegotiated.
In the area of m onitoring of loan applicants, there is evidence that Special Loan 
D epartm ents operated by Irish banks practice m ore rigorous m onitoring 
procedures than  loan departm ents of G erm an banks. O ngoing m onitoring of 
applicants in Germ any is no t system atic based on the results of a survey by 
Clements and Burns, 1992. One cannot extrapolate from  the practices which 
prevail in a particular departm ent of an Irish bank however. This departm ent 
only services the needs of 2 percent of risky AA category small borrowers. Due
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to the fact that Germ an banks do not have Special Loan D epartm ents which 
cater for riskier small businesses it is not possible to m ake inferences as to Irish 
banks being superior in this regard.
W ith respect to the relationship betw een small businesses and  their banks, both 
the prim ary literature and  the au thor's in terview s'w ith  G erm an banks indicate 
that close ties referred to as dom inant bank relationships do exist in  Germ any 
particularly am ong local branches of savings banks and  co-operative banks. 
W hether these ties are a derivative of or precursor to the large am ount of long 
term  lending w itnessed in G erm any is not clear. As seen in the first Chapter, 42 
percent of all com panies in  G erm any have long term  loans exceeding 5 years 
while in Ireland the proportion  w as 13 percent. This data w hich does no t make 
distinctions betw een small businesses and large corporations, nevertheless 
suggests that tim e horizons are longer in  Germany. The long term  view  taken 
by G erm any banks is also evidenced by the fact that several w ere concerned 
about the continuance of an  unincorporated firm  following the death  or retiral 
of the owner. For this reason, some advice adm inistered to small firms deals 
w ith  m aking provision for the continuity of the com pany th rough  adopting a 
m ore perm anent legal form.
W hat is evident is that apart from  the savings banks and co-operative banks 
w ho are involved in riskier small businesses, these close ties are not desirable
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from  a banker's perspective since they are sought by w eaker, less viable 
businesses.
There is no evidence to suggest that G erm an house banks exercise influence 
over their clients or dispense strategic information. G erm an banks justified this 
policy of w ithholding such advice for reasons of legal liability should  the advice 
result in  the firm  taking a  false decision and hold the bank accountable for the 
consequences.This policy of G erm an banks not to advise firms on  strategic and 
accounting issues is contrary to the widely held view  that the relationship 
betw een G erm an banks and  their small business clients approxim ates a 
partnership  arrangem ent.
There is sim ilarly no evidence to support the view  that close ties betw een 
Germ an banks and  their business clients culm inate in  relaxed collateral 
requirem ents. O n the contrary, the survey by Burns and Clem ents (1992) 
indicated that ow ner m anaged firms in Germ any believed that banks placed 
m ore im portance in securing loans than  on the long term  health  of the business. 
This underm ines the w idely held  view  that the long term  health  of a business in 
Germ any takes precedence as a resu lt of the long term  horizons of Germ an 
banks.
Irish banks have m oved aw ay from  an em phasis on total balance sheet assets in 
the Special Loan D epartm ents in lieu of assessing cash flow statem ents
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subm itted on a m onthly basis. G erm an banks, according to the survey by 
Clem ents and  Burns (1992) m onitor their clients on  an inform al basis. 92 
percent of ow ner m anaged firm s subm it annual accounts. Unfortunately the 
am ount of ongoing assessm ent in  the form  of m ore regular cash flow 
statem ents w as no t quantified.
Finally the theory by Stiglitz and  Weiss (1981) w hich postulates that banks 
w ould  prefer to w ithold credit rather than  extend loans covered by an 
augm ented prem ium  or additional interest charge to cover the risk involved in 
lending to a less creditw orthy borrow er underm ines the desirability of 
prom inent bank relationships from  the banker's perspective. In reality, Fischer 
and  Edw ards (1994) observed that only w eaker businesses willingly entered 
such exclusive arrangem ents w here firms w ith  greater potential preferred short 
term  lending arrangem ents w hich presented an opportun ity  for im proved 
lending term s on subsequent loans at later stages.
In general, the evidence suggests that Irish banks are m ore innovative 
regarding  m onitoring small firms under the auspices of Special Loan Units. 
They com pare favourably w ith  respect to their attitude tow ards not taking a 
charge on  the ow ner's hom e in certain instances. This is at variance w ith the 
G erm an banker's unanim ous support for using an en trepreneur's  residence as 
collateral. This reliance of the G erm an banks on "frontline security" such as the 
en trepreneur's  hom e further indicates that close ties betw een industry and
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business induce banks to treat firms more benignly than Irish banks w ith regard 
to loan security. However, there is reason to believe that in reality low house 
ow nership figures in Germ any limit serve to deny G erm an banks the option of 
using an entrepreneur's residence as collateral.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions
6.0 Introduction
The questions w hich w ere in tended to be addressed by this study  w ere set out 
in the abstract and  introduction.
Each area w ith  w hich this discussion dealt will be developed under the 
following headings:
6.1 The validity of com m only held beliefs about the superiority  of the 
G erm an banking system
6.2 A com parison of cash flow based lending of G erm an bankers to 
smaller enterprises com pared to that of Irish bankers
6.3 A conservative or liberal approach to lending
6.4 The relationship betw een small businesses and  their banks
6.5 Implications of this survey
6.1 The validity of commonly held beliefs about the superiority of the
German banking system
It has been seen that m uch of the literature w hich concerns the superiority of
the G erm an bank based system  does not extend itself to the specific case of
the G erm an bank 's dealings w ith  smaller businesses. By smaller, one m eans
SMEs w ith  less than 50 em ployees a n d /o r  £3 million turnover. Some of the
m isconceptions w hich have im plied the superiority of the G erm an banking
system  have focused on the practice of such banks taking equity in industry.
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Since an  SME in G erm an can have 499 employees and approxim ately £38.5 
million turnover, the term  SME in  a Germ an context is a m isnomer. It follows 
that m uch of the literature dealing w ith banks and  SMEs cannot be 
transferred to an Irish context w here the scale of operations is m uch smaller. 
A pproxim ately 33 percent of all SMEs in Germ any according to the G erm an 
definition of small enterprise have less than 50 em ployees1. In Ireland, 95 
percent of non-farm  enterprises are accounted for by small enterprises w ith  
less than 50 em ployees2.
The assertion that G erm an banks have an advantage over Irish banks in  being 
able to m onitor the perform ance of their small business borrow ers th rough 
participation on supervisory boards cannot be substantiated. Only G erm an 
Public Lim ited Com panies (Aktion Gesellschaft) are required by law  to have 
supervisory boards and  com panies w ith  lim ited liability if their em ployee 
num ber exceeds 500.
The contention that the nature of G erm an universal banks also confers them  
w ith  benefits of m onitoring can similarly be rejected. The advantage of being 
a universal bank im plies th a t depositors entrust their shares in a com pany 
w ith  a bank for safekeeping. This bank has the right to exercise proxy voting 
rights on behalf of the depositor and thus be in a position to influence the 
perform ance of the com pany. The fact that G erm an banks are universal banks
1 Burns and Clements, 1992. Kayser and Ibielski, 1986
2 Government Task Force on Small Business, 1994.
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does no t confer them  w ith  inform ation or m onitoring advantages in the case 
of SMEs since sm aller G erm an com panies do no t issue equity.
In the area of long term  finance, it is m y belief that assertions as to the long 
term  view  of G erm an banks are no t incorrect. G erm an banks are indisputably 
better long term  lenders. They also perm it low  level of ow ner's equity 
am ounting to from  10 percent to 15 percent of a firm 's capitalisation.
The survey revealed that half the G erm an bankers w ere no t satisfied w ith  the 
levels of equity. N one of the Irish banks interview ed perceived the high 
gearing levels cited for G erm an banks by the Bundesbank3 to be 
advantageous from  the poin t of view of both  the bank and  the small business 
borrow er.
Long term  lending to small enterprises G erm any is facilitated not so m uch by 
the commercial banks as by the Eigenkapitalhilfeprogram m e w hich involves 
extending a 20 year loan. It is envisaged that the enterprise becomes 
sufficiently viable after this tim e to enable it attain  a percentage of 40 percent 
owners equity to total capitalisation. In reality G erm an banks interview ed are 
concerned w ith  the fragile capitalisation of SMEs and  their reliance on long 
term  debt finance as a substitute for equity. A m anagem ent of guarantee bank 
cited a proportions of ow ners equity am ounting to less than  10 percent in the
3 D eutsche Bundesbank, 1994.
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case of start ups.4 O ther G erm an economists have voiced concern about the 
ability of a bank based system  w hich has accom m odated high gearing levels 
in SMEs to w ithstand  the recession.5
6.2 A comparison of cash flow based lending of German bankers to 
smaller enterprises compared to that of Irish bankers
Foley and  Griffith (1993) u rged  the Irish bankers to practice the lending based
on a cash flow rather than  total asset basis. O n the evidence of 20 interview s
held w ith  various G erm an bankers at various locations in  G erm any there is
reason to believe th a t they are no m ore oriented tow ards cash flow  based
lending than  Irish banks.
It is the au thor's  opinion th a t banks in Ireland have become better a t cash 
flow lending and have already practiced such lending in G erm any is based on 
the results of existing literature.
A com parison of uncollateralised lending in  Ireland and G erm any reveals that 
there is negligible disparity  betw een the proportion of loans in both  countries 
w hich are extended w ithout guarantees. O n the basis that the G erm an survey 
by Drukarcyk (1985) does no t take account of loans w ith  a duration  of m ore 
than 7 years, there is reason to believe that there is an even greater proportion 
of unsecured lending in  Ireland indicated by an SFA survey (1989) com pared
4 See Note 7
5 Kaufmann and Kokalj, 1995
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w ith Germany. This is because long term  loans such as m ortgages are 
generally secured by fixed assets and these are no t included in  the G erm an 
estimates.
It can be concluded that Irish banks are equally, if no t m ore liberal than  
Germ an banks as evidenced by the proportion of uncollateralised loans.
W ith respect to Ireland, tw o firm  based studies in  which the concerns of SMEs 
are ranked show  a change in the prioritisation of collateral as a concern in  the 
time period betw een 1989 w hen the SFA report was released and 1994, the 
period relating to the report by Deloitte and  Touche. In the form er report, 
collateral was placed in second place behind bank fees and charges as the 
second m ost im portan t issue. In the latter study, collateral was assigned by 
firms to th ird  place behind interest rates and  bank margins.
Owner m anaged firms in Germ any how ever, believed that guarantees w ere 
im portant to the bank in assessing loan applications. In contrast to larger 
Germ an enterprises they w ere assigned to second place behind the overall 
assets of the business.6 This implies that it is the belief of small, owner 
m anaged G erm an firms that their banks attach m ore im portance to securing 
loans than the long term  health of the business. This is indicative of a 
transactions based rather than  cash flow based attitude tow ards lending.
6 Clements and Burns, 1992
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This firm  survey in  Germ any carried ou t by Burns and  Clem ents (1992) 
testifies to the cautious approach to lending exhibited by G erm an bankers. 
This em phasis on security evidenced in the survey by Clem ents and  Burns 
(1992) suggests th a t G erm an bankers from  the perspective of G erm an firms 
take a conservative balance sheet approach to lending. *
All banks interview ed in this survey professed to pay m ore attention to the 
cash balances of the firm. There is a m arked dichotom y betw een w hat bankers 
say and w hat firm s claim  bankers actually do. For this reason, ratios such as 
collateral principle or gearing ratios can be m ore inferential about lending 
behaviour.
Germ an bankers both  in the savings bank and norm al commercial bank 
sectors adhere to rigid guidelines7 w hich govern the ratio of collateral to bank 
loans. There is reason to believe that Irish bankers observe less structured 
guidelines since only one of the five m ain  Irish banks interview ed w as in a 
position to provide an  estim ate on the ratio of collateral to loan. Irish bankers 
were reticent about providing estim ates which indicated the valuation of 
collateral which was used  to secure loans.
7 Kreditwesengesetz
196
O n the other h and  G erm an bankers had  no difficulty assigning w eightings to 
the following types of collateral; en trepreneur's  house, charge on debtors' 
ledger, business assets, th ird  party  guarantees and various types of 
investm ents such as shares.
To com pensate for the deficiency in  data  on  Irish- banks' w eightings of 
different types of collateral, this analysis recoursed to collateral to principle 
ratios evolved from  the SFA Survey (1989) and  the evidence of one Irish bank 
which provided  an  estim ate on the am ount of principle which could be 
leveraged as a p roportion  of the m arket value of the business ow ner's house.
It seems likely th a t the issue of collateral is so regulated in Germ any that 
collateral principal ratios in excess of 3 are never attained. The m axim um  
collateral principal ratio is in the region of 2.7s. O n the other hand, the SFA 
reported that 36 percent 1986 of small businesses exhibited ratios in  excess of
It w ould be im pruden t to com pare Irish figures pertaining to 1986 w ith 
Germ an estim ates one decade later. There is a need for m ore current 
quantitative estim ates on collateral to principal ratios in Irish banks. 
However, the one Irish bank w hich cited a w eighting of 50 percent which 
translates into a collateral principle ratio of 2 was not ou t of line w ith  the
8 Handbuch der Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken, January 1993
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estimates of G erm an bankers. Estimates varied betw een m axim um  of 2.7 and 
a m inim um  of 1.4 for collateral to principal ratios. The m anner of deriv ing the 
value of the asset w as very structured in  Germ any and involved the 
application of inflation adjusted property  indices, discounting for risk and 
then the application of threshold levels of collateral to loan.
There is reason to believe that the Irish values for collateral to principle have 
im proved since the 1989 survey conducted by the SFA. This is due to the fact 
that the 1989 survey predates the grow th in  im petus of the Enterprise Loan 
Schemes in troduced in 1989 and the Access to Finance Scheme in troduced in 
1995. Several Irish banks have w aived the collateral requirem ents under the 
auspices of Enterprise Developm ent Units.
Furtherm ore, the fact that collateral as a concern of small business has fallen
in priority in the tim e period betw een the SFA (1989) report and  that of 
Deloitte and  Touche (1994) further suggests th a t the securitisation of loans has 
ceased to be a prim ary concern of Irish industry  and is in line w ith  European 
trends. There is a need for further research in this area involving a larger 
sample size.
The one Irish bank w hich supplied an estim ate of the valuation of collateral 
dem onstrated that, at least in the case of his bank, the collateral to loan ratio
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was not ou t of line w ith  the G erm an estimates. The Irish value of 2.2 fell 
w ithin the G erm an param eter of 1.4 to 2.7.
One positive feature in favour of Irish banks is the innovativeness of their 
Enterprise D evelopm ent Units. These w ere so innovative th a t the concept was 
unfam iliar to the G erm an banks participating in the sürvey. The Association 
of G erm an Savings Banks (Sparkassenverband) in  Bonn and  a regional branch 
of a savings bank interview ed w ere aw are of these incubator units. It was 
proposed to introduce such a pilot scheme in  September, 1996.
The other positive feature of Irish banks lending practices is evidenced by the 
response of the G erm an bankers to the Enterprise Loan Scheme introduced in 
1989 w hich does not perm it the taking of the entrepreneurs' house as 
collateral and  the reduced use of personal guarantees. All G erm an bankers 
w ithout exception, w ere of the opinion that taking a charge on the house of a 
corporate borrow er constituted a loss of "front-line" security. It w as not 
unusual for G erm an banks to take a charge on a house although the more 
local branches of savings banks w ere aw are of the detrim ental im age effects 
the seizure of a house w ould  entail by underm ining their client base. 
However, the fact that only approxim ately 90 percent of entrepreneurs in 
start ups situations live in ren ted  accom m odation m eans that despite the 
im portance attached this form  of security by Germ an banks, it essentially
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remains a security used in the area of bank finance for developm ent capital in 
the case of m ore well established companies.
The Irish banks show  themselves to be m ore progressive in  relation to not 
taking a charge on the entrepreneur's house.
The G overnm ent Task Force Report (1994) u rged  for the repeal of Section 115 
of the 1986 Finance Act w hich gives the Revenue Com m issioners precedence 
on the book debts of a com pany in  the event of a liquidation. In Germany, 
w here book debts are used widely, they w ere no t seen as being of m uch 
value. The fact th a t the book debts of a sm all enterprise com prise only several 
key accounts of larger com panies some of w hom  m ay have placed a clause 
prohibiting the use of their debts as security m eans that sometim es the m ost 
valuable accounts have already been rem oved from  the ledger and  are not 
available as an  asset on w hich could be placed a charge.
One Bavarian bank has recently dim inished the percentage w eighting on such 
book debts from  40 percent to 20 percent as a result of poor paym ent periods 
in industry in general. The use of book debts as security is only used to 
supplem ent existing collateral and applies only to overdrafts. The fact that the 
G overnm ent Task Force suggested that the repeal of Section 115 w ould 
facilitate the provision of long term  finance is, in m y opinion, m isguided. It is
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to be envisaged that factoring in  Ireland will continue to show  the 
considerable grow th  exhibited in 1992 statistics9.
6.3 A conservative or liberal approach to lending
The responses of G erm an bankers reveal them  to be just as selective as Irish 
bankers in  assessing loan applications. This selectivity has been intensified 
due to the incursions m ade by the recession in Germany.
A com parison of a relatively low  specific risk provision relating to start ups in 
G erm any in  the context of h igh failure rates indicates that better projects w ith 
a prom ising future are selected. This is because the risk provisions cited by 
Germ an regional co-operative bank w ere low er than the small firm  attrition 
rate.
Figures relating to screening in Ireland indicate that approxim ately 14 percent 
of all loan applications are declined and  are not renegotiated10.
In the area of m onitoring loan applicants, there is evidence to suggest that 
Special Loan D epartm ents of Irish banks practice at least, if not better 
m onitoring procedures than loan departm ents of G erm an banks. Ongoing
9 Associacion Espaniola de Factoring, 1992
10 Internal bank survey, 1995.
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m onitoring of applicants in G erm any is not systematic based on  the results of 
a survey by Clements and Burns, 1992.
Guarantees from  guarantee banks in  Germ any are not used  very extensively 
in  the case of start ups b u t confine themselves to developm ent capital. 78 
percent of guarantees in Germ any are used for the purposes of developm ent 
capital as opposed to 13 percent in the area of start u ps11. H ow ever, all 
G erm an banks found them  a useful expedient in the case of riskier smaller 
enterprises w hich had  good cash flow  and good business plans bu t lacked 
tangible assets. These "know  how  - no capital" com panies accounted for 9 
percent of all guarantees.
It is m y belief that such guarantees are facilitate banks in  extending 
developm ent capital. However, the G erm an Laender system  w ith  each Land 
dispensing its ow n system  of guarantees depending on the am ount of private 
capital from  industrial trade organisations invested in the guarantee banks 
cannot easily be transferred to Ireland unless there is a willingness by 
G overnm ent to accommodate a loss of 22 percent of the guaranteed  am ount12. 
In G erm any funds from  the European Restructuring Program m e are used for 
this purpose. In m y opinion, Ireland does no t have a sim ilar institutional
11 Bürgschaftsbank Baden-Württemberg, Annual Report, 1994
12 Buergschaftsbank Baden Wuerttemberg Gmbh. Mittelstaendische Beteiligungsgesellschaft 
Baden Wuerttemberg Gmbh; Geschaeftsbericht, 1994. SME Venture Capital and Guarantee 
Bank Annual Report, 1994.
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fram ew ork com prising Cham bers of Commerce and  G uilds w hich w ould  
perm it the adoption of the G erm an system  of m utual guarantees.
Of the 5 Irish banks interview ed by me, 4 signalled their w illingness to enter 
into a scheme to the SBA system  in  the US. I do not see any aversion on the 
side of the Irish banks to supporting  a 3.1 percent fallout rate on a loan w hich 
carries a 70 percent G overnm ent backed guarantee.
The second issue investigated w as w hether G erm an banks incur m ore fallout 
on advances to small enterprises than  their Irish counterparts. A higher 
fallout on  the banks' portfolio could be indicative of the bank lending to 
riskier groups or being less likely to ration credit. Similarly, the level of 
provisioning for bad debts w as explored, a h igh level being suggestive of a 
riskier lending strategy.
One Irish bank furnished a figure of 1 percent w hich related to its fallout on 
"norm al"13 borrow er groups. It furnished a separate figure of 3 to 4 percent 
which relates to its fallout on riskier borrow ers served by its Developm ent 
Unit. A lthough m any banks dem urred  to offer estim ates on the level of their 
fallout sim ply because they d id  not know  them  or in  observance of 
confidentiality requirem ents, of the 5 G erm an banks offering estimates, 2 
incurred a fallout h igher than  the Irish fallout for norm al borrow ers. One of
13 All groups with exception of those in Enterprise Development Unit
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these sam e 2 banks sustained a higher fallout for riskier borrow er groups 
while the other sustained a fallout similar to the Enterprise D evelopm ent Unit 
of the Irish bank. One of these 2 w as the local branch of a savings bank and 
the other a local branch of the D resdner bank. It is interesting that both of 
these banks operated  at local as opposed to regional level. The branch of the 
D resdner bank, w hich is a  large Germ an commercial bank incurred the 
highest fallout on its portfolio of advances to small custom ers am ounting to 6 
percent of all advances being unrecoverable. The interesting fact to emerge, a 
fact w hich deserves m ore em pirical research in  the form  of a larger sample 
size, is th a t savings banks and  co-operative banks are renow ned in Germ any 
for serving riskier elem ents of small business. If this hypothesis w ere to stand 
the acid test of reality, savings banks and  co-operative banks w ould exhibit 
higher fallout on their advances than  branches of norm al, commercial banks14 
in  Germ any. This d id  not happen  in  this instance.
The other interesting com m ent which m ust be m ade regarding fallout on 
advances is that a guarantee bank sustained a fallout on its portfolio of 
advances of 3 percent. This fallout corresponds to the low er param eter of 
fallout on the portfolio of the Irish bank Enterprise D evelopm ent Unit. It is 
m y opinion that the Irish bank in question has served this riskier segm ent 
small enterprises better than its G erm an counterpart. This Irish bank exhibits 
com parable fallout on  its portfolio of "norm al borrow ers". It also serves a
14 Such as the branch of the Dresdner Bank in this instance
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segment catered for by a G erm an guarantee bank. This G erm an guarantee 
bank is in receipt of ERP funds w hich are used to com pensate it for any losses 
it m ay incur. It is incum bent on the G erm an guarantee banks to support 
riskier custom ers w hile the Irish commercial bank w hich serves the same 
palette of custom ers is not in receipt of governm ent assistance on  this 
scheme. It cannot be expected of Irish banks that "they compete against 
G erm an banks, given that G erm an banks are facilitated by guarantee banks.
One m ay argue that the Enterprise Developm ent Units set up  by Irish banks 
cater for a m inority of small enterprises corresponding to 2 to 3 percent of its 
total portfolio of advances to corporate borrow ers. The loans in value term s 
guaranteed by G erm an guarantee banks correspond to approxim ately 3 
percent of all bank advances. Does this suggest that Enterprise Developm ent 
Units in Ireland are fulfilling a function w hich is perform ed by guarantee 
banks in Germany? The au thor believes that they are, w hich if correct 
indicates that Irish banks have undertaken  to enter into cash flow and 
relationship banking, since it w as one of a lim ited num ber of options open to 
them  w hen dealing w ith  riskier small enterprises.
6.4 The re la tionsh ip  betw een  sm all businesses and  th e ir  banks
It w ould be reasonable to expect that close ties w ith a bank in the form  of 
prom inent banking relationships w ould give rise to low er m onitoring costs 
and relaxed collateral requirem ents.
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G erm an banks are w idely perceived to enjoy such advantageous term s w hich 
em anate from  house bank relationships.
From  the au thor's  interview s, the local branches of savings banks and  co­
operative banks m ost closely approxim ated traditional house bank behaviour 
in  that they proved m ore conciliatory w hen the firm  w as confronted w ith  
liquidity difficulties than  their big bank counterparts. Their com m itm ent to 
ailing firms extended only to firms w ith  prospects of recovery. Firms w hich 
exhibited strategic, m anagerial or industry  specific w eaknesses w ere less 
certain of the continued support of their respective house banks.
The advice extended by Irish banks under the auspices of Special Lending 
D epartm ents appears to be m ore clearly targeted than th a t of their Germ an 
banking counterparts in tha t for example certain loan officers are designated 
as agricultural advisors. A lthough the m erits of this system  of dem arcating 
inform ation m ay have been d ispu ted  by Bannock and  Albach (1991), the Irish 
system  represents an effort to offer spectrally specific advice w hich is not 
evident in  Germany.
Clements and Burns (1992) concluded that relationships betw een G erm an 
businesses and their banks have a tendency to be informal although 
surveillance of ow ner m anaged firms w hich perhaps represent the smaller
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size categories is m ore intense. This is evidenced by the fact that 92 percent of 
these subm it annual accounts com pared w ith 53 percent on  average.
In the Bank of Ireland Enterprise Support Unit, cash flow statem ents are 
subm itted on a m onthly basis by the firm. This close surveillance makes 
relaxed collateral requirem ents possible and  m o s t ' closely approxim ates 
"relationship banking" ra ther than  "transactions cost" banking.
In view of the fact that G erm an banks appear to have m ore relaxed reporting 
requirem ents than  Irish banks, it follows tha t the em phasis on collateral or 
"frontline security" such as the en trepreneur's house could be used to 
safeguard the G erm an banks against default by the firm. G erm an bankers 
indicated that due to the fact tha t the accounts of a small business are no t very 
transparent, such security is necessary particularly in  the case of riskier 
enterprises such as start ups.
All Germ an banks interview ed m aintained that a healthy cash flow w ere the 
m ost im portant prerequisite to m aintaining a loan, an  assertion w hich is 
contradicted by G erm an small firms w ho believed that G erm an banks place 
collateral second on the list of priorities behind total balance sheet assets.
It can be concluded that perhaps local savings banks and  co-operatives are 
m ost concerned about the long term  health of small businesses in Germ any
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since they are m ost instrum ental in m aintaining house bank relationships bu t 
that unlike in the case of Irish banks, there rem ains a heavy em phasis on 
personal collateral as a  m eans to secure a loan.
6.5 Implications of this survey
The m ain conclusions of this survey could be ennum erated under the 
following three m ain points.
Firstly, assertions as to the extraordinary influence of banks in G erm any over 
the perform ance of businesses via supervisory board  representation w hich 
ensure equity participation by the banks in  G erm an firms apply to a lim ited 
num ber of G erm an businesses. The legal requirem ent for supervisory boards 
assumes a m inim um  of 500 em ployees and  is no t invoked in the case of 
smaller businesses or partnerships of w hich there are m any in  Germany. 
Similarly, small firm s in  Germ any, by v irtue of their fragm ented nature do 
not issue equity unless this takes the form  of quasi equity in the guise of 
unlisted securities w hich are bought by G overnm ent guarantee banks in some 
instances.
Secondly, G erm an banks have longer tim e horizons than Irish banks as 
w itnessed in the proportion  of firms w ith  long term  loans bu t this longer tim e 
horizons are argued by some industrial econom ists as no t being desirable
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both from  the perspective of banks as well as firms which present good credit 
risks.
In 1994, the percentage of long term  loans am ounted to 42 percent in 
Germ any com pared to 13 percent in Ireland. The similarly high proportion of 
State sponsored long term  loan program m es am ounting to 13 percent versus 
1 percent suggests th a t the G erm an G overnm ent facilitates commercial banks 
to a greater extent. A n exam ple of such a subsidised loan w hich is extended 
to start ups is Eigenkapitalhilfeprogramme or "O w ners equity assistance 
program m e". This entails a 20 year loan for fixed capital purposes w ith  an 
interest m oratoria and  is largely State sponsored.
O n the same issue of long term  lending, evidence was presented by various 
other authors w ho argue tha t small businesses w hen  analysed in a tw o period 
m odel w ould choose a short term  loan and  renegotiate successive short term  
loans in sequential periods at better terms. The theory postulates that 
businesses w hich present good risks w ould  prefer not lock them selves into a 
long term  credit contract w ith  a house bank. This theory detracts from  the 
m uch advocated value of long termism.
The final conclusion w hich can be m ade is the fact that contrary to 
expectations, even traditional house banks in Germ any which are heavily 
involved w ith  small businesses underlined the im portance attached to
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collateral in securing loans. The Enterprise D evelopm ent Units attached to 
Irish banks approxim ate m ost the idea of prom inent bank relationships 
prevailing in Germany. These relationships are sustained based on enhanced 
inform ation and  cash flow as opposed to balance sheet or "transactions" 
based loan appraisal.
Due to com petitive pressures in Germ any betw een the traditional lenders to 
small enterprises represented by the savings bank and  co-operative bank 
sector and banks w hich historically have focused on larger enterprises, an 
example of which being the Dresdner, Deutsche and  Com m erz banks, savings 
banks are anxious to adopt special units dealing w ith  small, technological or 
enterprises w ith  a high cash flow to tangible asset basis. These Units w ould  
perform  the same function of the Irish Enterprise D evelopm ent Units.
The fact that the G erm an savings banks are now  considering introducing such 
Enterprise D evelopm ent Units suggests the progressive nature of Irish banks.
The unique advantage of the G erm an banking system  over the Irish system  
could lie in the assistance given the banks by guarantee banks, Cham bers of 
Industry and Commerce and the Craft Chambers. The evidence from 
interviews held w ith  these institutions and  the banks them selves indicated a 
vast am ount of co-operation from  such industrial, self -help groups. The
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banks are not isolated players in Germany but one autonomous component in 
an organised, coherent whole.
It will be interesting to see if this structure will w ithstand the im pact of the 
first deep seated recession to affect G erm any since the beginning of the 
Second W orld War. The fact that the savings banks are already seeking to 
em ulate the Enterprise Developm ent Units indicates that the Irish banks 
w hether consciously or not have set a precedent and are m ore innovative than 
has been acknow ledged to date.
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Interviews were held with the following institutions in Ireland and 
Germany.
The nam es of respondants are not disclosed for reasons of confidentiality:
Allied Irish Bank Executive from  area of small business 
banking
Baden-W ürttem bergische Bank Loan officer 
At local level in  BW
Bank of Ireland
Bayerische Vereinsbank 
M ünich head  office
Executive from  Enterprise Support U nit 
Loan officer
Cooperative bank 
At regional level in BW
Cooperative bank 
At local level in  BW
Officer for industry  and  trade lending
Loan officer
Deloitte and  Touche Executive
D resdner bank 
Local branch in BW
C orporate accounts officer
D resdner bank 
Frankfurt head office
Loan officer in area of developm ent finance
Forfas Executive
Guarantee and  V enture Capital Loan officer 
Bank, BW
ICC Bank 
Institut für
M ittelstandsforschung
Irish Bankers' Inform ation 
Service
Lending executive
Representative of G erm an institute for 
SME research in Bonn
Director General
L-Bank
G uarantee bank to BW
D evelopm ent finance
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Landesbank BW 
N ational Irish Bank 
O ' Riada Stockbrokers 
Private G erm an bank
Reutlingen Cham ber of 
Industry and Commerce
Savings bank
At clearing bank level in BW 
Savings bank
Bonn head office of association
Savings bank
At local level in Hessen
Savings bank 
At local level in BW
Trustee Savings Bank
Ulster Bank
W arth & Klein Gmbh. 
D üsseldorf
Loan officer to larger SMEs 
Executive from  area of retail business 
Executive
H ead of supervisory board and m anaging 
partner
Firm advisor
Corporate advisor and loan officer
Executive
Loan officer
Loan officer
Executive from area of credit assessm ent 
Executive from  area of retail services 
A uditor
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Appendix 4.2.1 Sample Irish Questionnaire
Draft Questionnaire
For Mr. X of the AIB bank.
• According to the Irish Bankers' Federation, in  1992 the m ain commercial 
banks have been losing 1 m illion per w eek on bad debts incurred by 
defaulting small enterprises. H as the attrition rate, in  your opinion, 
dim inished since then?
• W hat is the default rate of AA borrow ers vis a vis AAA borrowers?
• Is there a link betw een the exposure to AA borrow ers and  the m agnitude 
of the bad  debt provision?
• In 1995, Allied Irish Bank decreased its bad  debt provision to just 0.25% of 
total loan advances. Bank of Ireland had  a less conservative bad  debt 
provision of 0.11%. If, as your Chief Executive Thomas M ulcahy asserts, the 
reason for this decrease in  bad debt provision is ascribed to you bank's 
investm ent in  better credit grading system s will this m ean in the future 
fewer small industrial SME's obtaining finance at A A rates bu t rather 
translating the better loan appraisal into higher handling charges?
(Business and Finance, 23 February 1995 )
• Does AIB's higher bad debt provision reflect in  your opinion a greater 
exposure to AA custom ers than  the Bank of Ireland?
• By w hat fraction does the bad  debt provision increase as the exposure to 
A A borrow ers increases?
In 1995 ( Business and Finance, 23 February) Thom as M ulcahy of A IB ;
" A good portion  of the bad debt will come from  loans w ith  a life of less than
2 years". Does this im ply tha t m ost bad  debts are incurred in start up
situations w hereby com panies receive short term  loans?
• Are they less securitized?
• W ith w hich collateral types w ould the majority of loans for w orking capital 
to small industrial enterprises be secured;
Life assurance 
Proprieters' house 
Business assets
Claim on com pany book debts
A 1
• Can you give a w eighting to the differing ability of each collateral type to 
be cover the principal? E.g business assets to the value of £ 100,000 can
cover a loan of £ 80,000. This gives the category business assets a w eighting of 
80%.
• W hy have so m any bad debts accrued on loans of less than  tw o years if 
m any of these, I imagine, are extended by the bank in  the form  of Credit 
Line finance?
• Deloitte and  Touche in their 1992 Report entitled " Review o f Irish SME's" 
interview ed 400 firms from  the SME sector. They indicated in their 
conclusions th a t there was a need for m edium  term  finance for the purpose 
of w orking capital to be supplied  by the banks.
It has already been stated above that there seem to be m any bad debts 
accruing to banks on loans of less than  tw o years. In  Germ any, the State 
guarantee banks can securitise a loan to a m axim um  of 70%, the commercial 
bank taking the rem aining 30%. The fee charged for this service is norm ally a 
0 .5 -1 %  processing charge along w ith  an  interest prem ium  of approx. 0.5 - 
0.75% per annum .
Deloitte and  Touche proposed a  p rem ium  of 0.5 -1.5% per annum  bu t d id  not 
m ention a processing charge.
In the opinion of your bank w ould  the introduction of either of these 
guarantees defray the percentage loss accruing to Irish banks on loans to 
small industrial enterprises?
According to the US Small Business A dm inistration ( reported in Deloitte and 
Touche, 1992), the loss rate on SB A loan guarantees was as low  as 3.1% in 1989. 
"These projects w ould  not m eet the full lending criteria of the banks for lack 
of collateral reasons."
• Could your bank entertain such a loss rate?
• Do you feel that the loss rate of Irish industries w ould deviate from  this 
Am erican average?
• If so, in w hich way?
• Is profitability a good indicator of the ability of small industrial firms to 
repay loans?
H ow is an average SME profitability of 4.6% viewed by the AIB bank?
A 2
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Working capital issues by Sector
Number of firms
Category Sought increase in Obtained Have Need
last 2 yrs increase in difficulty further
last 2 years operating WC within
I within WC next year
limits
Food and Drink 27.1 79 58.8 94.8
Electronics and 43.7 57 64.3 73.8
Engineering
Chemicals and 29.3 70 58.8 88.2
Pharmaceuticals : . |
Textiles and Clothing 52.6 65 70 75
Paper and Packaging 25 75 37.5 75
Services and Distribution 28 77 55.5 667
Source; O wn calculations from data extracted from Deloitte and Touche
( P. 50 Review of Irish SME's, 1993 )
• Why, in your opinion, have the Services Sector and Food and Drink sector 
such a low  proportion of applicants for w orking capital and of these 
applicants such a high num ber of acceptances?
• W ith the introduction of a loan guarantee scheme w hich w ould guarantee 
commercial bank loans to the m agnitude of 70% is it possible the relatively 
high rejection rate of 43% exhibited by the engineering sector could be 
brought into line w ith the low er rejection of 23% represented by the 
services sector?
• Does the AIB bank have any com m ents it may w ish to m ake on the 
viability of such a scheme or propose m odifications to it?
A 3
Appendix 4.2.2 Sample German Questionnaire in  original format
88 Fragebogenentw urf
An Herrn X von der X Bank.
Abschnitt 1 Fremdkapital/ Eigenkapital
• N ach A ngaben der Bundesbank M onatsstatistik beträgt das
D urchschnittseigenkapitalm ittelquote 18% und  angesichts einiger Firm en mit 
w eniger als 50 Angestellten beträgt kann das Prozzentsatz auf 15% sinken. 
U nterscheidet sich Ihrer E rfahrung nach das F /  E Verhältnis besonders bei 
jungen, innovativen U nternehm en von den obigen Angaben?
Ja □
• Wie hoch ist die Rate, Ihrer M einung nach?
Nein □
H alten Sie das in D eutschland bestehende F rem dkap ita l/ Eigenkapital 
Verhältnis, das junge, innovative U nternehm en aufweisen, für befriedigend?
Ja Nein □
Abschnitt 2 Sicherheit
Beigefügt finden Sie eine Liste von verschiedenen Sicherheiten ( Tabelle A2) , 
die gegebenfalls bei der Sicherung eines Darlehens zum  Einsatz kom m en. Bitte 
weisen Sie den  einzelnen Sicherheiten Ihr jeweiliges Gewicht sowie die A rt des 
Kredites (Dauer, U m laufverm ögen vis ä vis A nlageverm ögen ) und  die 
H äufigkeit Ihres Einsatzes zu.
Abschnitt 3
Risikovorsorge & uneinbringliche 
Forderungen
U nten befinden sich zwei verschiedene Prozentzahlen. Die erste Prozentzahl 
entspricht den norm alen Verlusten, die eine irische Bank bei Darlenensvergabe 
erleidet. M an sollte dabei in Erw ägung ziehen, daß 50% des Gesam twertes ihres 
Kreditportfolios sich aus K rediten an  Firmen m it w eniger als 50 Angestellten 
besteht.
Die Vergabe von K rediten an "norm ale" K unden w eist eine Prozentzahl von 
höchstens 1% uneinbringliche Forderungen als Anteil von gesam ten 
Forderungen auf. (1  % entspricht dem  Break - Even - P u n k t)
A 4
Übertrifft diese Prozentzahl Ihre eigene Ausfallquote? 
Ja □ Nein □
Die Vergabe von K rediten an  ausgew ählten Firmen, die von deren "Special 
Loan D epartm ent" betreu t w ird, w eist eine Prozentzahl von höchstens 3 - 4 %  
uneinbringlicher Forderungen als Anteil an gesam ten Forderungen auf.
Ja □  N ein □
Wie charakterisieren Sie von einer Risikovorsorge im  Rahm en von 0.11 % bzw.
0.54% aller gegenüber Forderungen U nternehm en bestehender?
Konservativ □  Liberal □
A bschnitt 4 A usw ertung des Projekts eines jungen ,
innovativen  U nternehm ens
Kom m t es oftmals vor, daß Volksbanken bzw. Raiffeisenbanken den  K reditantrag 
eines jungen, innovativen U nternehm ens von einem  m it Technologie vertrau ten  
Experten ausw erten lassen?
Ja □  N ein □
Verfügen Sie vielleicht über A ngaben in bezug auf die Prozentzahl Ihrer 
Bankbranche, inw ieweit sie m it folgendem  Personal ausgestattet ist?
Ja □  Nein □
"Special loan departm ents ", die auf junge, innovative U nternehm en 
ausgerichtet sind.
Ja O  Nein □
"Special loan departm ents ", die auf den  m ittelständischen Sektor ausgerichtet 
sind.
Ja □  Nein □
Experten (die z. B m it Technologie vertrau t sind), die im Fall der A usw ertung 
des A ntrags eines jungen, innovativen U nternehm ens herangezogen werden.
Ja □  
A 5
N ein □
A bschnitt 5 Wettbewerb unter Banken
• Hat die gegenwärtige, anfängliche Rezession, der sich Banken jetzt 
gegenüber sehen, zu geringeren Margen geführt?
Ja □  Nein □
H at es dazu geführt, daß einige Anträge von risikobehafteten Firm en zu 
günstigeren K reditbedingungen akzeptiert w urden?
Ja □  Nein □
A 6
Tabelle 2
Art der Sicherheit Deckungsfähigkeit Art der Kredit
z.B
Haus des Unternehmers 60% "principle" + Bearbeitungskosten 
processing charge
Langfristiges Darlehen 
i.e 5 - 1 0  years
Geldanlagens
A ktien und  W ertpapier
H aus des Unternehm ens
Bürgschaften von D ritten
Bürgschaften von Bürgschaftsbanken
A btretung von K undenforderungen
A ndere
A 7
Appendix 4.3.3 Sample German Questionnaire (translated into English)
from the German
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Q uestionnaire
To Mr. X from the X bank.
Section 1 D ebt/ Equity
• According to the Bundesbank M onthly Stataistics of Novem ber, 1995, 
germ an SMEs in general exhibit levels of ow ners' equity am ounting to 18% 
of the total capitalisation of the firm. In the case of enterprises w ith  less than 
50 employees, this can sink to 15%. Does this percentage accord w ith  your 
lending experience?
Yes □ No □
If the answ er is no, how  high is the proportion, in  your opinion.
Do you find the prevailing d eb t/ equity ratio exhibited by young, fast 
grow th enterprises satisfactory?
Yes □ No □
Section 2 Security
Enclosed please find a list of the different types of collateral w hich can be used 
to secure a loan. (Table A2). Please assign to each security type its respective 
w eighting in  addition  to the type of the loan being covered by this security. 
(Duration, w hether it is used for w orking capital purposes) and also the 
frequency w ith  w hich you use this collateral.
Section 3
Bad debt provision and 
unrecoverable claims
Beneath you will find tw o different percentages. The first percentage 
corresponds to the norm al default rate of a bank 's portfolio of corporate 
customers. Please take note tha t 50% of the loanbook in  value term s comprises 
firms w ith  less than 50 employees.
The loan portfolio corresponding to "norm al custom ers" exhibits a fallout of 1% 
of advances in value term s as a percentage of its total value. (1% is the break­
even point)
Does this value excees your ow n fallout rate on such customers?
A 8
Yes Q No □
The extension of loans to firm s belonging to an  "Enterprise Developm ent Unit" 
sustains a 3-4% fallout rate on total advances in value terms. Does this exceed 
your fallout rate to riskier custom er groups, exam ples of which being firms 
w hich are lacking in  tangible assets?
Yes □  No □
H ow  w ould  you characterise risk provisions against general risk am ounting to
0.11% and 0.54% of total advances?
Conservative □  Liberal □
Section 4 Appraisal of the loan application of a
young, innovative enterprise
Does the occasion often present itself that a savings bank (particular banking 
type m entioned here) appoints an expert fam iliar w ith  technology to evaluate 
the viability of a loan application?
Yes □  No □
If the answ er is affirmative, do you have statistics pertaining to branches of 
your bank w hich relate to the num ber of such persons evaluating loan 
applications?
Yes □  No □
Do you have "Enterprise D evelopm ent Units" (Explain the term) w hich perm it 
close surveillance of the small com panies involved?
Yes □  No □
A 9
Do you have special bank divisions geared specifically towards dealing with 
smaller firms?
Yes □  N o □
Section 5 Competition among banks
• Has the recession prevailing at the moment lead to narrower bank margins? 
Yes □  N o □
• Has it induced G erm an bankers to extend riskier loan applicants more 
favourable credit terms?
Yes □  No □
A 10
Table A2
Type of Security W eighting Maturity of loan
i.e
Owner's residence Covers thè loan principle to 60% plus a 
processing charge
Long term loan 
Le 5 -1 0  years
Cash deposits
Gilts, bonds and shares
O w ner's residence
G uarantees from th ird  parties
G uarantees from  guarantee banks
Charge on debtor's ledger
O ther *
A 11
